Nuclear material safeguards

Kipphardt H, Debievre P, Taylor PDP (2004) New mathematical models with associated equations for IDMS. Anal Bioanal Chem 378 330—341 Koch L, Arenz HJ, Von Baeckman A, Ciicchio A, De Meester R, Romkowski M, Van Der Stijl E, Wilhelmi M (1976) Improvements and e >erience in the analysis of reprocessing samples, safeguard nuclear materials 1975, vol 2. IAEA, Vienna, p 449 Koch L, Betti M, Cromboom O, Mayer K (1997) Nuclear material safeguards for P and T. In Global 97 international conference on future nudear systems, Yokohama, Tokyo, 5-10 Oct, Proceedings, pp 876-878(1588 pp)... 

Fissile materials within civilian nuclear power programs are well-safeguarded by an effective international system. Current-generation plants have robust designs and added precautions against acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, it is desirable for future nuclear fuel cycles and nuclear materials safeguards to design from the start an even... 

STATISTICAL PROCESS CONTROL NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFEGUARDS... 

Applications to Nuclear Material Safeguards and Other Prior Research... 

The hulls are the first material removed from the process to merit concern in respect to safeguards. These represent a possible route for special nuclear material (SNM) to be clandestinely removed from the system. Special instmmentation is used to assay the hulls containers for residual SNM. This step not only monitors the dissolver for proper functioning, but also serves an accountancy function as a material access area portal and enables the satisfaction of contractual requirements regarding process losses (40). 

Third, excesses beget excesses. While many nuclear advocates responded to the exaggerated importance placed on the fuel cycle by the Carter policy by rejecting ary relationship of nuclear power to proliferation, this view is equally unsupportable. Although less likely, the fuel cycle - with or without recycle -can be a source of nuclear material for weapons. This is why safeguards and many other features of the nonproliferation regime were developed. 

Symposium on International Safeguards Verification and Nuclear Material Security, Vienna, Austria, October 29-November 2, 2001. 

To ensure the independence of the destructive analyses required by the safeguards system, the IAEA set up a Safeguards Analytical Laboratory as a part of its other Laboratories, adjacent to the Austrian Research Centre near the village of Seibersdorf some 30 kilometres south of Vienna. Here, a team of 20 scientists and technicians determine the concentration and isotopic composition of safeguarded nuclear materials by the analysis of samples taken at all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle, at some 56 nuclear facilities all over the world. 

As the accuracy of nuclear material accountability and safeguards measurements improves, it is appropriate to examine whether the reference materials used for the calibration of such measurements and the physical constants used in their evaluation provide with sufficient accuracy the expected link between field measurements and the SI system. 

Traditional safeguards measurements involve primarily the elemental and isotope analysis of nuclear materials encountered in declared plants and processes. New safeguard procedures, designed to verify that no illegitimate activity takes place clandestinely, lead to the more stringent performance of other analytical measurements. The following are examples of such additional measurements ... 

In August 1993, the number of facilities which deal with nuclear materials under safeguards reached 248, including the major facilities indicated in Fig. 11.3. The Nuclear Regulation Law mandates all of these facilities to receive permits for installation, business, use and change. In addition, the Law mandates that these facilities receive permits for procedures which stipulate the implementation of strict accountancy within these facilities. A breakdown of the types of facilities is indicated in Table 11.6 (after Hayashi et al., 1994). 

On 3 April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687 (and a number of subsequent resolutions) on Iraq, which placed an additional and new demand on the IAEA resources and subsumed all other safeguards activities in that country. For the first time a Member State with declared nuclear facilities (which had been regularly inspected by the IAEA under a Safeguards Agreement) had clandestinely established additional nuclear facilities and had begun to produce nuclear material in violation of the Agreement. 

The production of nuclear material in a location which is not a facility , as defined in Article 98(1) of the Safeguards Agreement, does not exempt the State from reporting such material to the IAEA. Article 49 of the Agreement requires that when nuclear material is customarily used outside facilities, the State must provide the Agency with. 

The technical objective of the safeguards procedures set forth in the Agreement, as described in Article 28, which relates to the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection, does not imply that any minimum quantity of nuclear material is required for the application of safeguards. 

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