South Pacific Area

The initial combat employment of chemical mortar units in the war against Japan took place in September 1943 during the fight for New Georgia in the South Pacific Area. It must be re-emphasized that the CWS did not receive authorization for the high explosive mission for 4.2-inch mortars until 19 March 1943, nearly seven months 

These initial mortar operations were accompanied by certain problems, notably those involving transportation and supply. Major Mc- 

Daily battalion expenditure of mortar shell on Bougainville during March was extremely heavy during the last three weeks of the month Company A alone expended 20,250 rounds in defense of a hill held by elements of the Americal Division. In an 11 March mission Companies A and D massed fire with 75-mm. and loj-mm. howitzers and with 6o-mm. and 81 -mm. mortars in a preparation which helped repel an enemy attack. Twelve days later Companies C and D joined with seven artillery battalions and two cannon companies in the heaviest general supporting fire laid down in the South Pacific fighting. 

Field artillery officers were impressed by the amount of effective fire produced by a chemical mortar company as compared to that of an artillery unit. Maj. John D. Tolman, who commanded the 8zd Chemical Mortar Battalion from 26 April until the close of the Luzon Campaign, disclosed that infantry commanders felt they could not properly accomplish [their] mission [without] 4.2-inch mortar sup- 

Infantry and chemical battalion commanders on Bougainville indicated that they were unfamiliar with each other s organization, tactics, and procedures and recognized the need for joint unit training. This reciprocal unfamiliarity continued to be a problem whenever a mortar unit was committed for its first engagement or a division had a chemical mortar unit attached to it for the first time.  

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The term theater will hereafter be used to indicate each of the Pacific areas and the senior U.S Army headquarters therein. The North Pacific and the South Pacific Areas will not be considered here since the major features of the Chemical Warfare Service experience are apparent in the SWPA and POA accounts. 

The South Pacific Area lay south of the Equator, east of longitude east, and west of longitude 110 west. It was a vast expanse and included more than one million square miles of ocean and thousands of islands among them New Zealand, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the Santa Cruz, Fiji, Samoan, Tongan, Cook, and Society Island. 

The 98 th Battalion encountered some of the same tribulations on New Guinea that had marked the fighting in the South Pacific Area. These included the unfamiliarity of infantry commanders with the capabilities and limitations of the weapon, the inadequate training of mortar personnel in infantry tactics and procedures, the excessive length of time firing personnel remained in the line without relief, and the deleterious effects of dampness on mortar shell components and their containers. The disadvantages of attaching mortar units to artillery... 

There were several attempts in the Pacific to mount portable flame throwers in some sort of armored vehicle, a combination made the more appealing by the lack thus far of cannon or other antitank weapons in the enemy bunkers. In the South Pacific Area, for example, the commander of a tank battalion in New Caledonia installed a flame gun in the pistol port of a tank, and a chemical officer on New Georgia modified the flame gun so that it could be fitted into the aperture for the tank s bow machine gun. The tst Marine Tank Battalion, serving in the Southwest Pacific, mounted several portable flame throwers on its tanks in preparation for the New Britain operation. None of these improvisions could have been called successful. The portable flame thrower was not constructed to withstand the vibrations and jarrings... 

USAFISPA U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area... 

The authors fully realize that the war was carried on in more than the four major areas usually considered herein. They have no desire to detract from the considerable contributions of the CWS branches in the other major areas and in those outposts which could not be designated major. But the authors believe that most CWS problems can be illustrated from activities in the European and North African/Mediterran-ean theaters and the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas with some reference to the South Pacific Area. The China, Burma-India, North Pacific, and Middle East areas are thus excluded. 

The CWS put its first intelligence units into the field in February 1944 when the Director of Intelligence, ASF, authorized the Chief, CWS, to send teams consisting of one major and four enlisted men to ETO, MTO, Central Pacific Area, South Pacific Area, Southwest Pacific Area, and CBI, where they would compose the CWS Section of the ASF Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams. These teams were trained to examine captured equipment and report any information of value. Before the war was over the original 6 teams were reinforced by 5 more, 1 for the China theater and 4 for ETO. 

In May 1944 the Commanding General, South Pacific Area, asked for colored smoke mortar shells. Chemists developed mixtures containing dyes that produced red, yellow, green, and violet smokes. With a fiize set for an air burst, shells containing these smokes erupted a colored cloud visible for some miles and lasting for several minutes in calm weather. Colored smoke shells were recommended for standardization shortly before the end of the war. ... 

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