SHE management models

The Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT) was first developed in the 1960s by the US Atomic Energy Commission. It has had large influence on the developments in SHE management since then. The idea at that time was to formulate an ideal SHE management system from a synthesis of the best accident models and quality assurance techniques then available (Johnson, 1980). 

Eigure 5.11 shows the main elements of MORT (Johnson, 1980 Knox and Eicher, 1992). They are displayed as events in a logical tree of, in total, about fifteen hundred basic events. Each event corresponds to a question to be addressed in accident investigations and SHE audits. The MORT diagram is not based on systematic research, but is rather a codified collection of the practical experience and judgement existing at that time. 

The top event of the tree is made up of the accidental loss (experienced or potential) to be analysed. The branches below the top event are built up around four principles  

the analyst has to address whether the accident represents an assumed risk or whether it is the result of oversights and omissions. Assumed risks are accident risks that have been identified, evaluated and accepted at a proper management level prior to the MORT analysis of an accident. The analyst will terminate the investigation if all these three conditions are fulfilled. 

In all other cases, the analysis will continue along two branches, called Specific oversights and omissions (S-branch) and Management oversights and omissions (M-branch) respectively. The S-branch of the MORT diagram focuses on the events and conditions of the accident occurrence (actual or potential). Flere, time develops from left to right. Causal influences go from bottom to top. 

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The Oil Industry International Exploration and Production Forum has issued voluntary guidelines for the development and nse of SHE management systems (E P Forum, 1994). These guidelines apply a similar SHE management model to that of the ISO 14000 family. 

There is a certain degree of arbitrariness in the development of SHE management models. The number and types of elements vary from model to model. There is no comprehensive theory behind any of the models, Rather, each model represents the collective experiences and perceptions of the expert team responsible for developing the model. Typically, these experts are inclined to believe in a structural perspective. 

Table 6.10 shows the causal hierarchy of different models of accidents. Here we recognise the two SHE management models of Section 5.7, MORT and SMORT. Also the ILCI model and TRIPOD include upper-management elements. TRIPOD is unique in the sense that it analyses the relations between human errors at different hierarchical levels. 

An ideal SHE management model defines the elements of the corporate SHE management system and its contents. 

There is no scientific evidence that helps us in selecting a particular SHE management model for use in this application. We have already touched upon some of the models available on the market (Section 5. 7). They apply the principles of feedback control and use codified experiences from SHE practice as input. The models vary with respect to the number and types of elements and in the detailed definition of each element. 

In today s competitive world, managers tend to look at their colleagues in other companies in order to learn from their best practices. Successful companies in the area of SHE become models for many other companies. 

This chapter presents a framework for the collection and analysis of data on accident risks, Figure 6.1. It borrows aspects from the different accident models presented in Chapter 5. We will apply this framework in a review of classification systems and variables used in the collection and analysis of accident risks. It will also be a common denominator in our reviews and analyses of different SHE management methods and tools in Parts HI to V. 

In the ILCI model, three common reasons for the lack of control at the workplace level are identified (1) inadeqnate SHE programme, (2) inadequate programme standards and (3) inadequate compliance with the standards (Bird and Germain, 1985). These elements also coincide with the main elements of the quality-assurance management model. 

Hale s problem-solving cycle is a typical example of a rational decisionmaking model that has been adapted to the needs of SHE management. 

The model has pedagogical merits by identifying important activities within a rational SHE management system. We may, for example, compare the way accidents are investigated in relation to this model in order to identify potential for improvement. It generates such questions as ... 

Example An oil company has developed a contractor s SHE qualification guideline, based on these principles (Statoil, 1997). Seven elements in the contractor s SHE management system are considered. They include (compare the E P forum model in Figure 5.13) Leadership and commitment Policy and objectives Organisation, resources and documentation Evaluation and risk... 

Norskoil applies common SHE management principles throughout the project phases in order to control and manage the different SHE aspects. The control-loop model of Figure 27.3 illustrates these principles. 

A portfolio manager has 100,000 to invest in a list of 20 stocks. She estimates the return from stock i over the next year as r(i), so that if x(i) dollars are invested in stock i at the start of the year, the end of year value is [1 + r(/)] jt(/). Write an MILP model that determines the amounts to invest in each stock in order to maximize end-of-year portfolio value under the following investment policy no more than 20,000 can be invested in any stock, and if a stock is purchased at all, at least 5000 worth must be purchased. 

The chemical engineer almost never encounters a single reaction in an ideal single-phase isothermal reactor. Real reactors are extremely complex with multiple reactions, multiple phases, and intricate flow patterns within the reactor and in inlet and outlet streams. An engineer needs enough information from this course to understand the basic concepts of reactions, flow, and heat management and how these interact so that she or he can begin to assemble simple analytical or intuitive models of the process. 

In this model, the ANALYST S role fundamentally changes from one of a technician to that of a supervisor of the expert system, ACanalyst. However, the MANAGER S role remains the same, although he or she now has the assistance of both the ANALYST and ACexpert in monitoring the... 

In order to use the data model with FEFLOW, MODFLOW or MIKE-SHE the geologic layers and aquifers must be transformed into representative layers subject to mathematical calculation. The transformation is mainly managed by the GIS data... 

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