Hazard Analysis Results

CFR830.6 29CFR1910.119(e)(7) 40CFR68.67(g) 4.2.1.7 Hazard analysis results and documentation, including updates, shall be retained for the life of the process operation... 

Perform safety audits, performance assessments, and inspections using the hazard analysis results as the preconditions for operations and maintenance. Collect data to ensure safety policies and procedures are being followed and that education and training about safety is effective. Establish feedback channels for leading indicators of increasing risk. 

It should be noted that not all managers agree with the need to be circumspect with regard to the communication of hazards analysis results. Once a hazard has been identified as being serious enough to require action, words that attenuate the recommendations will not make any difference if the incident actually occurs— the company will still be faced with a situation where a hazard was known about but had not been addressed. Fine words butter no parsnips. ... 

Advising and assisting human resources specialists when applying hazard analysis results or deahng with the capabilities and limitations of personnel. 

Hazard analysis results are summarized and displayed. A final hazard classification of the SNL HCF and the radioactive material storage areas, consistent with DOE-STD-1027-92, is also presented (DOE 1992b). Finally, a limited set of bounding hazards is Identified for further development using quantitative, deterministic techniques In Section 3.4, "Accident Analysis."... 

This appendix presents the potential external events that are considered in the hazard analysis of the Hot Cell Facility (HCF) and its associated radioactive material storage facilities. From this list of events, a screening assessment was performed to eliminate from further consideration any of e events that posed little or no hazard to the HCF and associated radioactive material storage facilities or their contents. Events that were not eliminated in this screening process were to be analyzed more closely as part of the qualitative analyses contained in Appendix 3C or 3D (and are summarized in Section 3.3.2, Hazard Analysis Results ). 

Often repair of the found defects is extremely undesirable. Therefore, for discontinuities which are potentially hazardous, it is very important to have a onfirmation of their stability. In this case monitoring of potentially hazardous discontinuities is well supported by automated UT systems and based on the comparative analysis results, the actual data from examination of a section of the welded joint of a (hydrogen) separator are given in Figures 5,6. 

The purpose of hazard analysis and risk assessment ia the chemical process industry is to (/) characterize the hazards associated with a chemical facihty (2) determine how these hazards can result in an accident, and (J) determine the risk, ie, the probabiUty and the consequence of these hazards. The complete procedure is shown in Figure 1 (see also Industrial hygiene Plant safety). 

The subsequent step is to identify the various scenarios which could cause loss of control of the hazard and result in an accident. This is perhaps the most difficult step in the procedure. Many accidents have been the result of improper characterization of the accident scenarios. For a reasonably complex chemical process, there might exist dozens, or even hundreds, of scenarios for each hazard. The essential part of the analysis is to select the scenarios which are deemed credible and worst case. 

Hazard analysis does have limitations. First, there can never be a guarantee that the method has identified all of the hazards, accident scenarios, and consequences. Second, the method is very sensitive to the assumptions made by the analysts prior to beginning the procedure. A different set of analysts might well lead to a different result. Third, the procedure is sensitive to the experience of the participants. Finally, the results are sometimes difficult to interpret and manage. 

An important part of hazard analysis and risk assessment is the identification of the scenario, or design basis by which hazards result in accidents. Hazards are constandy present in any chemical faciUty. It is the scenario, or sequence of initiating and propagating events, which makes the hazard result in an accident. Many accidents have been the result of an improper identification of the scenario. 

Risk-Based Inspection. Inspection programs developed using risk analysis methods are becoming increasingly popular (15,16) (see Hazard ANALYSIS AND RISK ASSESSMENT). In this approach, the frequency and type of in-service inspection (IS I) is determined by the probabiUstic risk assessment (PRA) of the inspection results. Here, the results might be a false acceptance of a part that will fail as well as the false rejection of a part that will not fail. Whether a plant or a consumer product, false acceptance of a defective part could lead to catastrophic failure and considerable cost. Also, the false rejection of parts may lead to unjustified, and sometimes exorbitant, costs of operation (2). Risk is defined as follows ... 

Experimental analysis involves the use of thermal hazard analysis tests to verify the results of screening as well as to identify reaction rates and kinetics. The goal of this level of testing is to provide additional information by which the materials and processes may be characterized. The decision on the type of experimental analysis that should be undertaken is dependent on a number of factors, including perceived hazard, planned pilot plant scale, sample availability, regulations, equipment availability, etc. 

Remember that the failure position of a valve refers to its failure mode if there is a utility failure. A valve can mechanically fail in any position it is possible for a fail closed valve to get stuck in the open position. When doing a process hazard analysis it is important to consider all possible failure positions of a valve, and not only the failure position resulting from utility failure. 

HAZWOPER applies only where exposure to hazardous substanees or to health and safety hazards resulting from a hazardous waste operation is likely (see Eigure 2-1). This ean be determined by analysis of exposure monitoring data, hazard eharaeterization, hazard analysis, or exposure assessment [1]. Some of the speeifle examples of work aetivi-ties and situations will be eovered later. 

The what if/checklist is a broadly based hazard assessment technique that combines the creative thinking of a selected team of specialists with the methodical focus of a prepared checklist. The result is a comprehensive hazard analysis that is useful in training operating personnel on the hazards of the particular operation. 

The employer establishes a system to promptly address the team s results, timely resolve recommendations, schedule completion, and communicate the activities to affected personnel, livery five years after the completion of the initial process hazard analysis, it is equivalently updated and revalidated. Employers retain the required process hazards analyses for the life of the nmei-v -.. 

Hazards analysis techniques fall in two broad categories. Some techniques focus on hazards control by assuring that the design is in compliance with a pre-existing standard practice. These techniques result from prior hazards analysis, industry standards and recommended practices, results of incident and accident evaluations or similar facilities. Other techniques are predictive in that they can be applied to new situations where such pre-existing standard practices do not exist. 

Assume that the system described below exists in a process unit recently purchased by your company. As the manager, the safety of this unit is now your responsibility. You are concerned because your process hazard analysis team identified the potential for an operator error to result in a rupture of the propane condenser. You have commissioned a human reliability analysis (HRA) to estimate the likelihood of the condenser rupturing as the result of such an error and to identify ways to reduce the expected frequency of such ruptures... 

The human factors audit was part of a hazard analysis which was used to recommend the degree of automation required in blowdown situations. The results of the human factors audit were mainly in terms of major errors which could affect blowdown success likelihood, and causal factors such as procedures, training, control room design, team communications, and aspects of hardware equipment. The major emphasis of the study was on improving the human interaction with the blowdown system, whether manual or automatic. Two specific platform scenarios were investigated. One was a significant gas release in the molecular sieve module (MSM) on a relatively new platform, and the other a release in the separator module (SM) on an older generation platform. 

The OSHA investigation13 found that (1) no process hazard analysis had been performed in the polyethylene plant, and as a result, many serious safety deficiencies were ignored or overlooked (2) the single-block (DEMCO) valve on the settling leg was not designed to fail to a safe closed position when the air failed (3) rather than relying on a single-block valve, a double-... 

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