CW terrorism

With respect to protection assistance (Article X), it was noted with concern that only 42 States Parties had provided information on national protective purposes programmes. The requirement to evaluate the various assistance measures that States Parties have offered to a State Party if chemical weapons are used against it was also recognized. The Director-General and a number of national statements referred to the importance of Article X, including in response to heightened concerns about CW terrorism, as well as the need to coordinate with other relevant international organizations. ... 

Sources of Information about Psychological/Behavioral Effects of CW Terrorism... 

CW Terrorism a Comparative Analysis of the Cases of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARCs) (low tech) and Aum Shinrikio (high tech)... 

When we talk or read about the CW terrorism or the threat of use of toxic chemical substances or weapons, in most of the cases we assume a capacity to manage certain level of technology to make chemicals (or to purify them) and also the means to deliver them. 

Probably the most widely reported instance of CW terrorism was the 1995 assault on the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo, a global apocalyptic religious... 

The main problem connected with chemical terrorism is that beside chemical weapons, terrorists can use different toxic chemicals from the chemical industry, the agriculture or products released from industrial facilities following a terrorist act. An attack on a chemical plant can immediately release a number of different kinds of chemicals [6], Some differences exist between chemical weapons (CW) and the chemicals released after destruction of a chemical plant following a terrorist act [4] ... 

Key WOrds Chemical Weapons (CW), CW Convention (CWC), CW Production Facilities (CWPF), CW destruction, CWPF destruction conversion, CW nonproduction, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), First Review Conference, Chemical terrorism. ... 

The OPCW s expertise and knowledge of CWs including its developed system of assistance and protection under the CWC (Article X) as a reflection of international solidarity and co-operation are being put to use to prevent and respond to chemical terrorism and thus considerably diminish its potential consequences. It can be added that pursuant to the recent UN Security Council Resolution No 1540, all nations are obliged to take actions ensuring that non-State actors cannot develop, produce, use or trade CWs according to the terms of CWC. 

A particularly important new development was the accession of Libya to the CWC at the beginning of 2004. This accession, facilitated by more than a year of quiet bilateral endeavours by both the United States and the United Kingdom, brought into the realm of the Convention a country that had in the past been associated with sponsoring terrorism and that had acquired a CW stockpile. 

By October 2002, the WGRC had met several times and discussed administrative arrangements and the objectives and methodology of the RevCon. In particular, it had agreed that, rather than the traditional Article-by-Article review, the RevCon would review the CWC on the following themes implementation of the Convention (including universality, changes to the security environment, terrorism) destruction of CW and former CW production facilities non-proliferation measures verification assistance and international cooperation. 

The issue of export controls on CW dual-use items, particularly if applied to other States Parties, continued to be a contentious issue through the PrepCom period and in the first few years of the operational CWC. However, as discussed in section 5.12, with greater concerns about the possibility of chemical terrorism since 11 September 2001, there is increasing recognition by many States Parties of the security benefits of having national export controls in place, based on the AG listed items, as well as domestic monitoring procedures for the AG listed items. 

The list of potential chemical agents that could be used in terrorism is quite extensive. Full and detailed discussions on CW agents can be found in chapter 25 and in the literature (Marrs, Maynard, Sidell, 1996). Rather than simply running through such a listing, it makes more sense to look at the most important physiological effects of different classes of chemicals that could be used in terrorism. These are ... 

In today s scenario, cyanide is considered to be neither an important CW agent nor an agent of choice for suicidal or homicidal purposes. However, threat from its possible use in local terrorism cannot be overlooked. Also, the occupational... 

Recent global events have focused attention on the potential threat of international and domestie chemical terrorism as well as the possibility of chemical warfare (CW) proliferation. The need for preparedness is highlighted by the wdi-documenicd domestic terrorist u.se of an anticholinesterase compound during the Tokyo subway incident of March 1995, when commuters received toxic inhalation and dermal exposures to a nerve agent deliberately released within subway cars and stations (Liliibridge, 1995 Morita et al., 1995 Okumura el al., 1996 Sidell, 1996). 

This terror organization has been, and still is, the most significant one worldwide, in terms of bioterrorism, especially that it was involved, most probably, in the Sept. 2001 anthrax letter attack. In the mid-1990s, while being sheltered in Sudan, its head, Osama bin Laden, financed, in part, the construction of BW (and CW) facilities in Sudan. Later on, members of al-Qaeda were apparently trained in Iraq (by its intelligence apparatus) for BW (and other nonconventional weapons) employment. In 1998, relationship with Iraqi intelligence was established, so as to obtain... 

Reflecting Soviet military doctrine, the DPRK [North Korea] has traditionally viewed chemical weapons as an integral part of any military offensive. There are no indications that this view has altered since the end of the Cold War. The most obvious tactical use of chemical weapons by the DPRK would be to terrorize South Korean civilians. Seoul lies within easy striking distance of North Korea s artillery and rocket systems and, today, the South Korean civilian population has no protection against CW attack---... 

In any event, if you remember two representatives from each of these classes—the blister agents mustard and Lewisite, and the nerve agents sarin and VX— you will have in memory a reasonably clear list of the most likely chemical threats, both military and from possible use in terrorism. Other CW agents—an extensive list of them will follow shortly—are of course potential threats, as described below, but mustard. Lewisite, sarin, and VX—as well as we can tell right now—are the modern poisons of choice. 

In conclusion, analysis of the chemical terrorism threat shows how important it is that medical personnel consider CWs poisoning in the differential diagnosis in cases of suspected chemical terrorist attacks and have knowledge of CWAs, including their effects and medical treatment. 

The British government has been cautious about alleging direct contravention of the BWC, but has referred to activities which blur the distinction between BW and CW. According to a former senior Soviet specialist in the US Army, Apparently the Soviet Army considers biological weapons to be unsuited for tactical employment on the battlefield . He assumes from this that They are probably reserved for strategic employment deep in the enemy rear or in his homeland . No evidence is adduced for this assertion. It is equally likely that if the USSR is violating the BWC (which in terms of publicly available evidence is not proven), biological weapons are viewed as instruments of assassination or terror. 

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