Prohibited verification

It would be considered prudent to prohibit the premature release of product if you did not have an adequate traceability system in place. If in fact any nonconformities in a component will be detected by the end product tests, it may be worth allowing production to commence without the receipt tests being available, in which case the tests will only be confidence checks and not verification checks. If only one product is received and released prior to verification one would think that, as the requirement applies prior to verification, there is no need to positively identify the product to permit recall because you would know where it was if you found it to be nonconforming. However, the nonconformity may have been reported to you by the supplier after delivery. The standard does not stipulate when and by whom the nonconformity may have been detected. If you lose the means of determining conformity by premature release, don t release the product until you have verified it is acceptable. 

At another level, certain KBS approaches provide the mechanisms for decomposing complex interpretation problems into a set of smaller, distributed and localized interpretations. Decomposition into smaller, more constrained interpretation problems is necessary to maintain the performance of any one interpreter and it makes it possible to apply different interpretation approaches to subparts of the problem. It is well recognized that scale-up is a problem for all of the interpretation approaches described. With increases in the number of input variables, potential output conclusions, complexity of subprocess interactions, and the spatial and temporal distribution of effects, the rapidity, accuracy, and resolution of interpretations can deteriorate dramatically. Furthermore, difficulties in construction, verification, and maintenance can prohibit successful implementation. 

Quantitative RT PCR (qRT PCR) can be used to accurately determine the levels of messages within given preparations of RNA. qRT PCR thermocyclers provide rapid online detection and quantification of mRNA, however, the initial purchase cost and the cost of reagents may be prohibitive for some laboratories. Methods of semiquantitative RT PCR have been used and good descriptions of these techniques are available (Samhrook and Russell, 2001). However, the same cDNA populations should not be used for differential display reactions and verification that a potential differential display band represents a differentially expressed gene. For this reason, independent cDNA samples should be prepared if both the screening and verification methods rely on PCR. qRT PCR, therefore, should be used in conjunction with other methods to verify that a differential display band represents a differentially expressed gene. 

Nevertheless, it was events in Kurdistan in particular which fully illustrated both the ambiguity of what was banned and the absence of verification measures under the Geneva Protocol. Only use of chemical weapons was banned, not possession. In 1972 the United Nations General Assembly had adopted the Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological Weapons. Chemical weapons fell outside this convention and by 1988 it became clear that a chemical weapons treaty was urgently needed to place effective constraints on the proliferation of these weapons worldwide. 

The Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons and of their destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC) was signed on January 13, 1993, and entered into force on April 29, 1997. The CWC includes 24 Articles, the Annex on Chemicals, the Annex on Implementation and Verification (so-called Verification Annex), and the Confidentiality Annex. The Verification Annex, which by the length occupies the majority of the CWC, is written in 11 parts. Article I lists the general obligations of the CWC as shown in Figure 1. 

The States Parties to the CWC have established the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW www.opcw.org) to achieve the object and purpose of the CWC, to ensure the implementation of its provisions, including those for international verification of compliance with it, and to provide a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties (SPs). All SPs to the CWC... 

During the first session of the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which was held between 8 and 12 February 1993 in The Hague, Working Group B was established with the task of drafting procedures for verification and technical cooperation and assistance . Up to the entry... 

Sampling and analysis (S A) during inspections is one of the verification tools provided for by the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1). Chemical analysis of a sample is the only direct and scientific (and not only circumstantial) tool to confirm the presence of a chemical substance. The presence of a declared chemical in a declared place at a declared time and in declared quantities confirms the declaration provided by a State Party to the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). The actual or past presence of a chemical, which should not be at the inspected site according to the declarations, or, which has... 

The Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) provides a proficiency-testing scheme for the analysis of samples in the context of the CWC. The design of the scheme should simulate analysis of authentic samples that are taken during inspections. The purpose of the scheme is to select, certify, and train highly competent laboratories for the analysis of CWC-related chemicals in various matrices. The Technical Secretariat designates laboratories, which perform successfully in the scheme, to support it in such analysis should they become necessary during the course of its verification activities. 

The definitions and criteria that determine whether a chemical falls within the scope of the CWC or not, leaves a large number of chemicals in the gray area. One example of a group of chemicals that are excluded from the OCAD on the basis of purposes not prohibited under this Convention , is given by the Riot Control Agents . There are other examples, which need to be addressed in the future to determine how they can be regulated by the CWC as these have been seen to be very useful in the verification activities of the OPCW. Efforts are underway to find a way for the inclusion in the OCAD, of chemicals that are relevant to the CWC but are not covered by the schedule list (Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) and Validation Group (VG)). 

M. Rautio (Ed.), H. Inter-laboratory Comparison Test Coordinated by the Provisional Technical Secretariat for the Preparatory Commission for the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. H.l First Inter-laboratory Comparison Test. Methodology and Instrumentation for Sampling and Analysis in the Verification of Chemical Disarmament, The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Helsinki, 1994. 

Verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (VERIFIN). The spectra are presented in their original form (size reduced from A4) to show layout and format of library spectra that have been acceptable to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Central Analytical Database (OCAD). The experimental conditions shown are the standard conditions used by the laboratory for the particular experiment. 

For inspection bodies in third countries, demonstrating compliance can be achieved either by accreditation, government verification or by submitting documents to the member state competent authority to evaluate compliance. In many situations, accreditation is prohibitively expensive, the third country government is unwilling or unable to provide verification, and member state competent authorities are unwilling to undertake such a task. This has left many third country inspection bodies from those based in the US to those in Chile at risk of being unable to provide access to Europe to their operators. 

In this chapter, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the object of examination. The CWC was the first disarmament treaty that totally prohibited and completely eliminated one whole category of weapons of mass destruction with an extremely extensive and intrusive verification system. The Convention has also become a model for subsequent disarmament treaties. It was no surprise that, when the CWC was opened for signature on 13 January 1993, the international community enthusiastically welcomed it as a truly epoch-making treaty. 

It is true that the same paragraph of the Verification Annex (Part X, para. 41) states that [t]he provisions in this paragraph may not be invoked by the inspected State Party to conceal evasion of its obligations not to engage in activities prohibited under this Convention . How effective this provision could be in practice, however, is an open question. 

The reach of this provision is extensive and is made more so by the so-called general purpose criterion set out in Article II of the CWC. This defines chemical weapons to mean, inter alia, [tjoxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes . In essence, this definition means that the Article I obligations undertaken by States Parties apply to all toxic chemicals and their precursors. These obligations are not limited to the chemicals that are subject to verification under the CWC. ... 

This provision enumerates two obligations (1) that each State Party must take the measures necessary to ensure that activities relating to toxic chemicals and their precursors are conducted only for purposes not prohibited under the CWC and (2) that, as part of fulfilling this obhgation and to verify that activities are in accordance with obhgations under th[e] Convention , Scheduled chemicals, related facilities and OCPFs shall be subject to verification. 

Both States Parties - quite properly - focused on the chemicals and facilities regulated by the Convention. This very focus, however, raises the issue of whether the first element of the States Parties Article VI, paragraph 2, obligation is met. This requires States Parties to adopt the necessary measures to ensure that all toxic chemicals and their precursors are involved only in activities for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. Thus, Article VI requires a State Party to go further in its regulation of toxic chemicals than covering only the chemicals that come within the verification purview of the CWC. ... 

The CWC furthermore requires States Parties to take measures to ensure that activities relating to toxic chemicals are conducted only for purposes not prohibited under the CWC. In part, this obhgation is met by the regulation of Scheduled chemicals and related facilities and of OCPFs. With regard to other toxic chemicals, however, a State Party may find that this provision requires it to enact provisions indicating the purposes for which activities involving toxic chemicals are permitted and/ or regulating toxic chemicals outside of those covered by the verification mechanisms of the CWC. 

Senior Policy Officer Verification Division Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons The Hague The Netherlands... 

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