Independent oversight

The Army has stated that while it is destroying the stockpile, its primary concern is the protection of the health and safety of the workers, the public, and the environment. After the Army conducted operational verification tests at the Johnston Atoll facility from 1990 through 1993, independent oversight contractors, for both EPA and the Army, concluded in their reports that the baseline incineration equipment generally operated safely and within environmental rules and regulations. 

The Board is responsible for an independent oversight of all activities affecting nuclear safety within DOE s nuclear weapons complex. Prior to the end of the nuclear arms race, the nuclear weapons complex concentrated on the design, manufacture, test, and maintenance of the nation s nuclear arsenal. The complex is now engaged in the cleanup of contaminated sites and facilities, disassembly of nuclear weapons to achieve arms control objectives, maintenance of the smaller stockpile, and storage and disposition of excess fissionable materials. All of these hazardous activities must be carried out in the strict observance of health and safety requirements. 

Reviews of facility activities by outside organizations or agencies provide an opportunity to reveal blind spots to facility management and personnel that could otherwise remained hidden. Independent oversight can identify conditions, processes, and practices that fall short of industry best practices and those that could lead to degraded facility performance if uncorrected. 

If there is one single lesson that can be drawn from the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents, it is the absolute requirement that any nuclear power program should have robust and independent oversight of its safety management arrangements. Independent oversight means that the regulator must be independent of the nuclear industry, and also independent from political interference. 

In the case of Chernobyl, the nature of the government in the Soviet Union meant that independent oversight was not really viable the requirements of central planning seemed to take precedence. The RBMK design was unsafe by international standards. 

The WSESRB provides independent oversight of all ordnance items, weapon devices, systems, ordnance or weapons programs, or weapons support test systems used, handled, stored, or tested aboard U.S. Naval vessels, and ensures that appropriate explosives safety, system safety, and environmental requirements are adhered to. Every DON weapon system acquisition program and all other services weapons system programs representing a system destined to be deployed aboard a U.S. Naval vessel must be reviewed by the WSESRB. 

External independent oversight has been provided by the Advisory Committee for Nuclear Facility Safety (ACNFS) and the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB). This SER is based on a review of the Level 1, Rev. 0, report, the results of reviews performed to date, and several related communications as noted. 

In addition to the review of general system integrity of the SRS reactors by various review panels, detailed aspects of the UT procedures, inspection work, and examination data have also been reviewed by independent NDE experts. Two recognized experts in the field of nuclear vessel NDE provided independent oversight and conducted random observations of the activities of the UT operation. Both UT and eddy current testing (ET) methods were used for ISI of... 

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