Principle of Safety Definition

Decisions concerning the safety program can only be made if the basic (root) causes of loss-producing events are clearly identified. A logical and proper decision can be made only when the basic or real problem is first defined. (Prescription without diagnosis is malpractice.) 

Often a lot of manpower is wasted by directing efforts into the rectification of immediate causes of loss-producing events. The principle of safety definition states that the basic or root cause must be identified before a remedy is prescribed. 

As can be seen, the close calls or warnings in the form of near miss incidents clearly indicate the basic or root causes of systans failure and offer the opportunity to rectify the failings before loss occurs. They are the true accident indicators. 

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Definition of a medicai device Risk-based classification of devices Essential principles of safety and performance Labelling... 

Coal Mines, Determination of Firedamp and of Coal Dust In Atmospheres of. Although many instruments have been designed to detect the presence of firedamp (or rather methane) in mine atmospheres, the principles of the flame safety lamp (Davy-type lamp) still form the basis of many detectors. The Davy lamp invented in 1815 is briefly described under COAL MINE EXPLOSIONS AND FIRES and it is stated that each US mine should have at least two Davy-type lamps to serve as detectors of firedamp or of lack of oxygen. If firedamp is present in small quantity, the flame of Davy lamp elongates and if the gas is present in considerable quantity, the lamp becomes filled with blue flame. For more definite detection of gas, the flame of the lamp is lowered until the yel part is at a minimum. Then the gas will be discernible as a small blue cap over the flame. This method is described in Refs 1, 9, 12 25. Some investigators consider that the safety lamp method of detection of firedamp is not very reliable (Ref 7)... 

The European-Commission definition of the precautionary principle should be distinguished from the use of uncertainty factors during risk assessment or margins of safety during risk management46 [255]. Assessment factors account for assumptions made during the risk assessment process, such as when deriving no-effect levels. 

With the definition of the study as an experiment or set of experiments the Principles of GLP clearly want to express this notion that a study has to have a defined objective with regard to safety evaluation. Depending on the declared purpose of the study, a single experiment may or may not be sufficient to fulfil this requirement. This is a major reason why it should be advisable not to break down a study into a series of substudies, since none of these could then claim to pursue such an objective in the strict sense. Only in the coherent assembly of all parts, of the whole set of experiments , can a study become recognised as a full human health and environmental safety study . 

For the practice of safety to be recognized as a profession, it must have a sound theoretical and practical base. I propose that there is a generic base for the work of safety professionals that must be understood and applied if we are to be effective. We take a variety of approaches to achieve safety, and they can t all be right. To promote discussion, a listing of general principles, statements, and definitions is given. 

The safety airbag electric principles figure and definitions of connector clips are in Figure 1,SRS-ECU stitch definition in Table 1 and the position and form of safety airbag failures indicator lamp in combined instrument in Figure 2. 

The safety of a process can be achieved by inherent (internal) and external means. Inherent safety focuses on the intrinsic properties of a process and attempts to design out hazards rather than trying to control hazards through the application of external protective systems. Inherently safer processes rely on chemistry and physics (properties of materials, quantity of hazardous materials) instead of control systems (interlocks, alarms, procedures) to protect workers, property, and the environment. It would be inappropriate to talk about an inherendy safe process, as an absolute definition of safe is difficult to achieve in this context since risk cannot be reduced to zero. However, one can talk about a process or chemical being inherently safer than other(s). For instance, water can be an extremely hazardous chemical under certain conditions (e.g., floods), but in the context of a chemical process, water is an inherently safer solvent than other chemicals. Trevor Kletz has postulated some basic principles of inherent safety [79,80] that process systems engineers can follow when designing or retrofitting chemical processes. Kletz s inherent safety principles can be summarized as follows ... 

Due to the fact that FREQUENTIS has customers around the world, many different standards have to be followed. This lead to the definition of a generic safety process that comprises the basic principles of all those standards as most of them anyway differ more in wording than in content. This process is then tailored for specific projects and customers. 

Safety professionals take a variety of approaches to achieving safety, each based on substantively different premises. They can t all be right or equally effective. To promote a discussion toward establishing a sound theoretical and practical base for the practice of safety, a listing is presented of general principles, statements, and definitions that are believed to be rational. The list is a beginning It is not complete. 

Adapted from Federal Aviation Administration, Chapters—Principles of System Safety , 2000, and Chapter 4—Safety Assessments Before Investment Decision , 2000 (Principles of System Safety, 2000, chap. 3, Safety assessments before Investment decision, 2000, chap. 6). Adapted from Roughton and Crutchfield, 2008 (Roughton Crutchfield, 2008) Acquisition Risk Management Probability Definitions, n.d. 

Section 2 addresses the strategy of defence in depth and the importance of fulfilling the safety functions (SFs) to achieve the objectives for the different levels of defence. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the approach for making an inventory of the defence in depth capabilities of a plant. Section 4 discusses the applications of the approach and how to use the approach for assessing defence in depth. Section 5 presents conclusions. A discussion of the SFs is presented in Appendix I. In Appendix II, the objective trees graphically represent how, for each relevant safety principle , the safety objectives of the different levels of defence can be achieved by establishing defence in depth provisions at different stages of the lifetime of the plant. A test application of the approach is summarized in Appendix III. Definitions are provided at the end of the book. 

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