Proliferation-Critical Knowledge

According to the open-source empirical record, there have been clear examples of demand for Russia s NBC weapons knowledge. For example, in the nuclear sector, the agreement that Iran has with Minatom to build the light-water reactor at Bushehr is an example of the demand for Russian nuclear expertise, but not specifically weapons expertise. Given that Iran has vast natural reserves of oil and has attempted to enrich uranium to weapons-useable levels, Bushehr could well be a means for Iran to get plutonium for nuclear weapons. 

In the early 1990s, leaders of Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese religious cult that in 1995 attacked riders on the Tokyo subway with a sarin nerve agent, made numerous trips to Russia.The group s leader in charge of weapons procurement made 21 trips to Russia between 1992 and 1995. Group leaders frequently met with senior government officials, such as the secretary of Russian Security Council, the Parliament speaker, and vice 

The International Atomic Agency has recently revealed that Iran has produced small quantities of highly enriched uranium. See Peter Slevin and Joby Warrick, Iran Faulted on Nuclear Declaration, The Washington Post, Wednesday, Febmary 25, 2004, http //www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/ A3297-2004Feb24.html (as of April 29, 2004). 

Congress, Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Parti, Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, pp. 72-73. 

Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda movement he helped create sought nuclear weapons capabilities throughout the 1990s. A number of reports indicated that al-Qaeda 

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This section examines sources of the supply of personnel with proliferation-critical knowledge who may divert their expertise to proliferant states and terrorist groups. A key question that this section addresses is the size of the pool of NBC weapons expertise in the former Soviet Union. Unfortunately, there is little confirmable data on the number of personnel in the NBC weapons complexes, and estimates of these numbers vary widely, particularly for the chemical and biological complexes. 

Another way to think about the supply of proliferation-critical knowledge in the former Soviet Union is to examine the types of individuals that are in the complexes and the knowledge they possess that would be useful to states or terrorist groups seeking to acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or the know-how to develop their own weapons. 

FSU personnel who possess proliferation-critical knowledge include more than just top NBC experts... 

Demand for proliferation-critical knowledge can vary significantly among the various types of proliferants... 

Evidence exists of diverse demand for FSU proliferation-critical knowledge and materials... 

Incentives, although they are fewer in number, may feel more tangible to personnel with proliferation-critical knowledge or satisfy more immediate needs, and thus may lead to proliferation of weapons knowledge ... 

Our threat assessment focuses attention on former Soviet NBC facilities that are of greater concern with regard to proliferation because they have a concentration of weapons-critical expertise and are experiencing substantial economic distress with limited prospects for improvement. For illustrative purposes, the list above provides some examples of NBC facilities in which Type I through Type V personnel could have increased incentives for undertaking illicit knowledge transfer of proliferation-critical expertise (e g., weapons-critical or other enabling information). 

Finally, there remains the fact that the countries of the former Soviet Union are not the only source of weapons expertise or information available to seekers, as Pakistan has shown. Secondary proliferation seems to have been more extensive than diversion from the FSU countries. To some extent, this secondary proliferation may reduce the demand for weapons-critical knowledge from the FSU. 

The development of drugs with actions on intermediary metabolism of proliferating cells has been important both conceptually and clinically. While biochemical properties unique to all cancer cells have yet to be discovered, there are a number of quantitative differences in metabolism between cancer cells and normal cells that render cancer cells more sensitive to the antimetabolites. Many of these agents have been rationally designed and synthesized based on knowledge of critical cellular processes involved in DNA biosynthesis. 

Diversions from state-approved activities may provide significant opportunities for proliferation that equal or exceed the danger posed by illicit acquisition from the FSU. Extensive government-sponsored cooperation between FSU states, especially Russia, and regional states such as Iran, India, Libya, and Syria provides channels for officially approved and illicit transfer of critical weapons knowledge. Furthermore, secondary proliferation from China, Pakistan, and North Korea is another significant channel for the transfer of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons expertise. 

This documented briefing offers a structured assessment of the threat of NBC weapons proliferation and examines each of its key components. It examines the countries and individuals that seek to illicitly acquire expertise and sensitive knowledge as well as the institutions and types of individuals who have them. Despite fears that such diversion might occur, the empirical record of documented incidents is comparatively small. Nevertheless, the diversion of even a small number of people or a limited amount of critical information can create a significant security concern for the international community. 

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