Understanding people

Accidents in construction (and elsewhere) are people problems at least as much as any other kind of problem. At some point, immediate or distant, people and decisions were involved. Toerris human we all make mistakes. It is the task of modern safety management systems to recc -nise that fact, and therefore to minimise the opportunities for mistakes, and to minimise the harm that can arise when they are made. Awareness of our limitations is needed before we can set up systems successfully which take those limitations into account and maximise safety efforts on site. 

Behavioural factors, sometimes called human factors , which affect human performance include  

All these can be found within organisations committed to a high standard of excellence in safety and health at work. 

A full discussion of the interactions between people and their organisation, jobs and working environment, and the influence of equipment and systems design on human performance, is beyond the scope of this book. The aim of this chapter is to provide an insight into some of the basic concepts involved, and to discuss some of the solutions currently used to tackle them. A concise and readable summary of human factors in safety can be found in the excellent HSE publication Reducing error and influencing behaviour . 

Some of these issues have been discussed previously modern techniques of managing safety and health incorporate best practice within them so as to produce and influence a positive safety culture. That means fostering positive attitudes to safety and health, and this can be done by  

Although the construction workforce is not made up of rats and pigeons, behaviourism can be recognised as the underlying theory of many different safety programmes found on construction sites, for example the Goals and Feedback approach (lOSH 2006) is based on behaviour modification. Drawing on Skinner s work, this approach assumes people will repeat behaviours that have a 

An example can be seen in expected utility theory, which states that people are rational decision makers that will weigh up the utilities of outcomes through probability, and seek to maximise expected utility from their actions (Baron 2008 Hardman 2009). This goes some way to explain why people will still take risks on site - if it will get the job done faster, the balance of safety versus productivity comes into play. However experimental research has disproved this basic assumption within certain contexts - people do not make rational decisions, and consequently further explanations have been developed, such as the Allais paradox, which states 

Other key ideas within the cognitive theories that are often employed within social research are those of values, attitudes and beliefs (Baron et a/. 2006). These elements are often seen as the basic criteria of many social phenomena, including the highly complex concept of culture, although it is attitudes, the inherent disposition to respond favourably or unfavourably to an object/person/ event (Aronson et a/. 2007), that are most frequently used, due to their accessibility through tools such as questionnaires or observed behaviours (Ajzen 2005). In construction, safety management often draws on this way of thinking in the use of safety climate surveys. 

Social constructionist theory examines individuals simply in terms of their social context and interactions with others (Wiggins and Potter 2007) - which actually means it does not really examine 

This approach might seem rather fanciful and unhelpful - surely it would be better to pin down why people do things, and seek explanations - but to see how this approach works in practice, consider the following example of a roofer on site. 

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The author wishes to thank the following for their considerable input Mr Richard Clark and Mr Anthony Kunesch (FCT Ltd), The Cooling Water Association (now The Industrial Water Society), Mr John Hill (Director of BEWA) and the many understanding people who gave permission for publication of the photographs. 

In law, particularly litigation, many occasions arise in which the ability to analyze and to understand people becomes an important asset. In numerous situations creating a rapport with a friendly or indifferent potential witness can lead to a fuller revelation of all the facts known to the witness. If the lawyer is unable to show understanding or to relate to an individual, some facts may remain hidden. 

Closely related to an ability to analyze and to understand people is an instinctively curious mind. Both facilitate investigation and revelation of facts—an important function of any lawyer, which like other aspects increases in importance with increasing complexity of subject matter. Chemists inherently tend to be inquisitive. This trait will help the chemist-tumed-lawyer during interviewing of witnesses, examining of witnesses by oral depositions, or in open court. When cross-examining witnesses, he will follow the witness s mental processes, learn what he may be holding back, and perhaps extract testimony that will be helpful to the lawyers case. 

Lawn chemical use is only one facet of lawn care, of course, and myriad other behaviors are relevant to understanding people s relationships with their lawns. Yet this initial result already upsets some simple assumptions about people s thoughts and actions, and raises some straightforward questions. What makes lawn people act this way What influences their behaviors How do people reconcile the complex outcomes of their decisions ... 

The position taken by Price and some other critics is psychologically understandable. People go to very strange and irrational lengths to protect their systems of belief. However, although I can understand this position, I do not believe that it has a legitimate place in scientific inquiry. 

Writing prescriptions is easy, understanding people is hard. (Franz Kafka, 1883-1924)... 

Understand people so that their efforts will harmonize with the realities of human nature Understand the learning process to ensure the optimal rate of growth and Apply that understanding on the job with diligence and patience. 

Let s examine these three components. Understanding people... 

A friend. I didn t want you to wake up with them taunting you. That would have been too horrible. You need my touch, my sympathy. I understand people like no other. I can prepare you for what is to come the offer you can t refuse."... 

There are many ways to remove or reduce hazards through design. Sometimes engineers forget to consider user capabilities and limitations, user behavior and the use environment (Chapter 7). Understanding people and their behavior is an important consideration in design. 

Improving communication both ways to enable industry and government to understand people s concerns and preferences once they have an unbiased understanding of the issues. 

People are at the core of health and safety. As research and experience indicates, most safety incidents are behavior related. It has been said that safety is a continuous battle with human nature but a fight that can be won with an appropriate investment in understanding people with all their capabilities, limitations, and behaviors. As such, successful health and safety management must be centered on people (Geller 1996)—both labor and management. However, the hiunan element is very complicated and dynamic, requiring constant attention and feedback. 

Appreciating this principle is key to understanding people and realizing the importance of actively listening to others before intervening. It also supports the need to depend on objective, systematic observation for knowledge rather than common sense (Principle 8). 

By using measures that are simple to understand, people can see the big issues more easily. They can measure and quantify the flow of activities directly, and ask themselves whether each of the steps in a process is adding real value or just adding cost. By following the flow through a process we can see where time is lost (see Chapter 3). This allows us to translate the data into time-reduction and cost-reduction opportunities. Looking at cost analyses alone does not tell anyone where to save time. 

All behaviour critical to the causation of accidents could not be shaped by information and motivation alone. Errors arising from insufficient adaptation of the work task to human capacity have to be approached through technical and ergonomic measures. .. Without such understanding, people will still be blamed for things that they couldn t have done otherwise and preventative measures will continue to be misdirected. 

Kantowitz, B.H. Sorkin, R.D., Human factors. Understanding people-system relationships, John Wiley Sons, New York, 1983. 

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