Central Pacific Area

Mason VR. Central pacific area. In Coates JB, ed. Activities of Medical Consultants. Vol 1. In Havens WP. Internal Medicine in World War II. Washington, DC US Department of the Army, Medical Department, Office of The Surgeon General 1961 Chap 7 647, 667. 

Copthorne felt the CWS in the United States should provide gas warfare technical and preparedness doctrine for the tropics, or else that it should assist him and his colleagues in the Pacific areas in formulating such doctrine, but he was not satisfied that his appeals for help had received sufficient attention in the United States. He found communication with the Central Pacific Area chemical staff too difficult in 1943 to offer adequate opportunity for co-ordinated study of chemical problems, but his colleagues in the South Pacific were closer... 

In actually commanding troops, Unmacht came closer to the manual definition of a chief of service than any other chief chemical officer. But this was not the only way in which Unmacht s position differed from the positions of the other chief chemical officers. The Hawaiian Departnient and its successor commands, U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area (USAFICPA), U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (USAFPOA), and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific (USAFMID-PAC), were in fact theater headquarters of the kind envisioned in the War Department organization manuals, and in these headquarters, unlike those in Europe, North Africa, and the Southwest Pacific, a commander, who did not double also as a supreme commander, was resident. Unmacht therefore had more opportunity to present his... 

Colonel Unmacht was an unusually dynamic officer who was not afraid to use his energy in any way he felt might contribute to the war effort. Few other chemical officers would have believed possible the overseas development, much less the assembly, of a main armament dame thrower tank. Unmacht not only believed it possible— he got the job done. His willingness to undertake large responsibilities in no small measure contributed to the success of the CWS in the Central Pacific and to the esteem in which the service was held. The Central Pacific situation also contributed because the commander, not being also a supreme commander as in other theaters, had the time to give support to his services. The Central Pacific Army commander did not command combat operations, but his support as senior Army commander in the theater for most of the war made easier the operation of the CWS. The CWS also enjoyed an excellent relationship with the POA and Navy commands in the area because it was able to provide services and weapons support when the Navy and the Marine Corps wanted them. The Central Pacific Area and the military facilities in the area offered a unique opportunity for accomplishment. The CWS administration in the theater was almost ideally suited to these circumstances. 

The CWS in Hawaii could report no improvement in June, but in September 1943 the theater reported that relief had been received. The War Department authorized for the Central Pacific Area a 60-day operating level in addition to the 7 5-day reserve level, and the port authorized an additional "pipeline factor. The "pipeline factor allowed the Hawaiian Department to requisition additional supplies to... 

The 43d Chemical Laboratory Company, activated at Edgewood Arsenal on 26 August 1942, was ordered to Hawaii in December of 1943. Upon its arrival it was assigned to theater headquarters (Central Pacific Area) and stationed at Schofield Barracks, where the theater chemical officer, Colonel Unmacht, had laboratory facilities (manned by 8th Chemical Depot Company personnel) already in operation. The 43d took over the existing laboratory functions, added its own equipment, and set to work. The immediate tasks were predominantly within the intelligence portion of the mission—the study and descrip-... 

The Central Pacific Area lacked adequate mortar battalion support throughout the entire war. Despite the efforts of Colonel Unmacht, theater chemical officer, the only mortar unit available prior to May 1944 was the 91st Chemical Company (Motorized) which had been stationed in Hawaii under various designations since 19 0. This unit was used in field tests, demonstrations, and joint training exercises, including amphibious assaults with several infantry divisions. 

The over-all shortage of chemical mortar battalions and the higher priority of other theaters prevented shipment of these units to the Central Pacific Area until the arrival early in May 1944 of the 88th Chemical Mortar Battalion. Four months later the theater activated the 189th Chemical Mortar Company (Separate). The only other mortar units in CENPAC were the 71st and /ad Chemical Mortar Battalions which did not reach Hawaii until mid-i94y, too late to see action before the war ended. ... 

Ltr, CCmlO Central Pacific Area to ACCWS for Field Opns, 24 Jul 44. 

Introduction of the Portable Flame Thrower in the Central Pacific Area... 

Thc Hawaiian Department soon became U.S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area, and later U.S. Army Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas and U.S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific. Colonel Unmacht served as chemical oficer of these head< uarters throughout the war. 

After the experience at Tarawa, General Richardson, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, asked the War Department if mechanized flame throwers were available in the zone of interior. Upon receiving a favorable reply, Richardson requisitioned... 

The CWS administrative effort overseas most nearly like that in the European theater was in the Central Pacific Area. There Colonel Un-macht vigorously asserted CWS independence with the active concurrence and support of first the senior Army headquarters and later the combined and joint Pacific Ocean Areas headquarters. Unmacht was the only overseas chief chemical oflScer who also commanded CWS troops other than the theater or area laboratory company. Unmacht was also the only overseas chief chemical officer who was specifically designated to co-ordinate and compile a joint Army, Army Air Forces, and Navy gas warfare plan although Rowan, as Porter s representative, and Copthorne, on temporary duty in GHQ SWPA, participated in both combined and joint planning while Shadle, as a staff officer in a combined headquarters, had advisory functions in the joint and combined field. Unmacht and his subordinates certainly maintained a very close connection between research and development and the firing line even to the extent of carrying on research, development, and manufacture in the theater of operations. 

The authors fully realize that the war was carried on in more than the four major areas usually considered herein. They have no desire to detract from the considerable contributions of the CWS branches in the other major areas and in those outposts which could not be designated major. But the authors believe that most CWS problems can be illustrated from activities in the European and North African/Mediterran-ean theaters and the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas with some reference to the South Pacific Area. The China, Burma-India, North Pacific, and Middle East areas are thus excluded. 

The CWS put its first intelligence units into the field in February 1944 when the Director of Intelligence, ASF, authorized the Chief, CWS, to send teams consisting of one major and four enlisted men to ETO, MTO, Central Pacific Area, South Pacific Area, Southwest Pacific Area, and CBI, where they would compose the CWS Section of the ASF Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams. These teams were trained to examine captured equipment and report any information of value. Before the war was over the original 6 teams were reinforced by 5 more, 1 for the China theater and 4 for ETO. 

Troops in the Pacific early discovered the value of flame throwers in overcoming fortified positions. By 1944 experience with flame warfare convinced them of the need for main armament flame throwing tanks. The weapons were not available for the reasons noted above and servicemen in the Central Pacific Area produced their own. 

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