Deepwater Horizon disaster

Just as the events of April 20, 2010, exposed a regulatory regime that had not kept up with the industry it was responsible for overseeing, the events that unfolded in the subsequent weeks and months made it dismayingly clear that neither BP nor the federal government was prepared to deal with a spill of the magnitude and complexity of the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 

The Deepwater Horizon Disaster Insurance Market Impacts, Insurance Information Institute (June 2, 2010). 

The National Commission Report to President Obama that was written in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon disaster provides a useful overview of the creation of the Minerals Management Service (MMS) in 1982, and also of the tensions that existed from its very inception between its two functions the collection of (very substantial) revenue for the United States government, and ensuring that offshore operations were conducted safely. The Commission s report indicates that the move toward risk-based analysis that had occurred in many other nations was opposed both by industry organizations and governmental bodies in the United States in the years leading up to the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe. 

The actions, policies, and procedures of the corporations involved did not provide an effective systems safety approach commensurate with the risks of the Macondo well. The multiple flawed decisions that led to the blowout indicated a lack of a strong safety culture and a deficient overall systems approach to safety. Industrial management involved with the MacoaAo-Deepwater Horizon disaster failed to appreciate or plan for the safety challenges presented by the Macondo well. 

Learning from failures The case of Deepwater Horizon disaster... 

Figure 3. The Deepwater Horizon disaster fault tree analysis.

Flouron, A.C., Three Meta-Lessons Government and Industry Should Learn from the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster and Why They Will Not, 2011 38 (2), Boston College Environmental. Affairs Law Review. 

Emergency Response Management for O hore Oil Spills, by Nicholas P. Cheremisinoff, PhD, and Anton Davletshin, ISBN 9780470927120. The first book to examine the Deepwater Horizon disaster and offer processes for safety and environmental protection. NOW AVAILABLE ... 

In 2010, in response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster, SEMP was made a legal requirement. The new rule, which is described in Chapters 4 and 5, is known as the Safety and Environmental... 

The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Executive Order - National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 22 May 2010, established the Commission with a mandate to analyse the root causes of the Deepwater Horizon oil disaster and to recommend options for future. 

A blowout off the coast of Australia left oil flowing into the Timor Sea for weeks. An out-of-control well in the Gulf of Mexico dislodged a 4000-pound piece of equipment on the deck of the Lorris Bouzigard drilling rig as workers scurried to safety. A gas leak in the North Sea aboard a production platform came within a rogue spark of a Deepwater Horizon-scaZe disaster off the coast of Norway. 

Prior to the Deepwater Horizon/Macondo disaster, the safety of oil and gas facilities on the United States Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) was regulated by the Minerals Management Service (MMS). Following that event, the agency was reorganized and renamed as BOEMRE. This new agency was then quickly divided into two new stand-alone agencies BOEM and BSEE. 

Ultimate safety systems are, by definition, only required in extremis. When they are required, they really must work - that is so obvious it should not have to be said. And yet, at Chernobyl (the reactor shutdown system). Deepwater Horizon (the blow out preventer) and Fukushima (the tsunami barrier), the ultimate safety system in each case was woefully inadequate and unable to prevent disaster when called for. 

In terms of BP as a company and culture the report by the Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG 2011) conclude that this disaster also has eerie similarities to the BP Texas City refinery disaster as outlined in the BP Texas City report (2007). These similarities include ... 

It is clear from the analysis that the Deepwater Horizon operation had many lines of defence (safety barriers) that were breached. This view is supported by research on the Texas City refinery disaster report (Holmstrom et al. 2005) which identified several deficiencies in observability and diagnosability of the condition of safety barriers in the refinery s isomerisation unit. 

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