Patent and licensing policy

Since 1950, the Federal Government has explicitly required Federal employees to report inventions created during the course of their work to the Federal Government (Executive Order 10096 15 FR 389). Beyond this requirement, however, there was no uniform patent and licensing policy for ail Federal agencies until 1980 when Congress passed the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act (Public Law 96-480). 

This license gave the Foundation an opportunity to use a patent and licensing policy first developed in 1947. This policy stated that the Foundation should own patents resulting from research work sponsored by it, should charge royalties for any license under any patent it owned, and should license any responsible applicant on a non-exclusive basis. The policy was thought to serve two purposes 1) to ensure that the results would be used to further the interests of the industry and to benefit the public, and 2) to obtain full exploitation of the discovery and give ample opportunity to demonstrate its usefulness in practice. 

The bulk of PHS technology transfer activity occurs at nih. Although the Patent Policy Board and OTT are located at NIH, they now also recommend policy and administer CRADAs, patents, and licenses for ADAMHA and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC),the other PHS agencies with technology transfer activities. 

The practical experience obtained from the patenting and licensing of sterile invert provided a firm basis for the expected, more extensive patenting and licensing program in the sucrochemical area. In 1957, the Foundation revised and refined its policies as a result of a two-year study by a special committee. 

Mowery, D., Nelson R., Sampat B., and A. Ziedonis. 2001. The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Research Policy 30 99-119. 

Award of such patents confers upon the individual or organizational inventor an exclusive right to exploit the invention for economic or other purposes (e.g., to use it for profit or license others to use it in return for royalties) and to exclude others from such use. The astounding breadth of such patents offers substantial economic opportunities. But it can also obstruct others from important research, a circumstance which has led many scientists to join others who decry the patenting and commercialization of life and nature, in opposing such trends in U.S. patent policy (Heller, 1998). 

According to the PHS Policy Statement on CRADAs and intellectual property licensing, In certain areas of research, e.g., where the Government has the intellectual lead or where both scientific and commercialization capabilities are deemed essential at the outset, NIH/ADAMHA may competitively seek a collaborator through Federal Register notification. The Patent Policy Board has left to each institute the decision of when to publish in the Federal Register (486). 

Until the 1980s, drugs discovered and developed in Federal laboratories rarely had patent protection because Federal policy dictated that they remain in the public realm. As a result of a series of legislative and policy initiatives developed during the 1980s, the Federal Government now patents drugs discovered in its laboratories and actively attempts to license them to the private sector.5... 

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