Chemical weapons destruction Russia

Amy E. Smithson and Maureen Lenihan, The Destruction of Weapons Under the Chemical Weapons Convention , Science and Global Security, 6 (1996), p. 93 Jonathan B. Tucker, Russia s Plan for Chemical Weapons Destruction, Arms Control Today (July-August 2001). 

Russia inherited the world s largest declared stockpile of chemical weapons, over 40,000 metric tons, from the Soviet Union. The Russian government has identified chemical weapons destruction as one of its two priority areas of concern for the G-8 Global Partnership accord against the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Although issues of economics have often dominated what has been said and written about the disposal programme, lack of local community support is also cited as a major political obstacle. Many of the same concerns detailed extensively by US citizens are also asserted by Russian citizens. Foremost is concern about the detrimental effects of chemical weapons destruction on public health and the environment . ... 

On a more cautionary note, opposition from citizens groups could embolden those who seek to limit the effectiveness of the CWC or other international agreements. If there is strong, vocal and well-established opposition at home that is already blaming the CWC, such sentiment could be co-opted as a tool to erode its effectiveness. One can imagine homeland opposition incorporated as part of the litany of motives for decreasing funding for cooperative threat reduction to aid Russia s chemical weapons destruction efforts. 

V. S. Polozov, Approach to the CWD Problem of the Deputy of Area Assembly (of the Deputies) , The Third Pubhc Hearings on Chemical Weapons Destruction, Kurgan region (1997) Anatoly A. Fominykh, Implementation of Russia s Obligations to Destroy Chemical Weapons in Udmurtia Repubhc , in Kolodkin and Ruck, eds. Ecological Risks Associated with the Destruction of Chemical Weapons. 

Seth Brugger, Russia Approves New Chemical Weapons Destruction Plan , Arms Control Today 31 7 (2001), pp. 15-16. 

Vadim Petrov, Safety in the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia , Common Sense (July 1998), p. 9. 

Tucker, Russia s New Plan for Chemical Weapons Destruction , p. 46. 

Petrov, Safety in the Destruction of Chemical Weapons in Russia . 

One of the principal concerns regarding the possible adverse effects of CW agents concerns the fate of the arsenic. Russia indicated its intention of utilizing the arsenic contained in its chemical weapon stockpile for use in the arsenic industry such as for the manufacture of computer chips (the economic viability of this plan has been questioned). Concern has also been expressed that if Russia were able to purify the arsenic sufficiently for sale to other countries, the price of arsenic on the world market would fall sharply. Arsenic resulting from a chemical weapon destruction process may be precipitated and transformed into a more stable compound and placed in a special container for term storage. In at least one country, the... 

Beletskaya I (1998) The Russian-US joint evaluation of the Russian two-stage process for the destruction of nerve agents. In Hart J, Miller C (eds) Chemical weapon destruction in Russia political, legal and technical aspects. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 103-112... 

The usual method for disposing of pesticides in the USSR was walling them into spent quarries and mine shafts. For example, more than 3000 tons of pesticides were walled into unfitted vertical boreholes in the Krasnodar Krai. The complete destruction of pesticides has become a large environmental problem, comparable in scale to the problem of destroying chemical weapons stocks. About 40,000 tons of unused pesticides (banned or too old to be used) had accumulated in the countries of the former Soviet Union, about half of which are located in Russia. 

The majority of inspections conducted so far by the OPCW inspectorate have been associated with verifying the destruction of chemical weapons. There are two major reasons for this situation. The first is that the United States and Russia never concluded the bilateral destruction agreement that had been envisaged during negotiations on the CWC, which would have seen the bulk of the verification of destruction of the US and Russian CW stockpiles being conducted by bilateral inspection teams, with OPCW inspectors providing only complementary verifica-... 

Statement by the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Conference to Review the Functioning of the Chemical Weapons Convention. The 1 per cent destruction represents the target for the first intermediate destruction deadline, which, according to Part IV(A) of the CWC s Verification Annex, should have been met three years after entry into force. Russia was granted an extension to this deadline by the Executive Council in 2000. 

Paul F. Walker, The Demilitarization of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Russia The Case of Chemical Weapons - From Architecture to Implementation , Green Cross Discussion Paper, presented at the Forum for Destruction of Chemical Weapons, Geneva, Switzerland, 26-27 June 2003 ([Pg.149]

Research efforts focused on materials relevant for the destruction of chemical weapons has been limited. An international collaboration between researchers in France, Russia, and the United States demonstrated complete mineralization of the mustard agent simulant in both air and water (Vorontsov et al., 2002). 

One of the more important U.S. Army programs is the destruction of chemical weapons. It is not only necessary from the standpoint of domestic concerns, but will be required under the bilateral agreements with Russia, and with the Chemical Weapons Convention when ratified by 65 countries. 

The Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the first use of chemicals for wartime use. Since 1928, an international treaty has banned the use of chemical weapons but not their development and production. A multilateral treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), would require the destruction of chemical weapons and the means to produce them. The United States signed the convention in 1993 but has not ratified it as of July 1996. Earlier, the United States signed bilateral agreements with Russia aimed at destroying both countries chemical weapon stockpiles. 

There is no accurate accounting of the world s stockpile of chemical weapons. Only the United States, Iraq, and Russia have made stockpile declarations. The United States has approximately 31,000 agent tons of chemical weapons stored in nine locations. Destruction of the weapons began in July 1990 at Johnston Atoll in the Pacific. Under current U.S. plans, destruction facilities will eventually operate at all the storage locations. 

Russia stated in December 1989, and again in October 1993, that it has 40,000 agent metric tons, stored in seven locations. None of the weapons were reported to have been destroyed. In 1986, Russia built a demonstration destruction facility in Chapayevsk. It never opened, however, because of local safety concerns. At this time it is expected that at least 24 countries are suspected of either having, or developing chemical weapons. 

The general public underestimates the hazard of chemical weapons, to a great extent, due to insufficient knowledge of the action of this means of mass destruction. According to the terms and conditions of the Chemical Weapons Convention, states possessing stockpiles of chemical weapons must have them destroyed early in the 21 century. According to the experts estimations, these stockpiles (in terms of the mass of chemical warfare agent) include more than 30,000 tonnes in the USA and 40,000 tonnes in Russia. 

In connection with the realisation of the Program Of Phased CW Destruction In Russia, first it is necessary to qualify the environmental conditions in regions of chemical weapons storage, destruction and former production or, in other words, to carry out comprehensive studies of areas which have been related or are now relevant to chemical weapons, their pollution by chemical warfare agents (WA), their transformation products (TP) and another toxic compounds. 

The CWC reqnires the verified destruction of all chemical weapons. The destruction of such stockpiles must be completed no later than 29 April 2012. However, it is increasingly likely that Russia and the United States will not be able to meet this deadline. In addition, the final destruction of old and/or abandoned chemical weapons will probably take decades since such weapons continue to be uncovered each week (e.g., in Belgium). It should also be noted that chemical weapons dumped at sea before January 1985 or buried before January 1977 and which remain buried are not covered by the declaration and destraction requirements of the CWC. As a result, there is no obligation under the agreement for the parties to recover and to destroy these weapons, although hundreds of thousands of metric tons of chemical weapons have been dumped or buried worldwide. There is periodic support expressed for recovering or otherwise securing dumped chemical weapons. 

After signing the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Russia has faced a number of governmental, economical, social, political, legal and ecological problems. Russian chemical weapon stockpile declared for destruction includes V-gas, sarin, soman, mustard gas, lewisite and mustard gas - lewisite mixtures, all these amount to 40 000 tons of chemical warfare agents. The most part of these chemical weapons (CW) is kept inside of the ready-to-use chemical warheads (Table 1) and stored in several densely populated areas of Russia (Fig.1, Table 2). 

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