Costs hazard evaluation

The use of field cages or semifield tunnel tests was originally devised by Gerig [71] and has constituted a useful and cost-effective part of the hazard evaluation... 

Laboratory rodents are the animal models most commonly used to identify hazards in reproductive toxicity. Rodents are used because they are small animals, the assay cost is moderate and there is a large database of toxicology information on these species (e.g., dose-response, metabolism, kinetics, etc.). The rat has proven to be a good model for human reproductive hazard evaluation (Francis et al., 1990). 

One SDC data base that would be relevant to hazard evaluation needs is called Safety . It provides broad, interdisciplinary coverage of literature related to safety and is particularly concerned with hazard identification and control. Costs for SDC computer-connect time run on average between 60.00-3100.00 per hour. 

Due to the need for premanufacture hazard evaluation and the high costs of field sampling, an increasing emphasis is being placed on predictions of environmental fate and exposure. The methods used to predict the environmental fate of chemicals can be categorized into three basic approaches ... 

Small format Li-ion battery commodities were selected to represent commercially available battery formats and Li-ion battery containing devices. The selected Li-ion battery types were individual 18,650 format cylindrical cells, power tool packs comprising 18,650 format cells, and polymer cells. The selected comparison commodities were the FM Global standard Class 2 and Cartoned Unexpanded Plastic (CUP). Two independent test series were conducted by FM Global. These tests represented a unique approach to hazard evaluation with limited commodity and were necessary due to the inordinate cost associated with Li-ion batteries. 

SMSs, whether developed for the aerospace, marine, food, or any other industry for that matter, all have certain concepts and elements in common. As explained in detail in Chapter 2, especially Figure 2.2, the safety organization within the SMS must follow a certain process. To refresh your memory, first, understand what you want to do (or protect, i.e., lives, hardware) then identify the hazards in the process analyze the hazards evaluate the risks (including the costs and benefits) control or mitigate the unacceptable risks verify that it is in place and finally, document and periodically review the entire system. The SMS institutionalizes this system safety process. Simply put, if the safety organization does not apply the system safety process, then it is not a viable SMS. 

Process Hazards Analysis. Analysis of processes for unrecogni2ed or inadequately controUed ha2ards (see Hazard analysis and risk assessment) is required by OSHA (36). The principal methods of analysis, in an approximate ascending order of intensity, are what-if checklist failure modes and effects ha2ard and operabiHty (HAZOP) and fault-tree analysis. Other complementary methods include human error prediction and cost/benefit analysis. The HAZOP method is the most popular as of 1995 because it can be used to identify ha2ards, pinpoint their causes and consequences, and disclose the need for protective systems. Fault-tree analysis is the method to be used if a quantitative evaluation of operational safety is needed to justify the implementation of process improvements. 

Once adopted, plans should be periodically reviewed (depending on the project) and evaluated for effectiveness and cost/benefit. If the scope of work or any worksite hazards change significantly or if lessons learned indicate a review, the plans should be revised promptly... 

The first step on transfer of the sythesis is to evaluate the discovery route, looking particularly at overall yield and purity, as well as parameters such as cost of production (cost of starting materials, solvents, labor and overhead, and disposal of waste stream), ease of removal of impurities or catalyst from products, and the degree of hazard associated with solvents, reactants, intermediates, and products. The route used in discovery is... 

Make safety investments on a basis of cost and performance. Evaluate each investment (money and time) to ensure that there is a true safety improvement proportional to the investment. If the designer is not careful, changes to the system or new procedures may add complexities that result in a more hazardous situation rather than in an improvement. 

Advantages of the RSST are its relatively low cost and its availability to permit a quick evaluation for potential runaways. Pressurized conditions may be used. The temperature-time curve and the concurrent pressure increase (of the containment vessel) can be recorded, which are measures of the reactivity hazards of the substance or reaction under investigation. The temperature-time curve shows the lowest temperature at which a runaway can be detected in the test system (initiation temperature, To). 

In general, risk reduction is accomplished by implementing one or more protective layers, which reduce the frequency and/or consequence of the hazard scenario. LOPA provides specific criteria and restrictions for the evaluation of protection layers, eliminating the subjectivity of qualitative methods at substantially less cost than fully quantitative techniques. LOPA is a rational, defensible methodology that allows a rapid, cost-effective means for identifying the protection layers that lower the frequency and/or the consequence of specific hazard scenarios. 

Before safety measures are applied to a facility, it is prudent to identify and evaluate the possible hazards that may evolve before spending considerable amounts on protection that may not be needed or overlooking requirements for protection measures that are needed. The first step in fire protection engineering should therefore be to always identify the major risks at a facility. When conducting these analyses it is prudent only to only consider credible events. Farfetched or outlandish event considerations (e.g., a meteor striking the facility) are not necessary or practical and lead to a less cost effective approach. 

Both qualitative and quantitative evaluation techniques may be used to consider the risk associated with a facility. The level and magnitude of these reviews should be commensurate with the risk that the facility represents. High value, critical facilities or employee vulnerability may warrant high review levels. While unmanned "off-the-shelf, low hazard facilities may suffice with only a checklist review. Specialized studies are performed when in-depth analysis is needed to determine the cost benefit of a safety feature or to fully demonstrate the intended safety feature has the capability to fully meet prescribed safety requirements. 

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