Command-and-control regulations

Moreover, in the 1970s, air, water, and waste were treated as separate problem areas to be governed by their own statutes and regulations. Toward the latter part of the decade, however, it became obvious that environmental problems were closely interwoven and should be treated in concert. The traditional type of regulation—command and control—had severely restricted compliance options. 

Secondly, stmctural features in dmg regulation in countries operating a federal system of government affect the ability of the DRA to monitor dmg distribution throughout the entire country. In Australia, authority over distribution channels is fully delegated to the individual states. As a result, the TGA does not have the authority to assess and control the dmg distribution situation for the whole country. In contrast, the Pharmaceutical Services Division in Malaysia appoints a deputy director of health in each of its 13 states with power to issue licences, carry out inspections and submit reports. Under this arrangement, command and control may be exercised and an official channel established for information flow between the federal and state governments. 

The primary goals of the project were to provide leadership in environmental stewardship and flexibility in regulation as an alternative to the command and control approach enumerated in the Cluster Rules (promulgated in 1998). The project, designated International Paper Effluent Improvements Project, was conducted at the International Paper (IP) Androscoggin Paper Mill in Jay, Maine (Figure 21.9) between the project start date of July 29, 2000, and its formal conclusion on December 29, 2004.81... 

Finally, I consider whether command-and-control regulation by government agencies enhances the efficient use of information. Said differently, should we permit individuals to ignore government recommendations about private goods ... 

Governments assist in the acquisition of information by funding and conducting basic research. Under command-and-control regulation, however, government agencies also use information to set behavior standards. 

The best mix of liability rules, information markets, and regulations varies across commodities even if efficiency is the only criterion. Because all are suboptimal in practice, the proper mix also depends on people s inefficiency preferences. Asserting that one values individual liberty eliminates only command-and-control regulation from the set of possibilities. Under the right circumstances, no liability, the negligence rule, strict liability, and strict liability with contributory negligence all promote individual liberty. On balance, 1 favor no liability or the negligence rule because 1 believe the adverse side effects of sfrict liability are too severe. 

Regulation could duplicate emissions-market results, but most scholars doubt that it does so in practice. Command-and-control regulation, as practiced by the EPA, does not remotely resemble the maximization of expected years of life saved. Instead, two characteristics prevent regulation from easily imitating market results (Crandall 1983). 

Second, regulations do not allow emissions reduction to vary across emitters. Instead, all emissions must be reduced by some fixed percentage or to a specified level. To achieve a given reduction in ambient exposure at lowest cost, however, requires that those emissions that are cheapest to reduce be cut back first. That would occur naturally in an emissions-rights market but not under command-and-control regulations that mandate specific reductions for each emitter. 

Unlike the continuous nature of emissions markets, command-and-control regulation has a dichotomous legal orientation. Exposure below the standard is okay, but exposure above the standard... 

In the case of chemical exposures that are private goods, government (to the extent that it does anything at all) should limit its activities to the provision of information so individuals can decide for themselves which risks to bear. Command-and-control regulations inhibit the development of robust private information markets because people think that if a product is for sale, the government must have checked it out to ensure that its benefits were greater than its harms. 

Command-and-control regulation is a rather blunt instrument for achieving an efficient level of public exposure. Its primary defect is its inability to allow emissions to vary across emitters in proportion to their marginal costs of abatement. That inability raises the cost of any specific level of ambient exposure reduction. Empirical analysis of regulatory decisions suggests that agencies are sensitive to the costs and benefits of risk reduction but demand far more reducfion in public exposure risks than individuals require for private risks. 

In my view, emissions rights are superior to bureaucratic regulation. Current command-and-control standards should be converted into equivalent tradeable emissions rights, and then common-law suits should handle disputes that result over their use. 

Command-and-control processes are the traditional way in which environmental pollution has been regulated. In typical form, this will amount to a license to emit a chemical or waste product to the environment but with conditions attached to the license that limit the quantity that can be released. Discharge consents to water are an example of this type of measure. 

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