Southwest Pacific Area

20 Apr 44. (4) The Sad remained on Bougainville until December 1944, when it sailed for Luzon. 

References used for this section, unless otherwise noted, include (i) Unit Reds, 9 th Cml Mortar Bn (CMLHO) (a) Sixth Army AAR s (Sixth Army Reds, ORB, CMLHO). 

In April 1944 General Mac Arthur launched a new offensive along the northern coast of New Guinea in a series of operations which, in collaboration with Admiral Nimitz drive through the Central Pacific, would place American forces in a position to retake the Philippine Islands. On 22 April Mac Arthur s initial objectives, Hollandia and Aitape, were attacked by I Corps operating as Reckless Task Force.  

The elements of Reckless Task Force had chemical mortar support for the Hollandia operation, but this support came from a rather odd source. Because of a shortage of mortar units in the zone of interior the War Department in February 1944 authorized the SWPA to convert a tank destroyer battalion to a chemical mortar battalion at the earliest practicable date. Almost immediately the theater reorganized the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion which, after a brief period of training, participated in the Hollandia operation, under command of Lt. Col. Alexander Batlin. But redesignation waited until Jime 1944, producing the anomalous situation of a so-called tank destroyer unit firing 4.2-inch chemical mortars.  

For details of the strategic decisions and tactical aspects of these operations along New Guinea s northern coast, see Smith, Approach to the Philippines. 

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Records of General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) U.S. Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC)... 

Army Forces in the Far East, Southwest Pacific Area. US Government Printing Office Washington DC. 

In the Far Eastern theatre, the first use of gas warfare was never seriously considered by the dominant Allied power - the United States. Until 1945 American gas policy has been aptly described as one of minimum deterrence, aimed at inhibiting initiation by the Axis nations. This limited objective reflected Roosevelt s fierce opposition to gas warfare and his declaration that America would never employ it initially. It also derived from a reluctance by the military to divert scarce resources to improve their gas readiness in the Far East. By January 1945, the United States possessed sufficient munitions to launch a gas attack but the bulk of them remained in the United States. Neither of the Pacific Theatre Commanders had allocated the requisite shipping space to transport the gas munitions overseas. In the Pacific Ocean Area, Admiral Chester Nimitz retained only about 5 per cent of the authorised stocks while in the Southwest Pacific Area General... 

Chemical Warfare Tactical Supply, Southwest Pacific Area Tactical Supply Policy... 

Another processing company in the Southwest Pacific Area, the 103d, though its overseas experience was much like that of the 105th,... 

In the early phases of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area commanders who considered area screening as a means of concealing airfields from enemy air attack ran up against several serious problems. These included not only a lack of a suitable means for static screening and a shortage of smoke materials but also a scarcity in shipping, both within the immediate area and from the United States to SWPA. If smoke was to be used the means and material would have to be devised locally. 

In July SWPA pressed the War Department for the immediate shipment of the two smoke companies and speculated on the reduced requirement for smoke pots if three smoke generator battalions were assigned. People in the Southwest Pacific Area were also concerned with the possibility that the two companies, which by September had not yet arrived, would be equipped with the 3,000-pound Mi generator, instead of the new lightweight Ma. Meanwhile, in response to the... 

During the first nine months of 1943 the loth Chemical Maintenance Company at Brisbane, commanded by Capt. John J. Shaffer, conducted extensive flame thrower tests in order to locate the major sources of trouble, a project which included the thorough overhaul of all flame throwers in the Southwest Pacific Area. The unit discovered that most malfunctions resulted from deteriorated cylinders and batteries which had succumbed to the deleterious temperatures and humidity of the tropics. All flame throwers shipped to the Southwest Pacific or carried as equipment by units arriving in the area were thoroughly tested, repaired, and waterproofed by trained technicians under the direction of Colonel Copthorne and his staff. Though fundamental defects remained, the work of the SWPA Chemical Section went a long way in effectively preventing a repetition of the mishaps suffered on Buna. 

Southwest Pacific Area established 18 April 1942. Strength merged under U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific from 1 July 1945. 

The CWS put its first intelligence units into the field in February 1944 when the Director of Intelligence, ASF, authorized the Chief, CWS, to send teams consisting of one major and four enlisted men to ETO, MTO, Central Pacific Area, South Pacific Area, Southwest Pacific Area, and CBI, where they would compose the CWS Section of the ASF Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service Teams. These teams were trained to examine captured equipment and report any information of value. Before the war was over the original 6 teams were reinforced by 5 more, 1 for the China theater and 4 for ETO. 

Hemleben, CWS-MIT Development Laboratory, pp. 201-04. (2) Off, Ch Cml O, USASOS, Southwest Pacific Area, Japanese Chemical Warfare. Hereafter cited as Japanese Chemical Warfare. 

USASOS United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area... 

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