Territorial State Party

Significantly, a state that is party to the Convention has primary responsibility for the disposal and clean-up of chemical weapons abandoned on another state party s territory. As the verification annex of the CWC states, [the] Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide appropriate cooperation. This is the clause that, for example, obUges Japan to survey the remains of chemical weapons its armies left behind in China and pay the associated costs of disposal. 

A State Party on whose territory there are abandoned chemical weapons (hereinafter referred to as the Territorial State Party ) shall, not later than 30 days after this Convention enters into force for it, submit to the Technical Secretariat all available relevant information concerning the abandoned chemical weapons. This information shall include, to the extent possible, the location, type, quantity and the present condition of the abandoned chemical weapons as well as information on the abandonment. 

The report of the Technical Secretariat shall be submitted to the Executive Council, the Territorial State Party, and to the Abandoning State Party or the State Party declared by the Territorial State Party or identified by the Technical Secretariat as having abandoned the chemical weapons. If one of the States Parties directly concerned is not satisfied with the report it shall have the right to settle the matter in accordance with provisions of this Convention or bring the issue to tire Executive Council with a view to settling the matter expeditiously. 

Pursuant to Article I, paragraph 3, the Territorial State Party shall have the right to request the State Party which has been established as the Abandoning State Party pursuant to paragraphs 8 to 12 to enter into consultations for the purpose of destroying the abandoned chemical weapons in cooperation with the Territorial State Party. It shall immediately inform the Technical Secretariat of this request. 

For the purpose of destroying abandoned chemical weapons, the Abandoning State Party shall provide all necessary financial, technical, expert, facility as well as other resources. The Territorial State Party shall provide appropriate cooperation. 

If the Abandoning State cannot be identified or is not a State Party, the Territorial State Party, in order to ensure the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons, may request the Organization and other States Parties to provide assistance in the destruction of these abandoned chemical weapons. 

Subject to paragraphs 8 to 16, Article IV and Part IV (A) of this Annex shall also apply to the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons. In the case of abandoned chemical weapons which also meet the definition of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Executive Council, upon the request of the Territorial State Party, individually or together with the Abandoning State Party, may modify or in exceptional cases suspend the application of provisions on destruction, if it determines that doing so would not pose a risk to the object and purpose of this Convention. In the case of abandoned chemical weapons which do not meet the definition of old chemical weapons in Article II, paragraph 5 (b), the Execu-... 

The Second Review Conference reaffirmed the undertaking of each State Party to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party in accordance with the provisions of the Convention. It welcomed the existing cooperation between territorial and abandoning States Parties, and noted with concern that a large amount of abandoned chemical weapons remain to be destroyed. The Second Review Conference called upon abandoning States Parties to make the fullest possible efforts to complete destruction as soon as possible with the appropriate cooperation provided by the territorial States Parties. It commended the active and positive role that has been played by the Secretariat in this process, and encouraged it to continue to play such a role in future. 

The Board transmits form D, an annual questionnaire on substances frequently used in the illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, to all Governments. As at 1 November 2004, a total of 135 States and territories, as well as the European Commission on behalf of the States members of the European Union, had submitted form D for 2003 (see annex II for details). With 66 per cent of all States parties and 48 per cent of non-parties submitting data for 2003, the rate of submission for 2003 is approximately the same as that of previous years. 

Each State Party undertakes to destroy all chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 

Each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any other State Party for the sole purpose of clarifying and resolving any questions concerning possible non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention, and to have this inspection conducted anjrwhere without delay by an inspection team designated by the Director-General [of the Technical Secretariat] and in accordance with the Verihcation Annex. 

At the same time, if it is not possible, that might entail a risk of undermining the whole verification system of the CWC. Let us assume that State Party A maintains military bases on the territory of non-State Party B. If State Party A could, however illegally, stockpile chemical weapons in those bases without any possibility of being inspected, that would represent a large loophole in the CWC verification system. That is perhaps why the above-quoted provision refers to the possibility of requesting a challenge inspection even in such cases. 

Nevertheless, the hard fact stiU remains that non-State Party B is a state that has chosen not to join the CWC and, as such, seems to be not in favour in the provisions of the CWC. It is almost inconceivable that non-State Party B would voluntarily accept an on-site challenge inspection carried out on its territory, even if it were limited to the military bases of State Party A. And yet one cannot easily abandon the possibility of conducting inspections in non-State Party B without making any effort, recalling the possible loophole mentioned above. Thus, the CWC has introduced the following paragraph in its Verification Annex, Part II ... 

In cases where facilities or areas of an inspected State Party are located on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention, the inspected State Party shall take all necessary measures to ensure that inspections of those facilities or areas can be carried out in accordance with the provisions of this Annex. A State Party that has one or more facilities or areas on the territory of a State not Party to this Convention shall take all necessary measures to ensure acceptance by the Host State of inspectors and inspection assistants designated to that State Party. If an inspected State Party is unable to ensure access, it shall demonstrate that it took all necessary measures to ensure access. 

A similar question would arise in the obverse situation where State Party A hosts on its territory military bases of non-State Party B. In this case, it is perhaps more difficult than in the case mentioned earlier to imagine that non-State Party B would voluntarily accept an on-site challenge inspection of its military bases on the territory of State Party A, because the direct object of inspection is the bases of non-State Party B itself. Nonetheless, to address this problem, the CWC has introduced another paragraph that is analogous to paragraph 20 quoted above. Paragraph 21 of the Verification Annex, Part II, stipulates as follows ... 

Yet another situation in which more than one state is involved in the implementation of the CWC inspection system is one when a State Party hosts on its territory military bases of another State Party. No significant questions would usually be expected in this situation. Perhaps the only... 

Each State Party would have the right to initiate inspections by the Technical Secretariat in civil and miUtary facilities and elsewhere on the territory of any other State Party. 

The newly adopted Additional Protocol contains rules on complementary access that in principle allow IAEA inspectors to visit any place on the territory of the States Parties to the Protocol in order to resolve a question or inconsistency relating to the information provided to... 

It should be noted, however, that Article 82 of the French CWC Act provides that, if certain offences are committed in a state not party to the Convention by a French national, French law will apply, by a waiver of the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 113-6 of the Penal Code, and the provisions of the second sentence of Article 113-8 of the Code will not apply . This provision, in effect, waives certain provisions of the French Penal Code with respect to the prosecntion of misdemeanonrs committed outside the territory of France. However, it waives these provisions only in the territory of non-States Parties to the CWC. With respect to States Parties, it can be assumed that normal French law (with its restrictions on the prosecution of misdemeanours abroad) would apply. It is unclear why France would choose this type of formulation. 

A State Party shall not produce, acquire, retain or use Schedule 1 chemicals outside the territories of States Parties and shall not transfer such chemicals outside its territory except to another State Party (Verification Annex, Part VI, Part A, para. 1) Schedule... 

Confidence-building measures. To reduce the likelihood that verification data may be misinterpreted, each State party will voluntarily notify the Technical Secretariat of any single chemical explosion using 300 tonnes or more of TNT-equivalent blasting material on its territory. In order to calibrate the stations of IMS, each State party may liaise with the Technical Secretariat in carrying out chemical calibration explosions or providing information on chemical explosions planned for other purposes. 

Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures to ensure that toxic chemicals and their precursors are only developed, produced, otherwise acquired, retained, transferred, or used within its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction or control for purposes not prohibited under this Convention. 

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