Facilities security

Threats of Concern Terrorist acts can be the most problematic to defend against since they may be more extreme or malevolent than other crimes focused on monetary gains or outcomes with less malicious intent. Plus terrorists may use military tactics not often provided for in base chemical facility design. Chemical facility security must be considered in context with local and national homeland security and law enforcement activities, as well as with emergency response capabilities. There is a practical limit to the ability of a chemical site to prevent or mitigate a terrorist act. Above a certain level of threat, the facility needs to rely on law enforcement and military services to provide physical security against extreme acts of intentional harm. The security posture must be risk-based, and so extremely robust security measures are not always applicable or necessary. 

Shea, D. A. 2008. Chemical facility security Regulation and issues for Congress. Washington,... 

Note At the time of this writing, the chemical facility security information from the Congressional Research Service, which is presented here, was last updated in January 2008. 

For existing facilities, security upgrades should be based on the results generated from the vulnerability assessment, which characterizes and prioritizes those assets that may be targeted. The vulnerabilities identified must be protected. 

It is not the intent of this Guideline to deal in depth with facility security issues. However, effective fire prevention in a processing facility depends on people in addition to systems to detect developing fires and other incidents and to detect unauthorized intrusion into the facility. Intruder-caused vandalism, damage, spills, releases, or fires are not common, but are a credible threat. The potential fire prevention and protection requirements to manage the risk of security events from terrorism need to be considered in the overall fire protection system design. 

Vandalism. Vandalism is a surprisingly significant cause of spills. If a facility adopts a tank management program aimed at preventing leaks and spills, one of its elements addresses facility security. 

RCRA incinerator regulations include administrative as well as performance standards. Administrative standards include procedures for waste analysis, inspection of equipment, monitoring, and facility security. Steps needed to meet administrative standards are outlined in the permit application performance standards are demonstrated during a trial bum. Trial bum operating conditions are included in the permit to assure ongoing compliance with the performance standards. Performance standards include destruction and removal efficiency (DRE), particulate emissions limits, products of incomplete combustion emission limits, metal emission limits, and HC1 and Cl emission limits (see Exhaust control, industrial). 

Physical access controls (limited access) (all listed implementation features must be present) This area is related to the procedures for limiting physical access to an entity while ensuring that properly authorized access is allowed. Disaster recovery Emergency operating mode Equipment control (into and out of site) Facility security plan Procedures for verifying access authorizations prior to physical access Maintenance records Need-to-know procedures for personnel access Sign-in for visitors and their escorts, if appropriate Testing and revision... 

As with most of a company s information where proprietary, trade secrets, or a facilities security may be involved, process hazard analysis reports may be considered confidential information. Release outside the company should be discussed with the legal staff or by the contractor agreements made with outside personnel participating in the study. A suitable distinction should be applied to the cover of any review produced documents whenever the confidentiality requirement is required. 

Overall, many chemical plants are making great progress on the long, hard road to improved facility security. Proactive companies and members of ACC are ahead of the curve, says Marsh s Salmans, and the industry is shifting its focus from crisis management to critical incident prevention (see Section 6.6). 

International Air Transport Association International Civil Aviation Organization International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code International Maritime Organization International Organization for Standardization International Ship and Port Facility Security Inherently Safer Technology Information Technology... 

IMO (2002), International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, IMO Publication, SOLSA/CONF. 5/34, Dec. 17, London, UK. 

NFPA 99 became a code with the release of the 2012 Edition. The updated version now includes a chapter about categories of risk, new requirements on emergency managanent, a chapter addressing facility security, and information-related technology and communication systans. NFPA 99-2012 also includes updated information on medical gas and vacuum systems. NFPA 99C will no longer exist as a stand-alone document. The content now appears in NFPA 99, Chapters 1 through 5. 

Chemical facility security is rarely treated separately from general security concerns. At both national and institutional levels, there are no plans for security of chemical facilities and storage sites. Vulnerability assessments are rare, and hidden dangers are poorly understood. In the absence of a specialized security strategy, generic security measures are applied to chemical laboratory facilities. 

J. J. KELLER S CONSTRUCTION TOOLBOX TALKS Building Facility Security... 

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