Baker Report

More recently Baker reported that indole magnesium bromide reacts readily in the cold with both methoxycarbonylaeetyl chloride and ethoxycarbonylacety] chloride. In the former case the main product was methyl 3-(3-indolyl)- 3-oxopropionate (249), accompanied by a small quantity of an unidentified substance (CioHgON), the ethyl ester 246 was the major product in the latter ease. ... 

Golgi, in early neuroanatomical studies (1898) staining neurones by silver impregnation, observed a reticular apparatus which was crescent shaped and appeared to be linked through canaliculi. The structure was also seen in secretory cells. Between 1949 and 1954, Baker reported the presence of similar systems in unfixed cells examined by phase contrast. The structures could be stained by osmium tetroxide and probably contained lipid. They also stained for glycoprotein and alkaline phosphatase. Baker s confirmation of the existence of the... 

The lack of a simple correlation between occupational safety and process safety was highlighted in the Baker report to do with the 2005 explosion at BP s Texas City refinery (Baker, 2007), one section of which states ... 

It is difficult to identify effective lagging indicators for use with process safety. The most obvious problem is that major PSIs do not occur frequently enough to develop a statistically significant trend such as that shown in Figure 2.3. If many facilities and companies pool their data it may be possible to that some trending results can be developed. However, such results are always open to doubt, not least because different organizations define terms differently. For example, the Baker report (Baker, 2007) provides a list of events that fall under the term fire. That list includes a fault in a motor control center. It is questionable as to how many organizations would call such an event a fire unless it resulted in actual flames. 

Some events are sufficiently serious as to justify making recommendations throughout the industry for example, an incident involving a highly hazardous catalyst could lead to a recommendation that new technology—one which uses a much less hazardous catalyst— is needed. A weU-known example of an industry-wide recommendation occurred following release of the Baker report to do with the explosion at a Texas City refinery (Baker, 2007). The persons who died were all working in temporary trailers. Within a very short period of time, most other refineries had removed trailers that were within their battery limits. 

Baker, J. (2007) The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel. Baker Report. London and Washington, DC. 

And then there is the 374 page Baker Report , which is officially entitled The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independerrt Safety Review Panel which was published in Jantrary 2007 [17]. A blue ribbon corrrrruttee was chartered to make a thorough, independent, and creditable assessmerrt of BP s safety culture, safety management systems, and corporate oversight at its five refineries US refineries. 

As recommended the BP Board of Directors established and funded an independent safety review panel in August 2005. This blue ribbon panel was chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, 11. The mission was to review the BP s corporate safety culture, safety management systems, and corporate safety oversight at all five US North American refineries. The report, published in 2007, was officially named The Report of the BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, however it is commonly called the Baker Report. ... 

The Baker Report is so skillfully written that it is hard to paraphrase or compress most sections. The introductory page states why each of us in industry or ar one studying process safety should review the original report and its implications. See page 1 in the Baker Report [17]. 

The first two sentences in Finding VT of the Baker Report (p. 59) states ... 

Basically the panel declared that a positive safety culture is the required foundation for effective process safety performance. In a broad brush within the Baker Report a safely culture includes process safety leadership providing emphasis, employee trast and empowerment, snfficient resources, proper positioning of process safety capabilities, and incorporation of process safety into management decision-making. 

The execntive summary of the Baker Report [17] (p. xii) defined substantial weak features in BP s process safety culture including ... 

This concludes the brief treatment of the BP Texas City disaster. For additional information see the 374-page skillfiilly developed and pubhshed Baker Report. Please also review a later chapter in this text entitled A Strong Safety Culture is Essential. A quick review of the Baker Report will make ai one a believer of the strength and value of safety culture. dewing the excellent CSB deo of this tragic incident entitled Anatomy of a Disaster Explosion at BP Texas City Refinery is a must. It is also beneficial to read the CSB s Executive Smmnary Report on this tragedy. 

Human and organizational faetors are also important and these were addressed in Recommendations 19-22. Recommendation 19 provided key characteristics of high reliability organizations. They eehoed the discussions in the Baker Report on the BP Texas City incident and CSB reports which covered that 2005 incident (see previous chapter). Finally, Recommendations 23-25 dealt with broader strategic objectives relating to sector leadership and safety culture, essential to ensure continuing progress [9],... 

The Baker Report, which was a follow up to the March 23, 2005, BP Texas City, Texas, catastrophic process accident, said it extremely well ... 

Little and Baker reported on field and laboratory studies of the use of dispersants in nearshore areas or on shorelines [J35]. Tests showed that some dispersant treatments can increase penetration of oil into sediment and that the oil may be retained in the subsurface. The nature of the shoreline or sediment was the main factor determining whether the penetration was enhanced by dispersant. On some shorelines it was shown that natural removal can be enhanced by dispersant usage. It was also found that dispersant-enhanced toxicity of oU could pose a problem and suggested that work be done on defining an effective minimum dispersant-to-oil ratio. 

The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel was made public in January 2007 it has become known in occupational safety and health circles as the Baker Report. The panel s chair was James A. Baker, HI, who has served in senior government positions under three U.S. presidents. 

Several references are made in the Report to sections in ZIO as recommended practices. Those references, and by inference the ZIO standard itself, are testimony that they represent the state-of-the-art in safety and health management systems. In the Report, the most extensive references to ZIO processes concern Management Reviews. A very large part of ZlO s Section 7.0 is quoted, close to verbatim. The following, as it appears in The Baker Report, is close to a duplicate of the shall provisions in Section 7.0. 

The Baker Report continued with these slightly modified excerpts from the advisory column for Section 7.0. Where we have inserted [safety management system] here, the actual designation in Section 7.0 is OHSMS. 

Baker III JA, Bowman FL, Erwin G, Gorton S, Hendershot D, Leveson N, Priest S, Rosenthal I, Tebo PV, Wiegmann DA, Wilson LD (2007) The report of the BP U.S, refineries independent safety review panel. The baker report http //www.bp.coin/liveassets/bp intemet/globalbp/ STAGING/global assets/downloads/Baker panel report.pdf. Accessed 16 June 2014 Baram M (2007) Liability and its influence on designing for product and process safety. Saf Sci 45 (1-2) 11-30... 

One of the investigation committees was chaired by James Baker. The report that his committee published is generally referred to as The Baker Report (Baker, 2007). Although most risk management professionals understood the distinction between process and occupational or personal safety, The Baker Report was influential in making that distinction clear, as can be seen from the following quotation. 

The paradigm shift that The Baker Report helped bring about was an understanding that process safety requires its own management systems and that they do not necessarily correlate closely with traditional personal/occupational safety programs. In its ten key findings, the report uses the term process safety seven times. 

The reports may, on occasion, suggest a new paradigm for managing safety in the industry covered. Examples of such paradigm shifts occurred in The Cullen Report and Piper Alpha in 1990 and The Baker Report and the Texas City explosion in 2007. 

The Baker report—The Report of the BP U.S. Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel— was developed after a catastrophe at a BP location in Texas City in 2005. 

A high reiiabiiity organisation has been defined as one that produces product relatively error-free over a long period of time (see the Baker Report ). Two key attributes of high reliability... 

The Baker Report was aimed, in particular, at the effectiveness of BP s corporate oversight of safety managanent systems at its five US refineries and its corporate safety culture. Amongst its findings were the following. 

The report of the BP US refineries independent safety review panel (The Baker Report), January 2007. 

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