Process safety Baker report

The lack of a simple correlation between occupational safety and process safety was highlighted in the Baker report to do with the 2005 explosion at BP s Texas City refinery (Baker, 2007), one section of which states ... 

The discussion in Chapter 1 showed how safety and risk management programs developed over the last 200 years. Typically new programs and approaches were introduced once existing systems had become mature and well established. The discussion also showed that current risk management initiatives are largely to do with the topic of culture and employee participation. Hence much of the recent literature to do with Process Safety Management (PSM) speaks to the topic of company culture. For example, the Baker Commission report to do with the 2005 accident at Texas City... 

It is difficult to identify effective lagging indicators for use with process safety. The most obvious problem is that major PSIs do not occur frequently enough to develop a statistically significant trend such as that shown in Figure 2.3. If many facilities and companies pool their data it may be possible to that some trending results can be developed. However, such results are always open to doubt, not least because different organizations define terms differently. For example, the Baker report (Baker, 2007) provides a list of events that fall under the term fire. That list includes a fault in a motor control center. It is questionable as to how many organizations would call such an event a fire unless it resulted in actual flames. 

These mission statements and associated documents set the tone for the company. Even if these documents don t specifically mention process safety, these high-level managers should find a way to convey the importance of safety for the company. The first recommendation from the Baker Panel report on the BP U.S. Refineries highlighted this need ... 

The panel consisted of Secretary of State James A. Baker, 11, and ten other distinguished individuals, including leaders in industry, a former senator, a retired admiral, a professor of aeronautics, and process safety specialists. The panel completed their investigation complete with a 374-page report [17]. 

The Baker Panel reported their findings nnder three areas of emphasis The first focus area was Corporate Safety Culture. In the years since this Panel s report Safely Cnlture is being infused into maity organizations via the API RP 754 Process Safety Performance Indicators for Refining and Petrochemical Industries...and other w s. 

The Baker Report is so skillfully written that it is hard to paraphrase or compress most sections. The introductory page states why each of us in industry or ar one studying process safety should review the original report and its implications. See page 1 in the Baker Report [17]. 

Basically the panel declared that a positive safety culture is the required foundation for effective process safety performance. In a broad brush within the Baker Report a safely culture includes process safety leadership providing emphasis, employee trast and empowerment, snfficient resources, proper positioning of process safety capabilities, and incorporation of process safety into management decision-making. 

The execntive summary of the Baker Report [17] (p. xii) defined substantial weak features in BP s process safety culture including ... 

Several references are made in the Report to sections in ZIO as recommended practices. Those references, and by inference the ZIO standard itself, are testimony that they represent the state-of-the-art in safety and health management systems. In the Report, the most extensive references to ZIO processes concern Management Reviews. A very large part of ZlO s Section 7.0 is quoted, close to verbatim. The following, as it appears in The Baker Report, is close to a duplicate of the shall provisions in Section 7.0. 

Baker III JA, Bowman FL, Erwin G, Gorton S, Hendershot D, Leveson N, Priest S, Rosenthal I, Tebo PV, Wiegmann DA, Wilson LD (2007) The report of the BP U.S, refineries independent safety review panel. The baker report http //www.bp.coin/liveassets/bp intemet/globalbp/ STAGING/global assets/downloads/Baker panel report.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2014 Baram M (2007) Liability and its influence on designing for product and process safety. Saf Sci 45 (1-2) 11-30... 

One of the investigation committees was chaired by James Baker. The report that his committee published is generally referred to as The Baker Report (Baker, 2007). Although most risk management professionals understood the distinction between process and occupational or personal safety, The Baker Report was influential in making that distinction clear, as can be seen from the following quotation. 

The paradigm shift that The Baker Report helped bring about was an understanding that process safety requires its own management systems and that they do not necessarily correlate closely with traditional personal/occupational safety programs. In its ten key findings, the report uses the term process safety seven times. 

The Baker Panei Report inciudes a quesfionnaire used for a process safefy cuifure survey, ie it is about process safety, and not personai safety, and couid be adapted as required for a review of safety cuiture/ciimate. 

One of the recommendations of the Baker Panel Report following the Texas Qty Refinery explosion was that BP should establish and implement an integrated and comprehensive process safety management system that systematically and continuously identifies, reduces and manages process safety risks at its US refineries. The CSB Investigation Report made similar recommendations. These recommendations are equally applicable to sites with Buncefield-type potential. 

The presence of an effective personal safety management system does not ensure the presence of an effective process safety management system. The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel (the Baker Panel report ), following the Texas City refinery explosion in 2005, found that personal injury rates were not predictive of process safety performance at five US refineries. 

The CSB requested an independent panel investigate safety culture and management at BP North America. The Baker panel report found a lack of process safety management at company. BP CEO resigned in 2007. 

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