Nuclear weapons dismantling

Note An article regarding safety considerations involved in the nuclear weapons dismantling process was reported in the New York Times of 6/26/96, page A16. 

In plutonium-fueled breeder power reactors, more plutonium is produced than is consumed (see Nuclearreactors, reactor types). Thus the utilisa tion of plutonium as a nuclear energy or weapon source is especially attractive to countries that do not have uranium-enrichment faciUties. The cost of a chemical reprocessing plant for plutonium production is much less than that of a uranium-235 enrichment plant (see Uranium and uranium compounds). Since the end of the Cold War, the potential surplus of Pu metal recovered from the dismantling of nuclear weapons has presented a large risk from a security standpoint. 

The political problems with profound economic impact could include, for example, the significance of the continuing worldwide growth of nuclear power, with such issues as the use of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and Plutonium obtained from tire dismantling of U.S. and former USSR nuclear weapons the urgency of nonproliferation the disposal of civilian and military nuclear waste nuclear power alternatives. 

The partial elimination of nuclear weapons has created an additional disposal problem. The thousands of weapons being dismantled contain thousands of kilograms of plutonium. Some of it is suitable for use in nuclear power plants. However, the less useful low-grade plutonium must be disposed of in a way that would not allow its use in weapons. One strategy being investigated is first to convert the plutonium into a hydride, which would allow its separation from other elements in the warhead or bomb. The hydride would then be converted to an oxide, which could be incorporated into a ceramic material containing neutron absorbers to stabilize the material further. 

High-level wastes are a different matter. After a period of time, the fuel rods in a reactor are no longer able to sustain a chain reaction and must be removed. These rods are still highly radioactive, however, and present a serious threat to human life and the environment that can be expected to last for tens of thousands of years. These rods and any materials derived from them (as, for example, during chemical dismantling of the rods to extract their plutonium for the production of nuclear weapons or for use as a nuclear fuel), are considered high-level wastes. 

The United States and Russia signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 1993 to eliminate two thirds of their nuclear warheads in ten years. By 1995, nearly 2,500 nuclear warheads had been removed from bombers and missiles in the two countries, according to U.S. government officials. ( Elimination, in this context, does not necessarily mean dismantlement many of the weapons that have been eliminated by treaty have been put in storage.) Although thousands of nuclear weapons still remain in the hands of many different governments, especially those of the U.S. and the Russian Federation, re-... 

DESTROYING AND RECYCLING MATERIALS RESULTING FROM DISMANTLING NUCLEAR WEAPONS... 

Size Reduction The dismantlement of nuclear weapons results in many thousands of pounds of plastic bonded explosive (PBX) waste in an assortment of hemisphere sizes and odd pieces. The PBX types of interest are PBX-9404, PBX-9501, LX-10, and LX-04. Size reduction is important in the subsequent destruction or recycling of this PBX waste. 

The design and evaluation of nuclear waste forms requires some understanding of the sources, volumes, compositions and activities of the various waste streams generated by the nuclear fuel cycle. There are three primary sources of radioactive waste in the United States (DOE 1997) the high-level waste (HEW) from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, the spent nuclear fuel itself, and plutonium reclaimed by reprocessing or obtained by the dismantlement of nuclear weapons. 

Plutonium Reprocessiug of speut uuclear fuel and dismantled nuclear weapons... 

Under the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, as well as unilateral pledges made by both the United States and Russia, thousands of nuclear weapons will be dismantled. Initially, this will result in between 70 and 100 metric tons of weapons-related plutonium that will require long-term disposition. The selected disposition strategy (stabilization and storage versus permanent disposal) should not only protect the public and the environment, but must also ensure that the plutonium is not readily recoverable for use in weapons (NRC 1994). The initial U.S. strategy called for... 

The interest in phosphate minerals is largely based on their ability to incorporate actinides (Ewing et al. 1995a). In addition to the Pu that results from dismantling nuclear weapons and the plutonium separated during the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power plants, substantial quantities of the minor actinides are generated annually Np (3.4 tons/yr), " Am (2.7 tons/yr), and (335 kg/yr). 

The disarmament policy conducted at present by states possessing nuclear weapons after the cold war has both positive aspects that are aimed at promoting peace on the Earth, as well as a number of security problems that are common to mankind on the whole. Among these problems, the most complicated are the provision of highly reliable radiation safety for the personal and the population as well as environmental protection when dismantling nuclear weapons and disposal of the resulting fissile and radioactive wastes. 

The vital nature of these problems is quite evident, as the world community has not had any experience in the practical solution of problems relating to the safety of broad-scale operations on dismantling nuclear weapons and their hypothetical medico-biological impact. 

The Russian Federation (RF) Ministry of Health has made supplementary provisions to ensure the radiation safety of these operations. In a special RF Government Decree (1994), a comprehensive research and practical program titled Radiation Safety and Medico-Hygienic Provision of Operations on Dismantling Nuclear Weapons Including Plutonium Disposal (1994-1998) was approved. 

The present report stresses the following safety aspects while handling radioactive substances produced as a result of dismantling nuclear weapons ... 

In addition to interaction between technical specialists, it was further noted the need for training and educational programs to achieve these objectives. It was also recommended that follow-up efforts should focus on safety management and safety technology development for weapons-related nuclear materials (exclusive of nuclear reactors, weapons dismantlement, waste disposal and other areas in which Memoranda of Cooperation exist between DOE and Minatom). However, it was further recognized that technical exchanges in the area of nuclear materials safety might benefit from a Memorandum of Cooperation between DOE and Minatom in this area and that efforts should be directed towards this accomplishment. 

The invitation to participants in the NATO Nuclear Materials Safety Advanced Research Workshop stated that the goal of a nuclear materials safety program is to enhance and improve nuclear materials safety and the safety cultures embedded in day-to-day operations associated with the storage and disposition of excess fissile materials from the dismantled nuclear weapons. The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of our cooperative reactor safety studies. It will be evident how that experience can be applied to enhance future cooperation related to use of mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel. 

As a result of the end of the cold war and the subsequent agreements, one of the most pressing issues for the international community is to decide on the fissile material recovered from ongoing and planned dismantlement of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. 

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