Mortar battalions, chemical

Since First Army was responsible for all logistics arrangements on the Continent in the early period, the first job was to establish dumps, especially dumps at which the chemical mortar battalions could draw ammunition. The initial supply of several chemical items, including... 

Rowan gave much of his personal attention to the problems of operating in a nongas warfare situation. The chemical mortar battalions were in considerable demand for close infantry support from the time of their debut on the Continent, but since their extensive use in a nonchemical role had not been envisioned before the war, there was no well-established body of doctrine relating to their employment. In the resultant controversy over infantry or artillery fire... 

FUSA Chemical Section, devoted maximum attention to supply and to the needs of the chemical mortar battalions. It also meant the provision of supply support and tactical advice for the smoke generator units which were heavily employed by TUSA, especially in its river crossings. As a result of experience in these tasks, the TUSA Chemical Section found that the one chemical depot company attached could not handle all supply requirements. It recommended that two such companies be assigned, and more important still, that CWS should have far more transportation for the depot company, the smoke generator, and the mortar units. The CWS could not operate its own supply system, which it did with very little help from other supply services, and at the same time shift men and equipment in a fast-moving war without greatly Increased transportation. The chemical section suggested addition of a truck company to the Army for CWS... 

At the end of May, Shadle expressed his satisfaction with the chemical offensive potential and ammunition status in the North African theater. His view seems to have been overly optimistic since smoke pots, tear gas, and HC smoke grenades were the only ammunition items available in sufficient supply. All the chemical supply officers reported urgent requests for unavailable white phosphorus grenades. The Twelfth Air Force reported limited quantities of ANM50A1 4-pound incendiary bombs, a few Mja yoo-pound incendiary bomb clusters, and a considerable number of My4 loo-pound incendiary bomb clusters. There was no other chemical ammunition in the theater although the New York port had promised that 120 days supply of high explosive and smoke shell was en route for the three chemical mortar battalions which had recently arrived in the theater. Aside from a small amount of artillery shell stored by Ordnance, no toxics were available in the theater and none was scheduled to arrive until the fall of 1943. The March theater plan for gas warfare, the first such plan, was based on meeting possible enemy gas attack with this plainly inadequate supply of artillery shell. The new War Department policy for retaliation in event of enemy initiation of gas warfare called for the use of aerial munitions as the principal gas weapons. Shadle s satisfaction with the toxic supply status can be explained by the fact that he did not con-... 

Despite these handicaps, the chemical mortar battalions in the North African—Mediterranean theater reported only one instance when mortar fire was actually curtailed because of the shortage of weapons, parts, or ammunition. That there was only one such instance, in this case... 

Tbe availability of and requirement for chemical mortar battalions remained in doubt during the entire preparation period, and consequently no firm basis existed on which to compute weapons and ammunition requirements. Weapons supply and ammunition supply, in Colonel St. John s opinion, were adequate, and he believed that the only serious preinvasion chemical shortage was in repair parts for the mortar. ETO chemical officers, aware of the spare parts problems in the Mediterranean area, attempted to improve their own situation by requesting supply from the United States. The CWS at home had not yet remedied the repair parts situation. The task was doubly difficult because ASF was attempting to standardize all repair parts requirements computations, and, owing to the uncertain weapons... 

The ist Platoon, 2ist Decontamination Company, received an extra amount of training because the 3d Division had detailed plans for the use of ground smoke during the initial phases. The additional work for the platoon, and for a detail of two officers and thirty enlisted men from the 3d Chemical Mortar Battalion which augmented the division s smoke troops, was aimed at producing physical hardness, self-reliance, and proficiency in tactics of the infantryman. 

As of January 1942 there were two chemical mortar battalions, the id and 3d, on active duty. Four more, the 8ist, 8id, 83d, and 84th were activated by mid-year. During the ten-month interval from June 1942 until May 1943 the number of mortar battalions remained at six. 

Chemical mortar battalion was the designation prescribed by the last of several wartime tables of organization. Earlier names included separate chemical battalions, chemical battalions (separate), and chemical battalions (motorized). For the sake of simplicity, the designation chemical mortar battalion will be used throughout the text. 

Despite early difficulties faced by the chemical mortar battalions in their first combat action, they made a creditable record during the Sicily Campaign. The absence of established doctrine and, with the exception of the 2d Battalion, the lack of joint infantry-mortar training, resulted not only in some misuse of the battalions but in the failure to use them "where they could have been employed to exceptional advantage. ... 

The initial attack on the Winter Line saw all four chemical mortar battalions committed to action. The 3d Battalion, which had remained... 

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