Deepwater Horizon

Deepwater energy exploration and production, particularly at the frontiers of experience, involve risks for which neither industry nor government has been adequately prepared, but for which they can and must be prepared in the future. 

The oil industry has said the Deepwater Horizon rig catastrophe was a unique event, the result of an unprecedented series of missteps that are unlikely to be repeated. The recent history of offshore drilling suggests otherwise. 

The above quotation from the Wall Street foumal cites a munber of events and near-misses that occurred worldwide in a 12-month period prior to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. The frequency of such events suggests that the move to evermore-technically-challenging conditions (particularly drilling in deep water) have created problems that have not been fully overcome. Incidents that the article described included the following  

Furthermore, the issues raised by Deepwater Horizon are not confined to the offshore oil and gas industry. At the time of writing, the consequences of the severe damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plants in Japan are still being ascertained. But it is clear that those consequences will be profound substantial quantities of radioactive materials have been released, a significant fraction of Japan s power-generating capability is lost forever, and the cost of clean-up and remediation is going to be enormous. Indeed, the Fukushima accident may result in a massive slowdown in the construction 

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Another example occurred in the Deepwater Horizon accident. Reports after the accident indicated that workers felt comfortable raising safety concerns and ideas for safety improvement to managers on the rig, but they felt that they could not raise concerns at the divisional or corporate level without reprisal. In a confidential survey of workers on Deepwater Horizon taken before the oil platform exploded, workers expressed concerns about safety ... 

Undersea drifting provides the possibility of oil being released into the ocean from below, rather than above, the surface. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil rig explosion created an undersea oil spill of nearly 5 million barrels ( 6 X 10 kg)... 

On 20 April 2010, the offshore drilling unit Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, and the resulting loss of oil led to worldwide attention on the possibility of a global ecological catastrophe. 

Deepwater Horizon/ Macondo, Gulf of Mexico Explosion and fire leading to nine fatalities, a massive environmental spill, and enormous financial loss. 

He is equally scathing about estimates of consequence. He believes that the consequences of events such as Deepwater Horizon or Fukushima—Daiichi will always be much more serious that estimated in the risk management models. 

On an offshore platform, however, the persons who are not on duty are still present, and they may be killed or injured. Many of the deaths on the Piper Alpha platform, for example, were of off-duty crew who were sleeping, and who could not escape from the Living Quarters. By contrast, 25 years later, when the explosion and fire occurred on the Deepwater Horizon platform, 11 men died instantly, but the other 135 persons on board survived the blast and subsequent fire. This is an indication that the safety measures that have been designed into platforms in the years following Piper have had a positive effect on safety improvement. 

If the worst happens, and there is a big release of oil or gas to the ocean, industry needs to be able to respond quickly and effectively. The Deepwater Horizon incident demonstrated that such a response capability was not in place—it took industry 3 months to cap the leak from the damaged well head and to direct the flow of oil to a safe location. The National Commission report to the President (discussed in detail in the next chapter) says the following about that event. 

Just as the events of April 20, 2010, exposed a regulatory regime that had not kept up with the industry it was responsible for overseeing, the events that unfolded in the subsequent weeks and months made it dismayingly clear that neither BP nor the federal government was prepared to deal with a spill of the magnitude and complexity of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 

The Report to the President concerning the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe discussed the creation of an industry-sponsored agency analogous to the nuclear industry s independent Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) that was created in the wake of the Three Mile Island event. The President s Commission to do with that event said the following. 

Given this background, the API created the COS following Deepwater Horizon. The intent is that the center will supplement and complement formal regulations, and would have a relationship to Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and the other agencies analogous to that between INPO and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

A major component of each reprat that has followed the Deepwater Horizon explosion and resulting oil spill is the recommendation to iminove the safety culture upon the Outer Continental Shelf. An analysis of these reports is provided in an upcoming OTC paper. 

With occupational safety measurement is fairly simple recordables and other statistics provide a reliable indication of how a company is doing and how it compares to others. The measurement of results with regard to Process Safety is much more tricky. But the measurement problem is even more severe when it comes to the topic of culture. In particular it is very difficult to assess people are people issues. For example, one of the reports that was written following the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe (BOEMRE, 2011) records in some detail the tension that existed between two of the managers and publishes some of the emails that were sent prior to the event. These clashes illustrate the difficulties of implementing a positive culture, particularly when personalities clash or department managers are squabbling with one another. 

Senior managers are concerned primarily with long-term issues. With respect to risk, they are particularly sensitive to the potential for major environmental and safety events such as the Exxon Valdez spill, the refinery explosion at Texas City, or the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo catastrophe. 

Contract companies vary enormously in size. Some of them are small organizations that are on board just to carry out tasks that are hmited in scope and number. However, other contractors—as was seen on Deepwater Horizon—are not only large, but they are responsible for much of the high-risk work that is carried out on rigs and drill rigs. Clearly, there cannot be a one-size-fits-all contractor management program in such circumstances. 

A fine example of effective stoiytelling is provided in a paper (Espinosa-Gala, 2004) that features the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo tragedy in human terms. 

It is unusual for a process safety event to involve conflict between people (although it was a factor in the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe). However, conflicting departmental goals are often a factor— particularly the perceived clash between safety and getting the job done. We may instill the mantra There s always time to do a job safely into people. But they do not always behave that way. 

The stories we tell should have a resolution. In the case of major events such as Piper Alpha or Deepwater Horizon, the resolution could be new ways of managing safety (Safety Cases) or the introduction of new regulations (SEMS). Even less dramatic stories should always provide guidance to better behaviors or improved management systems. 

For those primarily concerned with the financial costs and opportunities from the planned change, it is good to note the severe financial consequences of process safety incidents, such as the Deepwater Horizon incident. According to a CCPS study, in the... 

None of the interviewed persons demanded a new risk reduction plan or a reappraisal of the risk in the aftermath of the accident at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. They were convinced that the knowledge basis is sufficient to reach a positive judgment and that petroleum operations in these areas will not pose different challenges from those that the Norwegian public is familiar with further south. In contrast to the lack of ambiguity in the perception of risks, there was a... 

Helge Ryggvik (Chapter 15 in this volume) notes that the number of offshore inspections in the Gulf of Mexico has dropped from the peak of 7,000 in 1994 to approximately 5,000 in 2009. Shortly before the fatal Deepwater Horizon accident, Ry ik had the opportunity to meet with Troy Trosclair, at the time the leader of all offshore safety inspectors in the Gulf of Mexico, whom Ry ik found to be frustrated because he felt he was [at the time] under pressure to reduce the number of inspections on offshore installations (Chapter 15). 

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order - National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 22 May 2010, established the Commission with a mandate to analyse the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster and to recommend options for future. 

National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (2010) The History of Offshore Oil and Gas in the United States (Long Version). Washington, DC. See also Staff Working Paper N0.22, 2010, p. 13 (hereinafter. Commission, History of Offshore). 

C. Cleveland, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, in Encyclopedia of Earth, at http //www.eoearth.org See, for example. Deepwater Horizon Court-Supervised Settlement Program at http //www.deepwa-... 

The Deepwater Horizon Disaster Insurance Market Impacts, Insurance Information Institute (June 2, 2010). 

Federal Trial Set to Decide Responsibility, Other Issues in Deepwater Horizon Case, 43 ER 496 (March 2, 2012) BP Oil Spill Trial Delayed for Settlement Talks, Reuters (February 27,2012). Secretarial Order n. 3302, U.S. Dept, of Interior (June 18,2oro). 

Final Report, National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling (January 11, 20ir) (http //www.oilspillcommission.gov/), and staff working papers, (often referred to as the Presidential Commission ). 

Final Report on the Investigation of the Macondo Well Blowout, Deepwater Horizon Study Croup, University of California (March r, 2orr), http //ccrm.berkeley.edu/deepwaterhorizonstudygroup/dhsg reportsandtestimony.shtml... 

Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Selected Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service (May 27,2010). 

Macondo Well Deepwater Horizon Blowout Lessons for Improving Offshore Drilling Safety, Marine Board, National Academy of Engineering (2012), 115. 

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