Minimum safety requirements

The arrester selected has protective margins much greater than the minimum required. In fact even considering a protective distance up to 8-10 m, it would be possible to select the arrester with the next higher /res to enhance the life of the arrester without jeopardizing the safety of the equipment. 

This same organization may insist on fall proteetion at five feet instead of the six feet rule as outlined in the eonstruetion standard 29 CLR 1926.503, and so on. The point is simple. If you follow OSHA you have set minimum requirements for your operation. This is okay for some situations, but progressive organizations will set higher standards to make sure that all employees are proteeted to a greater extent. It is your deeision, and a refleetion of your eompany s safety program. 

Contractors and subcontractors are typically required by contract to be responsible for their own workers and should provide a level of oversight to meet all specifications. The primary contractor who is responsible for the worksite typically establishes the minimum requirements, controls access to the worksite, and verifies that subcontractors fulfill their health and safety duties and responsibilities. Wlien these specifications are defined, all contractors and subcontractors should meet or exceed these requirements, as appropriate. This could be based on the nature of the assigned tasks and associated hazards [2]. 

Subcontractor may be used in support zone or nonhazardous site activities. Eor limited activities at a hazardous waste site, the scope of work must be reviewed with the health and safety professional before work is started (examples landscape service, electricians, software development, training, etc.). The subcontractor must meet the following minimum requirements ... 

The Safety Goal Policy Statement was published to define acceptable radiological risk IVom nuclear power plant operation, and by implication provide a de minimus risk to be assured without cost considerations. Safety beyond the minimum requires cost-benefit analysis. Since being promulgated, bulletins and generic letters have been imposed to enhance safety, under the provisions of 10 CFR 50.109, the Backfit Rule. 

Minimum design vapor velocity through the holes may be used as calculated, or if additional safety is required increase the value by 20%. 

The Hydrocarbon Processing Industry (HPI), has traditionally been reluctant to invest capital where an immediate direct return on the investment to the company is not obvious, as would any business enterprise. Additionally financial fire losses in the petroleum and related industries were relatively small up to about the 1950 s. This was due to the small size of facilities and the relatively low value of oil and gas to the volume of production. Until 1950, a fire or explosion loss of more than 5 million U. S. Dollars had not occurred in the refining industry in the USA. Also in this period, the capital intensive offshore oil exploration and production industry were only just beginning. The use of gas was also limited early in the century. Consequentially its value was also very low. Typically production gas was immediately flared or the well was capped and considered as an uneconomical reservoir. Since gas development was limited, large vapor explosions were relatively rare and catastrophic destruction from petroleum incidents was essentially unheard of. The outlays for petroleum industry safety features were traditionally the absolute minimum required by governmental regulations. The development of loss prevention philosophies and practices were therefore not effectively developed within the industry. 

This exposure relationship is frequently more important in establishing human safety margins, as dose alone may be subject to a variety of differences between species such as absolute bioavailability, distribution, and excretion. This aspect, now commonly referred to as "toxicokinetics," has been outlined in an ICH guideline.6 This guideline specifies minimum requirements in terms of number of time points examined, number of animals per time point, and the requirements for calculation of various pharmacokinetic parameters such as Cmax, AUC. These will become important for comparison with human data as it becomes available later. 

The heart of Dow s safety and loss prevention program is summarized in Minimum Requirements for Safety, Loss Prevention and Security. Like other elements of safety and loss prevention, Minimum Requirements is revised as experience indicates revision is desirable. 

Minimum Requirements contains a statement of policy and a list of specific requirements in three sections, Safety, Loss Prevention, and Security, plus a section on Other Related Safety, Loss Prevention and Security Requirements. The latter section addresses distribution emergency response, industrial hygiene and medical programs, material hazard identification, and product stewardship. 

Others may create, implement, and update the operating discipline. However, the plant manager or superintendent bears the responsibility for establishing and maintaining it. At Dow, this responsibility is formally spelled out in the company s Minimum Requirements for Safety, Loss Prevention and Security. ... 

People selected for the audit team must know safety and loss prevention standards and terminology. In addition, they must be familiar with Dow s Minimum Requirements and with management s expectations for safety and loss prevention performance. 

There are a number of areas where the RHP and its component factors, have limitations and could result in mis-representation of a hazard or non-discrimination between hazards. For example, nuclear safety cases require the highest reasonably practicable levels of monitoring and intervention to be applied so that risks are reduced to a minimum. If these levels were used for the control factor in the RHP, discrimination would not be possible between the diverse range of stored materials for which the RHP is likely to be applied. 

A critical issue is the step coverage of the adhesion layer. This should be sufficient such that both the adhesion and the (chemical) barrier properties of the film are maintained. The minimum required step coverage depends upon the allowed nominal thickness at the top oxide surface (see figure 2.2) and the minimum thickness where both adhesion and the barrier properties of the material are still present. Assuming that for safety reasons a minimum thickness of the order of 0.05 pm is needed and that the nominal thickness will be of the order of 0.1 pm, then the step coverage should be 50%. For sputtered TiW in a contact of a radius of one micron and an aspect ratio of one, 50% step coverage has been shown to be achievable [Eltwanger et al.7]. 

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