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Fault tree analysis frequency

Fault Tree Analysis. Fault trees represent a deductive approach to determining the causes contributing to a designated failure. The approach begins with the definition of a top or undesired event, and branches backward through intermediate events until the top event is defined in terms of basic events. A basic event is an event for which further development would not be useful for the purpose at hand. For example, for a quantitative fault tree, if a frequency or probabiUty for a failure can be deterrnined without further development of the failure logic, then there is no point to further development, and the event is regarded as basic. [Pg.473]

Fault Tree Analysis Faiilt tree analysis permits the hazardous incident (called the top event) frequency to be estimated from a logic model of the failure mechanisms of a system. The top event is traced downward to more basic failures using logic gates to determine its causes and hkelihood. The model is based on the combinations of fail-... [Pg.2273]

Frequency Estimation There are two primary sources for estimates of incident frequencies. These are historical records and the apphcation of fault tree analysis and related techniques, and they are not necessarily applied independently. Specific historical data can sometimes be usehiUy applied as a check on frequency estimates of various subevents of a fault tree, for example. [Pg.2276]

In some instances, plant-specific information relating to frequencies of subevents (e.g., a release from a relief device) can be compared against results derived from the quantitative fault tree analysis, starting with basic component failure rate data. [Pg.2277]

Layer of protection analysis (LOPA) is a simplified form of event tree analysis. Instead of analyzing all accident scenarios, LOPA selects a few specific scenarios as representative, or boundary, cases. LOPA uses order-of-magnitLide estimates, rather than specific data, for the frequency of initiating events and for the probability the various layers of protection will fail on demand. In many cases, the simplified results of a LOPA provide sufficient input for deciding whether additional protection is necessary to reduce the likelihood of a given accident type. LOPAs typically require only a small fraction of the effort required for detailed event tree or fault tree analysis. [Pg.37]

The QRA was conducted by risk sts and design innel to determine the probability of explosive releases of the chemical. Fault tree analysis identified several combinations of equipment failures and operator errors that could cause the top event (reactor explosion), Failure data were obtained from plant ex ice and industry da%.ui,/uoes to quantify the fault trees to estimate the frequency of reactor explosions. The fault trees suggested several safety improv-... [Pg.444]

To determine maximum individual risk, generic frequency data are required for explosion events for Process Units 1 and 2. For Process Unit 1, incident data were available from the unit licenser identifying three explosions in approximately 15,000 operating years, for an explosion frequency of 2.0 x 10-4 per year. For Process Unit 2, a fault tree analysis of the nitrogen vessel brittle fracture event had been conducted as part of an unrelated project. That study concluded that the frequency of brittle fracture failure of the nitrogen vapor storage vessel was 5x10"4 per year. [Pg.50]

Prior to installing a new shutdown system, however, a fault tree analysis was performed on the proposed modifications. From this study, it was concluded that the overall frequency of brittle fracture was lowered from 5x10"4 to 5 x 10-5 (occurrences/year). Using this new frequency in the calculation for aggregate risk would result in revised outcome frequencies and F-N data points, as shown below. [Pg.128]

Under certain circumstances, it may be appropriate to examine the sequence of events that may lead to the initiating event. Techniques such as fault tree analysis or event trees may be used to estimate the frequency of these events. [Pg.105]

Event trees are used to perform postrelease frequency analysis. Event trees are pictorial representations of logic models or truth tables. Their foundation is based on logic theory. The frequency of n outcomes is defined as the product of the initiating event frequency and all succeeding conditional event probabilities leading to that outcome. The process is similar to fault tree analysis, but in reverse. [Pg.105]

Fault Tree Analysis (ETA)—Estimation of the hazardous incident (top event) frequency from a logic model of the failure mechanisms of a system. [Pg.441]

Fault tree analysis is used to assess the frequency of an incident. A fault tree is a diagram that shows how primary causes produce events, which can contribute to a particular hazard. There are several pathways in which a single primary cause can combine with other primary causes or events. Therefore, a single cause may be found in more than one hazard and may occur at different locations in the fault tree. [Pg.997]

The estimated impact is then compared to hazard acceptance criteria to determine whether the consequences are tolerable without additional loss prevention and mitigation measures. If the identified consequences are not tolerable, the next step is to estimate the ffequency/probability of occurrence of the identified failure modes leading to loss of containment. For simple cases, frequency estimates are combined with consequences to yield a qualitative estimate of risk. For complex cases, fault tree analysis is used to estimate the frequency of the event leading to the hazard. These estimates are then combined with the consequences to yield a measure of risk. The calculated risk level is compared to a risk acceptance criterion to determine if mitigation is required for further risk reduction. [Pg.168]

Failure rates for both equipment and peoples responses are assigned and the frequency and severity of a TOP Event can be calculated. Should the risk be found to be unacceptable, additional process safety hardware or additional procedures can be recommended. Then, calculations can be made to determine the benefits of the additional hardware or procedures. The Fault Tree Analysis method of evaluation is very sophisticated and a detailed explanation is beyond the scope of this book. [Pg.285]


See other pages where Fault tree analysis frequency is mentioned: [Pg.2276]    [Pg.2277]    [Pg.59]    [Pg.112]    [Pg.129]    [Pg.49]    [Pg.50]    [Pg.26]    [Pg.2031]    [Pg.2032]    [Pg.29]    [Pg.2551]    [Pg.2552]    [Pg.2531]    [Pg.2532]    [Pg.2280]    [Pg.2281]   
See also in sourсe #XX -- [ Pg.337 ]




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