Chemical officers field command

This woik was supported by the U. S. Aimy Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization, Project Manager for Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Field Command, Defense Nuclear Agency and the Office of Non-Proliferation and National Security, NN-20, U.S. Department of Energy, under DOE Field Office, Idaho, contract no. DE-AC-07-94-ID13223. 

Other considerations were particularly important to military commanders. For example, how high a dose could the average person survive if no treatment were available How much would weather conditions - particularly heat - affect the likelihood of a fatal outcome Just how much BZ would a chemical officer in the field need to disseminate to achieve desired effects throughout a given area, and how much variation in dosage would each type of munition produce ... 

The tremendous potentialities of biological warfare in the future demand that the necessary tactics and employment in the field be worked out well in advance so that such means may be used immediately and effectively once a decision to do so is made. It is essential that Chemical Officers on the staffs of divisions and higher units, including equivalent Army Air Force elements, be in a position to advise their Commanders relative to the capability, limitations and means of protection against this new method of attack. Further, they must be able to prepare suitable offensive and defensive plans and to supervise such training of troops in these methods as may be required.114... 

Another function was to plan the use and allotment of chemical troop units, and in 1943 the scope of this planning was extended to the procurement and supervision of all CWS personnel in the theater. Performance under these functions was advisory since Shadle had no command responsibilities. The advisory capacity was severely limited by theater quotas on both personnel and units, and by the requests of individual field commanders for personnel and units—requests which usually overrode staff advice. Shadle s Chemical Section managed to get enough service units even when training in the United States could not keep pace with worldwide demand. Combat units were eventually obtained on about the same basis on which they were furnished other theaters, three battalions per authorized army during peak combat activity.With respect to officers, Shadle experienced difficulties similar to Rowan s—the theater received a number of CWS casual officers who frequently were badly handled by the replacement system. It was practically impossible to find vacancies for all arriving officers, and it was absolutely impossible to determine their qualifications so as to channel officers to duties for which they were fitted. ... 

At the end of 1942 the Hawaiian Department reorganized from an advance and rear echelon structure in which both echelons were responsible for all functions under the direction of the rear echelon, to a more conventional combat forces, service forces, and air forces pattern and added an echelon for military government since the territory was still under military control. Unmacht remained the department chemical officer with responsibilities in all four fields. His position was unique among chief chemical officers overseas in that he was both staff officer and commander of the chemical warfare troops not assigned to other organizations. ... 

There was some justice in Marriott s comments. The quantity of chemical supply was very small, but perhaps precisely for that reason, chemical materials tended to be lost when handled by another service. But Marriott was not to be relieved of his supply burden if anything, it increased. USASOS did offer some help. The Distribution Division, USASOS, had been created in January specifically to handle Sixth Army s most vexing problems—transportation and distribution policy. The veteran CWS supply manager, Maj. Arthur H. Williams, Jr., moved into the position of Chemical Officer, Distribution Division. The Distribution Division operated as a field element of USASOS and it moved forward ahead of the main echelons. The USASOS commander, Maj. Gen. John L. Frink, also redefined the duties of USASOS Advance and Intermediate Sections. Effective i March 1944, Advance Section became a transportation and handling agency and Intermediate Section took over the command of all forward bases and the supervision of supply policy. Since the Distribution Division soon moved into Intermediate Section, the Sixth Army Chemical Section at last had... 

The CWS administrative effort overseas most nearly like that in the European theater was in the Central Pacific Area. There Colonel Un-macht vigorously asserted CWS independence with the active concurrence and support of first the senior Army headquarters and later the combined and joint Pacific Ocean Areas headquarters. Unmacht was the only overseas chief chemical oflScer who also commanded CWS troops other than the theater or area laboratory company. Unmacht was also the only overseas chief chemical officer who was specifically designated to co-ordinate and compile a joint Army, Army Air Forces, and Navy gas warfare plan although Rowan, as Porter s representative, and Copthorne, on temporary duty in GHQ SWPA, participated in both combined and joint planning while Shadle, as a staff officer in a combined headquarters, had advisory functions in the joint and combined field. Unmacht and his subordinates certainly maintained a very close connection between research and development and the firing line even to the extent of carrying on research, development, and manufacture in the theater of operations. 

Administratively and organizationally the CWS was only partially prepared for gas warfare. In Europe, while the chief chemical officer held a staff position under the theater commander, he did not have a position in the supreme tactical and strategic headquarters, SHAEF. Colonel St. John s presence in SHAEF would have helped so far as the function of providing advice is concerned, but his lack of a direct and formal channel to the chief chemical officer might have proved a handicap. The informal relationship which existed between Rowan and the air chemical officers and between Rowan and the United States Navy officers with interests in the chemical field would probably have served as a basis for co-operative effort among the U.S. forces. 

The chiefs of the technical services had two distinct fields of responsibility. Each administered an important procurement and supply agency, supervision of which was delegated by the War Department to Headquarters, Army Service Forces. At the same time each branch chief was a technical adviser to the Chief of Staff and/or the Secretary of War in his special field, the Surgeon General in the field of medicine, the Chemical Officer in the field of chemical warfare, and so forth. In this latter capacity, the relationship of the technical branch to the War Department was naturally direct rather than through the commanding general, ASF. It was the practice of the Chief of Staff, when circumstances demanded, to curtail... 

William H. Summerson, a worker in the field of biochemistry with a Ph.D. from Cornell, has had a long career of college teaching and research in the area of biochemistry. He also had a distinguished career in the Biochemistry Division of the Army Chemical Corps and with the Office of Scientific Research and Development during the war. He is at present the Acting Deputy Commander for Scientific Activities of the Research and Development Command, United States Army Chemical Corps. 

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