Hawaiian Department

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, commander of the Army s Hawaiian Department, received a coded message on November 27 signed in the name of the Chief of Staff—George Marshall—that read in part ... 

Organizing the Chemical Warfare Service, Hawaiian Department The Emergency... 

Lt. Col. George F. Unmacht, Chemical Officer, Hawaiian Department, was having breakfast on the morning of 7 December 1941 when... 

Chronological history of the chemical office, Hawaiian Department to Middle Pacific, History of Cml Sec, USAFMIDPAC, vol. I, sec. II. Lieutenant Reilly was awarded the Legion of Merit for his performance on 7 December 1941. 

At the end of 1942 the Hawaiian Department reorganized from an advance and rear echelon structure in which both echelons were responsible for all functions under the direction of the rear echelon, to a more conventional combat forces, service forces, and air forces pattern and added an echelon for military government since the territory was still under military control. Unmacht remained the department chemical officer with responsibilities in all four fields. His position was unique among chief chemical officers overseas in that he was both staff officer and commander of the chemical warfare troops not assigned to other organizations. ... 

The Chemical Section, Hawaiian Department, like the chemical sections all over the world, had a paramount interest In gas warfare preparedness. Although Unmacht had devoted most of his attention after the Pearl Harbor attack to Immediate individual and collective... 

The first Hawaiian Department gas warfare plan, which was coordinated with the local Navy and Marine Corps commands, was dispatched to the War Department on 8 February 1943. The plan simply indicated that in the event of gas warfare maximum use of available weapons and equipment would be made, and no request for special supplies was included. The heart of the plan consisted of a detailed plea for the immediate provision of chemical units and manpower, including a chemical weapons regiment, air and ground service troops, and chemical staff personnel. The War Department at first indicated that no troops were available but in July requested restudy and resubmission of the troop request. Unmacht replied by reviewing the problems of preparedness. In his opinion these were (r) lack of... 

The CWS Hawaiian Department in December 1941 stocked more chemical items than any other overseas element of the Army. Major... 

The CWS in Hawaii could report no improvement in June, but in September 1943 the theater reported that relief had been received. The War Department authorized for the Central Pacific Area a 60-day operating level in addition to the 7 5-day reserve level, and the port authorized an additional "pipeline factor. The "pipeline factor allowed the Hawaiian Department to requisition additional supplies to... 

During the last week in July 1943 the Hawaiian Department presented a portable flame thrower demonstration, based on an analysis of operations in the South Pacific, to approximately 1,400 Army, Navy, and Marine officers and enlisted men. The display, demonstrating how Japanese fortified defenses might be attacked and destroyed by assault parties armed with the flame thrower, generated considerable interest. ... 

Later, when plans were being made for the invasion of the Gilbert Islands, the Hawaiian Department chemical office prepared detailed studies of types of Japanese defenses- that might be encountered. An examination of these studies convinced planners that the flame thrower would be a desirable weapon in the coming operations accordingly, the ayth Infantry Division received twenty-four and the ad Marine Divi-... 

Thc Hawaiian Department soon became U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, and later U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific. Colonel Unmacht served as chemical oficer of these head< uarters throughout the war. 

The War Department policy restricting the build-up of area reserves threatened to become a CWS problem in POA just as in SWPA, but shortages did not become critical because anticipated demands were larger than actual demands and because Hawaiian Department resources were large enough to allow for improvisations and substitutions. In POA combat supply, transport space allocation and loading were carefully controlled by the area joint headquarters. The POA CWS soon learned to work within the joint system, and the result, admittedly under relatively ideal circumstances, was the smoothest CWS supply operation of World War II. 

Organizing the CWS, Hawaiian Department. The Offensive Period in the Central Pacific.. 

Company A, ist Separate Chemical Battalion, assigned to Hawaiian Department and attached to the Hawaiian Division (remainder of battalion inactive). 

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