Fail-active design

A fail-active design maintains an energized condition that keeps the system in a safe operating mode until (a) corrective and overriding action occurs or (b) activates an alternative system to eliminate the possibility of an accident... 

A fail-active design might be a monitor system that activates a visual or audible indicator if a failure or adverse condition is detected in a critical operation. 

A battery-operated smoke detector is an example of a fail-active design. 

The service provided by maintenance engineering was traditionally that of repairing equipment items when they failed. This is no longer the case, and a maintenance department is now pro-active rather than reactive in its approach. Maintenance of equipment items will be an important consideration in the FDP, because the mode and cost of maintaining equipment plays an important part in the facilities design and in the mode of operation. 

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. The system design activity usually emphasizes the attainment of performance objectives in a timely and cost-efficient fashion. The failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) procedure considers the system from a failure point of view to determine how the product might fail. The terms design failure mode and effects analysis (DFMEA) and failure mode effects and criticaUty analysis (EMECA) also are used. This EMEA technique is used to identify and eliminate potential failure modes early in the design cycle, and its success is well documented (3,4). 

What can be done by predictive methods if the sequence search fails to reveal any homology with a protein of known tertiary structure Is it possible to model a tertiary structure from the amino acid sequence alone There are no methods available today to do this and obtain a model detailed enough to be of any use, for example, in drug design and protein engineering. This is, however, a very active area of research and quite promising results are being obtained in some cases it is possible to predict correctly the type of protein, a, p, or a/p, and even to derive approximations to the correct fold. 

A substance that does not produce a response above the hit threshold in an assay at the tested concentration. Note a substance may also be designated as inactive when attempts to confirm an ACTIVE fail. 

In theory, the application of radon barriers should be adequate to avoid elevated radon levels in houses. In practice, however, a backup radon mitigation system has been found essential for maintaining indoor radon concentrations below 4 pCi/L in most homes studied. In the recent radon-resistant residential construction projects conducted by U.S. EPA and/or private builders, several of the homes designed to be radon resistant have contained radon concentrations above 4 pCi/L. In each of those houses, a backup system consisting of an active (fan-assisted), or passive (wind-and-stack-effect-assisted), SSD system was installed at the time of construction. When mechanical barriers failed to adequately control radon, the soil depressurization methods were made operational. 

Failures can either be fail-safe or fail dangerously. Fail safe incidents may be initiated by spurious trips that may result in accidental shutdown of equipment or processes. Fail dangerously incidents are initiated by undetected process design errors or operations, which disable the safety interlock. The fail dangerously activation may also result in accidental process liquid or gas releases, equipment damage, or fire and explosions. 

It is recognized that as wood preservative systems that exhibit broad-spectrum activity are phased out, there will be an increase in the use of systems that are designed to be Tit for purpose . In the area of wood modification, it is well known that some systems perform well in some situations and less well in others. There will need to be a framework of tests that recognize this fact and allow products to be licensed that perform entirely satisfactorily in service, even though they may fail the current tests as they stand at the moment. 

Remote automatic—based on a sensing element, logic solver, and output signal to close the valve. In most cases, these automatic valves are designed to fail safe. Automatic isolation can be associated with the automatic activation of a shutdown system for equipment or a process unit. 

Fire barriers should be considered when the spacing recommended can not be met and hazards are not easily mitigated with active fire protection systems. Barriers, such as walls, partitions, and floors, provide physical separation of spaces and materials. The effectiveness of a fire barrier is dependant on its fire resistance, materials of construction, and the number of penetrations. Inattention to the integrity of penetrations is one of the primary reasons fire barriers fail to provide proper protection. Factors to consider in the design and placement of fire barriers include ... 

Cable trays outside of process areas or unit battery limits are normally not provided with either passive or active fire protection regardless of size. Small cable trays are usually not fire protected regardless of location when they provide service for ancillary equipment or for equipment designed to fail to a safe state on loss of power, control signal or communication. 

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