CWC challenge inspection system

This chapter tries to answer these questions with particnlar reference to the CWC challenge inspection system, because this is one of the most striking featnres of the Convention and, in fact, the Convention s epoch-making character has often been attributed to the existence of that system. The challenge inspection system, whose effectiveness seems to govern the tolerance threshold of non-compliance concerns, is also important from the perspective of the current security environment, be-canse the risk that the production of prohibited weapons might lead to their actnal nse is now greater than ever before. 

As we have seen, the single biggest practical problem that the CWC challenge inspection system has faced is the fact that the system has never been utilized and that there is no shared view about how to deal with the situation. To construct a remedial mechanism to overcome the difficulty on the basis of these facts might run the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy , whereby the non-use of the system could firmly establish itself. Nevertheless, a new solution should be contemplated based on the above facts in order to get over the current impasse. 

The biggest practical problem of the challenge inspection system of the CWC... 

Arguably the most challenging problem of the CWC s challenge inspection system has been that it has been neither used nor requested. As was highlighted in the Review Document of the First Review Conference of the CWC convened in The Hague from 28 April to 9 May 2003, there has never been a request for a challenge inspection in the eight years plus of CWC history. Of course, if there had been no concern about non-compliance with the Convention, there would be no need to be concerned about the non-use and absence of request. Yet non-compliance concerns have in fact been raised openly. 

If no State Party requests a challenge inspection when the possibility of non-compliance by States Parties is openly pointed out, that would have a detrimental effect on the credibility of the CWC s challenge inspection system itself. Nevertheless, the fact is that no request has been made for a challenge inspection. 

There seem to be several reasons for this phenomenon. First, verifying arms control agreements and arrangements involving chemicals is far more difficult than for those involving nuclear materials, for example, as was exemplified by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections in Iraq. It is, therefore, possible that even the most advanced challenge inspection system under the CWC would not reveal evidence of the suspected non-compliance, particularly if the relevant site is unknown. 

If the CWC had been able to adopt an ad hoc inspection system, the problem that the CWC is now fadng with regard to its challenge inspection system might not have come abont. Put differently, the problem might well be resolved, at least partially, if the OPCW could adopt, and States Parties could accept, a document comparable to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA. Thus, the idea contained in the Protocol s complementary access system seems worth exploring in the CWC verification context. 

In this context, one needs to recall the objectives of the multilateral verification system. Traditionally, two aspects were emphasized confidence-building and deterrence of treaty violation. In the CWC case, confidence-building relates to the confirmation (a) that the declared CW stockpiles and production capabilities are actually being destroyed, and (b) that chemical activities in those facilities inspected under Article VI are legitimate. The deterrence effect of the CWC verification system relies essentially on two interconnected factors the probability that an Article VI inspection can actually detect a violation (and, relatedly, that the inspection system is optimized in such a way that it induces compliance and maximizes the selection of relevant facilities ), and the confidence of States Parties in the OPCW s ability to conduct an effective and conclusive challenge inspection should it be requested to do so. 

At the same time, if it is not possible, that might entail a risk of undermining the whole verification system of the CWC. Let us assume that State Party A maintains military bases on the territory of non-State Party B. If State Party A could, however illegally, stockpile chemical weapons in those bases without any possibility of being inspected, that would represent a large loophole in the CWC verification system. That is perhaps why the above-quoted provision refers to the possibility of requesting a challenge inspection even in such cases. 

The verification provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention are not nearly as extensive as those employed by UNSCOM. The CWC inspectors will lack the access rights, the freedom of movement, and the surveillance opportunities enjoyed by UNSCOM. They will have to implement two systems of verification, involving routine and challenge inspections. Under the routine system, inspectors will be required to validate the declarations of participating states to the OPCW on topics specified in the treaty. This will include initial information on the size and composition of existing stockpiles, storage facilities, and any production facilities the actual destruction of those stockpiles and production facilities (or the conversion of the latter for purposes not prohibited under the Convention) the non-diversion of chemicals made in civilian facilities for military purposes and the operation of the single, small-scale facility pennitted to each state party for the production of Schedule 1 chemicals for research, medical, protective and other purposes. 

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