Gas munition

Swearengen, Thomas F. Tear Gas Munitions An Analysis of Commercial Riot Gas Guns, Tear Gas Projectiles, Grenades, Small Arms Ammunition, and Related Tear Gas Devices. Springfield, IL Charles C Thomas Publisher, 1966. 

Gas Munition. Munition such as bomb, projectile, pot, candle or spray tank contg a chemical agent (See Vol 2 of Encycl, pp C165-R to C178-R) and means of release Ref Glossary of Ordn (1959), 133 R... 

Swearengen TR (1966). Tear-Gas Munitions. Spring-field, VA USA Thomas. 

Intelligence reports indicate extensive preparation for gas warfare by the USSR with current Soviet superiority over the U.S. in this field as to stockpiles of gas munitions, currently operating war-gas plant capacity, and Soviet ability to maintain this superiority for at least 12 months after the start of hostilities, assuming the U.S. gas warfare position is not improved prior to M-Day.118... 

From factories and plants, gas munitions and containers had to be transported to the battlefield. For example, from the Edgewood arsenal (Aberdeen Proving Ground) the gas was transported by railroad to docks on the Bush River. Such depots and loading facilities could be expected... 

Experience with the leftover gas shells found on the World War I European battlelields conclusively demonstrates that the gas in these shells remains viable and tiiat the shells wiU corrode through releasing the gas. A very definitive article on the hazards of remaining World War I gas munitions is The Soldiers Moved On. The War Moved On. The Bombs Stayed. by Donovan Webster, from the Smithsonian Magazine (1994). The article consists of interviews with the French demineurs, who find and destroy the live munitions on the European battlefields. Many demineurs have been hurt or killed by gas shells. 

TGM Tear Gas Munitions Swearengen, Thomas F., Thomas, Charles C. Springfield... 

In the Far Eastern theatre, the first use of gas warfare was never seriously considered by the dominant Allied power - the United States. Until 1945 American gas policy has been aptly described as one of minimum deterrence, aimed at inhibiting initiation by the Axis nations. This limited objective reflected Roosevelt s fierce opposition to gas warfare and his declaration that America would never employ it initially. It also derived from a reluctance by the military to divert scarce resources to improve their gas readiness in the Far East. By January 1945, the United States possessed sufficient munitions to launch a gas attack but the bulk of them remained in the United States. Neither of the Pacific Theatre Commanders had allocated the requisite shipping space to transport the gas munitions overseas. In the Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Chester Nimitz retained only about 5 per cent of the authorised stocks while in the Southwest Pacific Area General... 

Another question which the War Department referred to the committee dealt with requirements for nonpersistent gases. The CWS had proposed the expansion of production facilities to create stockpiles of nonpersistent gas munitions which the AAF desired in 1944. The USCWC suggested instead that sufficient facilities be created to sustain operational gas warfare. The desired stockpiles could be manufactured by these plants and the plants then placed in standby condition pending the outbreak of gas warfare. Such a step would, in effect, provide a broad production base that would make possible a considerable expansion in the event of gas warfare. " Although the War Department adopted this idea in principle, it authorized only one half of the production increase proposed by the USCWC." ... 

The USCWC undertook to make statistical studies of theater stocks of chemical munitions beginning in December 1943. From these studies the committee evolved certain fundamental principles upon which future committee recommendations were based. One principle was that in the event the Axis Powers used gas U.S. retaliation should be immediate and intensive, with airplanes flying 150 percent of their normal number of missions during the first fifteen days of gas warfare. After this initial effort, in which bomb loads would consist of 75-percent gas munitions and 25-percent high explosives, the normal number of aircraft missions would be flown with 50 percent of the bomb load consisting of gas. Additional principles were that the European and Mediterranean Theaters of Operations, where the United Nations were on the strategic offensive, should have... 

JPS 484/5, 28 May 45, Theater Plans for Cml Warfare. The JPS felt that in view of the extremely tight shipping situation likely to last until after Operation Olympic (the invasion of the island of Kyushu) the forward shipment of gas munitions should be avoided unless there was a likelihood gas would be used. 

Compared to the amount of organization and effort involved in defensive training, that devoted to offensive chemical warfare was relatively limited. Policy in this field was frequently reviewed by the War Department General Staff. Standard procedure was that chemical weapons developed for the U.S. Army should be produced "with a view to employment by one or more of the combatant branches (that is, by Infantry, Field Artillery, Air Corps, etc.). For such materiel, the CWS was in theory a producer and supplier only. But the Chemical Warfare Service was never content merely to purvey. It took the view that the stocks of smoke, incendiary, and gas munitions were specialties, the merits of which might be overlooked if not adequately utilized. Hence an important function of CWS officers detailed to the faculties of special service schools and the Command and General Staff School was to further the introduction of chemical warfare situations into instructional problems and at the same time assist in the development of doctrine covering the employment of chemical munitions by the several combat arms. The Chief, CWS, selected instructors for assignment to those schools with the utmost care. 

Considerable training had been accomplished in connection with the projected mobilization of chemical combat troops. The composition of these troops and the tactics of their employment in conjunction with field armies were studied at service schools and in correspondence courses. The CWS expected that gas warfare would be resumed where it had left off in 1918 that the scale of gas casualties suffered by the American Army would be reduced because of improved defensive techniques and that gathering momentum in the United States in the production of gas munitions during the final phases of World War I would quickly be regained in a new war so as to assure dominance in this field. In the view of the Chemical Warfare Service, at least, gas was a normal military weapon and, as a result of progressive training, the theory of its employment had become integrated into the main stream of Army tactical doctrine. 

Ochsner Report, p. 22 Hinsley, op. cit., pp. 675-6 and Index, dtes PRO WO 208/3576 as referring to the capture of German gas munitions in the Middle East. The file is, however, closed until 2022, and it is therefore not possible to ascertain the precise nature of the munitions. A UPI Cable of 22 April 1942 reported that Germany carries complete gas equipment in the field but in containers marked To be used only on orders from the Fuehrer in PRO PREM 3/88/3. 

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