Port chemical officers

There were no personnel units at the CWS sections of the ports of embarkation or at the CWS government-owned, privately operated plants. Requests for funds to cover authorization of civilian positions in the chemical sections of the ports were forwarded through the commanding officers of the ports to the Office of the Chief, CWS. It was incumbent upon port chemical officers to supply the Chief s office with pertinent data relating to the jobs, such as organization charts and job descriptions. The OC CWS, particularly the Supply Division, kept close watch on all port activ-... 

Hemleben, CWS Actmiies at Pons of Embarkation, pp. 142, 206. 213. Approximatdy 15,000 aq. It. of CWS warehouse storage space was in use by the Port Chemical Officers at the smaller Ports of Embarkation. 

Sandell and his sergeants spent a few days in the Port Moresby area locating the chemical equipment which the regiments had discarded on landing. Most of the equipment was in a deplorable state, having been scattered in odd piles about Port Moresby and exposed to the elements. The gas masks, approximately 5,000, had been collected and put under cover. USASOS had established a forward base at Port Moresby, but the base chemical officer, inexperienced and recuperating from malaria, had been unable to locate either the labor or the materials... 

Responsibility for CWS operational supply projects rested with Marriott. Since he had very little assistance and since, after the move to Alamo Force at Milne Bay, even his own section was divided, most of the supply policy load fell directly upon his own shoulders. But even this was not difficulty enough in the difficult Pacific area. He lacked the logistic information and means of transportation, and his ability to improvise locally was practically nil, since there was no available civilian source of transportation and no substitute line of communication to Allied forces such as many field chemical officers had. New Guinea had no motor roads, no industry, and only a little unskilled manpower. Air transportation carried very high priority and water transportation was at a premium. Until 15 November 1943, he could deal with the Chemical Officer, Advance Section, USASOS, at Port Moresby. From 15 November until 31 March 1944 he dealt with chemical officers of Advance Section at Lae and Intermediate Section at Port Moresby. But miles of water or air lay between the USASOS sections and his office in Alamo Force headquarters, which was at Milne Bay until October, at Goodenough Island until December, and near Finschhafen until May 1944. ... 

Marriott spent much of his time in 1943 simply in determining how SWPA interpreted chemical supply, what channels existed, how much subordinate elements wanted, and where to store the immediate supply demands of organizations. In June 1943 USASOS provided that requisitions for TBA equipment should be submitted to base section chemical officers who could fill them without further reference. Requisitions for supplies in excess of TBA had to be approved by Marriott and forwarded to USASOS. The availability of non-TBA items in USASOS depended upon the ability of the USASOS Chemical Section supply officers to predict unusual issues and to persuade the United States authorities to ship them. Transportation could be obtained either by theater allotment of space, which was controlled in GHQ, or by San Francisco Port of Embarkation allotment. USASOS sometimes issued credits for controlled (non-TBA or scarce) items to Sixth Army for Marriott s suballotment, but each issue against credit had to be approved... 

There were several attempts in the Pacific to mount portable flame throwers in some sort of armored vehicle, a combination made the more appealing by the lack thus far of cannon or other antitank weapons in the enemy bunkers. In the South Pacific Area, for example, the commander of a tank battalion in New Caledonia installed a flame gun in the pistol port of a tank, and a chemical officer on New Georgia modified the flame gun so that it could be fitted into the aperture for the tank s bow machine gun. The tst Marine Tank Battalion, serving in the Southwest Pacific, mounted several portable flame throwers on its tanks in preparation for the New Britain operation. None of these improvisions could have been called successful. The portable flame thrower was not constructed to withstand the vibrations and jarrings... 

A basic responsibility of zone of interior distribution was supplying the ports of embarkation, the Army commands which, under the general authority of the Chief of Transportation, supervised the transfer of men and materiel overseas. Within each of these commands a chemical officer served as adviser to the commanding general on technical matters in his... 

The PROTECT architecture consists of sensors deployed in various subway stations, complemented by closed-circuit television (CCTV) cameras that have automated and manual pan-tilt-zoom capabilities. These sensor and camera combinations provide data continuously to a centralized chemical-biological emergency management information system (CB-EMIS developed by Argonne National Laboratory) located in a centralized WMATA operations control center. In addition to the sensor and video data from the stations, train operation data and ambient meteorological data are also ported to the CB-EMIS system. Under normal operations, CB-EMIS can provide operator access to the multiple fixed and movable cameras throughout the metro system to assist law enforcement officers or firefighters. It also monitors the status of the sensor systems deployed in the metro. 

The required qualifications, training, and experience of the assessors are described in the respective documents. With the exception of Ships, an assessor of an ISO 9000/14000 certifying body carries out the SQAS assessment. In the case of Port Agencies or Forwarders, however, self-assessment of the subsidiary may be considered, provided the subsidiary operates under the same safety and quality management system as the head office. In the case of Ships, the chemical company carries out the SQAS assessment on a spot basis. 

At the end of May, Shadle expressed his satisfaction with the chemical offensive potential and ammunition status in the North African theater. His view seems to have been overly optimistic since smoke pots, tear gas, and HC smoke grenades were the only ammunition items available in sufficient supply. All the chemical supply officers reported urgent requests for unavailable white phosphorus grenades. The Twelfth Air Force reported limited quantities of ANM50A1 4-pound incendiary bombs, a few Mja yoo-pound incendiary bomb clusters, and a considerable number of My4 loo-pound incendiary bomb clusters. There was no other chemical ammunition in the theater although the New York port had promised that 120 days supply of high explosive and smoke shell was en route for the three chemical mortar battalions which had recently arrived in the theater. Aside from a small amount of artillery shell stored by Ordnance, no toxics were available in the theater and none was scheduled to arrive until the fall of 1943. The March theater plan for gas warfare, the first such plan, was based on meeting possible enemy gas attack with this plainly inadequate supply of artillery shell. The new War Department policy for retaliation in event of enemy initiation of gas warfare called for the use of aerial munitions as the principal gas weapons. Shadle s satisfaction with the toxic supply status can be explained by the fact that he did not con-... 

The armies were moving rapidly forward in September when Rowan and the United Kingdom section of his office moved into the new COMZ headquarters in Paris. Supply of fast-moving items was by then on a hand-to-mouth basis. General Rowan personally visited the ports to expedite the distribution of chemical mortar shell which was finally arriving from the United States. Shortage of docking facilities frequently made it difficult to unload ships. But, when he could get shells ashore, he got the theater chief of ordnance to allot railway ammunition cars for his use and he had these cars included in priority supply trains. Usually no more than one day s reserve of shell was available in forward areas.""... 

The CWS in SWPA was not yet aware, at the end of June, of the War Department supply policy they had heard nothing at all from the United States in the first four months after the establishment of the USAFIA and were to have no word from the Office of the Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, until July. The basic War Department plan was dated 22 January 1942, and the specific plan for the forces in Australia was dated 2 February 1942. The specific War Department plan called for 90 days supply of all classes other than ammunition, computed on the standard tables of basic allowances (TBA) 90 days supply of ground ammunition, computed on the basis of a special ammunition day of supply for weapons in the theater and five months supply of aerial bombs, ammunition, and pyrotechnics, computed according to a special allowance per aircraft in Australia and the Netherlands East Indies. The Adjutant General instructed the technical services in the United States to compute allowances and set up shipments to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation, which was charged with shipment to the theater. The chiefs of the technical services were also charged with allotting funds to the theater for the operation of their services in the theater and for the local procurement of materiel. ... 

The audiors would like to acknowledge the siq>port of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) for their financial siqtport on the development of porous dielectrics under die Advanced Technology Program (ATP) in collaboration with The Dow Chemical Conqiany. The SAXS experiments were performed on the IMM-CAT beamline 8-ID at the Advanced Photon Source and was supported by the U. S. Department of Energy, Office of Science, Office of Basic Energy Sciences, under Contract No. W-31-109-ENG-38. 

Originally the depots located at CWS arsenals had the same name as the arsenals, which led to confusion in the mails. In July 1943, therefore, the names of those depots were changed as follows Edgewood Chemical Warfare Depot to Eastern Chemical Warfare Depot, Huntsville Chemical Warfare Depot to Gulf Chemical Warfare Depot, and Pine Bluff Chemical Warfare Depot to Midwest Chemical Warfare Depot. The latter two depots were under the jurisdiction of the commanding officers of the arsenals to which they were attached. While not officially designated as a depot, a storage area at Rocky Mountain Arsenal was used to store items not shipped immediately to ports of embarkation. 

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