Safeguard Agreement

All States required by article III of the Treaty to sign and bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements and which have not yet done so should do so without delay. 

Nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities should, as soon as practicable, be placed under IAEA safeguards in the framework of the voluntary safeguards agreements in place with the nuclear-weapon States. Safeguards should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. 

On 3 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687 (and a number of subsequent resolutions) on Iraq, which placed an additional and new demand on the IAEA resources and subsumed all other safeguards activities in that country. For the first time a Member State with declared nuclear facilities (which had been regularly inspected by the IAEA under a Safeguards Agreement) had clandestinely established additional nuclear facilities and had begun to produce nuclear material in violation of the Agreement. 

The production of nuclear material in a location which is not a facility , as defined in Article 98(1) of the Safeguards Agreement, does not exempt the State from reporting such material to the IAEA. Article 49 of the Agreement requires that when nuclear material is customarily used outside facilities, the State must provide the Agency with. 

It is of interest is to present here a list of items which were to be reported to the IAEA. Security Council Resolution 707 demands that Iraq, inter alia, halt all nuclear activities of any kind, except for certain uses of isotopes, until the Security Council determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the provisions of Resolution 707 and paragraphs 12 and 13 of Resolution 687 and that the IAEA determines that Iraq is in full compliance with the provisions of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. Once these determinations have been made affirmatively by the Security Council and by the IAEA, Iraq may seek to initiate the nuclear activities which are not prohibited by Resolution 687. Approval by the Security Council for Iraq to initiate one or more of these nuclear activities may necessitate a corresponding amendment to this list. The list contains articles specifically prohibited to Iraq under Resolution 687 as well as others which may be prohibited if they are used, or are to be used, in activities prohibited under Resolution 687. 

At its March 1995 meetings, the IAEA Board of Governors reiterated that under comprehensive safeguards agreements verification by the Agency should be so designed as to cover the correctness and completeness of States declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of any undeclared nuclear activities. 

The type of the safeguards agreement and facility, as well as all the above factors are taken into consideration when the safeguards approach for the particular facility is prepared. This approach will determine also the verification methods and the instruments that will be installed permanently at facilities and applied during inspections or used in the analytical laboratories on samples taken by the inspectors. 

Safeguards Agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency... 

In the operational context, arrangements shall be made to ensure that the facility operator is aware at all times of the location and quantities of nuclear materials in storage and to provide the necessary reports defined within the particular Safeguards Agreement. 

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