Training Operating Teams

If a toller has a contract to perform the same toll repeatedly, but on an infrequent basis, training should not be overlooked in preparation for restarting the repetitive toll. It is a good practice to provide refresher-training sessions to assure that the personnel have received current training. One company has picked a six-month period between campaigns as the indicator that the operations team needs refresher training. 

The what if/checklist is a broadly based hazard assessment technique that combines the creative thinking of a selected team of specialists with the methodical focus of a prepared checklist. The result is a comprehensive hazard analysis that is useful in training operating personnel on the hazards of the particular operation. 

It is not possible to predict all the potential situations which the process worker will have to deal with. Unfamiliar situations sometimes arise whose recovery is entirely dependent upon the operating team. When this is the case, the likelihood of success will depend upon the problem solving skills of the process workers. These skills can be trained in refresher training exercises... 

Test planning should recognize the value of familiarizing the operating team with column operation under conditions where mistakes are neither too costly nor too hazardous. It is often beneficial to schedule additional tests just for the sake of operator training. 

TASK h conduct the PrHA. PrHAs are conducted after all up-to-date process safety information is assembled and the team members are appropriately trained. The team should walkdown the process and facility immediately prior to the analysis, to have the process fresh in mind and to get a sense of the scale and orientation of the process, the surrounding facilities, and the location of operating and co-located personnel. 

As pointed out above in (3), it is possible to have more than one machine/operator—this is double tooling. For example, use two sets of load/unload fixtures on an indexing fixture to reduce idle time while waiting for the machine to cut. Or one person can service two machines (i.e., 1 operator/2 machines or 0.5 operator/machine). It is also possible to have 0.67 or 0.75 operators/ machine. Do this by assigning 2 people/3 machines or 3/4, that is, having the workers work as a team, not as individuals. This will require cross-trained operators, which is very useful when someone is absent. 

Postincident response may affect impact of the event. For example, a well-trained emergency response team can remove injured persons from the area and get them to hospital quickly, thus reducing the ultimate severity of the injuries sustained. Similarly, a well-trained operator will know how to shut down other units in the facility in a safe and controlled manner, thus avoiding a follow-on fire or chemical release. 

In practice, most operators are highly trained and will have a much better response rate than that described above. Nevertheless, it is best not to rely on human response during an emergency if at all possible. The operator should initiate an automatic shutdown, then remove himself from the area of the incident if at all possible. If the incident becomes increasingly out of control the trained operator should be supported by a trained emergency response team. 

Wolf, F.A., Way, L.W. and Stewart, L. 2010. The efficacy of medical team training Improved team performance and decreased operating room delays A detailed analysis of 4863 cases, zlnno/5 of Surgery, 252, 477-85. 

Although it was in the South and Southwest Pacific that flame throwers were first employed, it remained for troops in the Central Pacific to demonstrate the full potential of the weapon. This they proceeded to do in a long series of amphibious assaults that, paralleling MacArthur s drive in the Southwest Pacific, carried Army and Marine units from the Gilberts and Marshalls to the very doorstep of Japan. From the start commanders in the Central Pacific, especially Marine leaders, showed an interest in and an enthusiasm for the flame thrower unmatched in other theaters. Forces in the area were also blessed with an adequate and sometimes overabundant supply of the weapon, a relative absence of technical problems that plagued the Southwest Pacific, and sufficient time between engagements to train operators and assault teams. These factors helped to produce the success achieved by the flame thrower in the Central Pacific. 

Closely related to the problem of doctrine was the status of flame thrower training. Despite several 2-day flame thrower schools sponsored by Fifth Army, the lack of adequately trained operators remained a problem throughout the campaign. These shortcomings in doctrine and training occasionally added up to situations wherein untrained operators received poor support from improperly oriented assault teams with the consequent failure of the mission. ... 

Such exercises performed on pressurized wato- reactor nuclear power plants with EDF have confirmed the importance of the national emergency teams having access to Ae information supplied by the nuclear reactor safety panels. In such exercises, information is supplied by the EDF training centre operating simulators using the actual actions of an operating team confronted with a simulated accident situation. 

Team 3 Training teams (advanced MCR operation teams)... 

After the incident, an investigation team determined that the first operator had not added the initiator when required earlier in the process. When the relief operator added the initiator, the entire monomer mass was in the reactor and the reaction was too energetic for the cooling system to handle. Errors by both operators contributed to the runaway. Both operators were performing many tasks. The initiator should have been added much earlier in the process when much smaller quantities of monomer were present. There was also no procedure to require supervision review if residual monomers were detected. The lesson learned was that operators need thorough training and need to be made aware of significant hazardous scenarios that could develop. 

For inherently safer interactions of designs and procedures, include an operator trained in human factors on the design team. 

The Site I subeontraetor also laeked a baekup safety and health supervisor fully trained in site safety and health management. The aeting health and safety speeialist (HSS) at Site E was a site worker who had held the position for one week. This individual stated to the audit team that he did not meet the eorporate or SSAHP qualiheations required to hold that position. Apparently, while the Site E eontraetor was waiting for the results of the LTEV performanee test and the unit was not in operation, site management determined that less health and safety oversight was needed. 

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