Weapons verification costs

The States Parties reaffirmed the obligation to destroy chemical weapons and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities within the time limits provided for by the Convention. The possessor States Parties are fully committed to meeting their destruction obligations and the verification costs as required by the Convention. There has been progress in chemical weapons disarmament. However, there have been difficulties in the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, and the Conference has taken action on delays in some States Parties and granted extensions of destruction time limits, as provided for by the Convention. 

The Second Review Conference reaffirmed the importance of the verification of chemical weapons stockpiles as well as of their destruction in accordance vrith the Convention. This is one of the main activities of the Secretariat and will remain so until stockpile destruction has been completed. It recalled the obligation of possessor States Parties to pay Article IV and V verification costs. It called on the relevant States Parties to pay as-... 

The Chemical Weapons Convention is intended to reinforce the existing political and legal inhibitions, add new norms against the possession of chemical weapons, and raise the possibility of states incurring economic and other sanctions if they fail to adhere to its provisions. Several commentators share the optimism expressed within the diplomatic community about its likely effects. Jay Brin maintains that the CWC, even with its imperfect verification procedures,. .. will deter illicit production . By removing the easiest proliferation pathways , the treaty, he contends, will drive up the financial and political costs of producing chemical... 

Significantly, a state that is party to the Convention has primary responsibility for the disposal and clean-up of chemical weapons abandoned on another state party s territory. As the verification annex of the CWC states, [the] Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide appropriate cooperation. This is the clause that, for example, obUges Japan to survey the remains of chemical weapons its armies left behind in China and pay the associated costs of disposal. 

Each State Party shall meet the costs of destruction of chemical weapons it is obliged to destroy. It shall also meet the costs of verification of storage and destruction of these chemical weapons unless the Executive Council decides otherwise. If the Executive Council decides to limit verification measures of the Organization pursuant to paragraph 13, the costs of com-... 

A decision on the request shall be taken by the Conference at its next session, on the recommendation of the Executive Council. Any extension shall be the rrrinimum necessary, but in no case shall the deadline for a State Party to complete its destruction of all chemical weapons be extended beyond 15 years after the entry into force of this Convention. The Executive Council shall set conditions for the granting of the extension, including the specific verification measures deemed necessary as well as specific actions to be taken by the State Party to overcome problems in its destruction programme. Costs of verification during the extension period shall be allocated in accordance with Article IV, paragraph 16. 

Regular Budget Fund shall mean that fund established in accordance with Article VIII of the Chemical Weapons Convention to finance the OPCW s verification, administrative and other costs from the financial contributions of States Parties. 

The project SEMB analysed the threat potential which lEMI (intentional electromagnetic interference) poses to Cl in Austria. The non-classified study analysed freely available literature on respective events, available lEMI weapons and their cost, and the state of the art with respect to technical protective measures. In addition, an appropriate risk analysis method was developed, which was intended to support Cl providers in judging where in the infrastructure to prioritize improvements of protective measures. This paper describes the selection and adaptation of the risk analysis method, explains the effort-saving way of data capturing and shows how the risk assessment results are presented. Finally, some of the results are shown, which were obtained in the verification of the method on the basis of three vehicle convoy scenarios. The conclusions comprise a judgment on the benefit of the method and an outlook on further research planned. 

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