Operational risk management indicators

A Scorecard/Dashboard lists the elements of the Operational Risk Management System in place and numerical or alpha scores are applied to the elements, often resulting from audits. A color scheme may be applied to indicate the status of the Operational Risk Management System, such as ... 

This implies that the critical processes can be identified and that statistical indicators for breakthrough performance can be developed. This idea—focusing on the processes that are most critical with respect to hazards and the risks that derive from them— would enhance the effectiveness of an operational risk management system. 

In situation one, the organization to which the safety professional gives counsel has OSHA incident and lost-workday case rates (DART rates) three times that of its industry averages. Much needs to be done to bring operational risks down to acceptable levels. Leading indicators selected would be for the basics of an operational risk management system and a measurement system could be established with suitable and attainable goals. 

To minimize the potential for the occurrence of low-probability/high consequence incidents, the operations risk management system should include a distinctly identified activity designed for that purpose—if the inherent risks in an operation indicate that it is needed. 

Beyond playing a significant role as a measurement tool, audits provide the opportunity to share a set of fresh perspectives on areas where requirements have yet to be codified (e.g., process control procedures, management information systems, and maintenance programs). Audits also serve to indicate ongoing efforts to reexamine and reevaluate operations to further reduce operational risks and consequent liabilities (including property damage and business interruption). 

The definition of an accident contained in the original literature on MORT management oversight and risk tree) indicated that an injury was preceded by sequences of planning and operational errors which (a) failed to... 

Safety and risk management research in healthcare has adopted as its dominant trend the systems oriented approach, modelled largely on previous research in safely critical industries such as aviation and nuclear power. The systems view entails that the focus is not primarily on the mechanisms of individual human error but on the factors that shape human performance (Rasmussen 1986 Reason 1993,1997). In an organisational context, such factors are, of course, those that are within the control of the organisation. For instance, it has been suggested that quahty and safety are affected not only by operators professional and technical competence and skills, but also by their attitudes to and perceptions of their job roles, their organisation and management (Helmreich and Merritt 1998). Such employee attitudes and views are important elements which shape safety cirlture - and its related notion safety climate . Indeed, survey studies have shown that staff attitudes are important indices of safety performance not only in human-machine system domains such as railway operations and constmction (e.g. Itoh and Andersen 1999 Itoh et al. 2004 Silva et al. 2004) but also in healthcare (e.g. Colla et al. 2005 Itoh and Andersen 2010). 

The several bullets above indicate that the risk management process failed to minimize or manage the risks. Indeed, extremely hazardous processes usually do have several layers of protection and Bhopal personnel took active steps to override many safety systems. They took many known risks. Most disasters are the result of multiple failures to take known safety precautions. Often we are protected by multiple layers of safety, but when these layers are continually removed, we are put in jeopardy. As each layer is removed and nothing happens (but the risk increases), the operators become more comfortable in time, then seek to remove more... 

Success can best be achieved through application of a process model that merges proven performance management techniques with sound risk management practices. Experience indicates that the following eight process elements are essential for effectively maintaining workplace conditions and practices necessary to sustain incident-free operations. 

Exposure Monitoring Exposure monitoring is a critical risk management tool. Additionally, it assures the evaluation of enclosures and ventilation systems for proper design and efficient operation. If exposure monitoring results indicate a potential or existing problem, immediate actions should be taken to correct or mitigate the problem. 

Risk-based information provides a foundation for regulation of severe accidents. Early PRAs, with large uncertainties, indicated risk that was above or below the Safety Goals depending on containment performance. Consequently the NRC developed an Integration Plan for Closure of Severe Accident Issues (SECY-88-47) with six main elements to this plan 1) individual plant examinations (IPE), 2) containment performance improvements, 3) improved plant oper itions, 4) severe accident research, 5) external event considerations, and 6) accident management. 

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