Chemical warfare research scientists

From the reports issued by the editorial section many of the chemists came to appreciate other areas of the research in which they were not directly involved, and they were enabled to appreciate the intense research effort that was made on chemical warfare by scientists in the United States. As the accomplishments and methods of their wartime work became known through their personal contacts and published papers, the Research Division became known to an even larger number of scientists as a model of project-research. 

There is no doubt that by the middle of the war the Nazis had acquired vast, hidden armouries of chemical weapons and the Wehrmacht still found millions of marks to pump into the testing and production of poison gas. Indeed, the effort put by the Germans into chemical warfare research was considerable with them employing double the number of scientists than Britain,12 and their twenty factories were capable of producing about 12,000 tons of poison gas a month.13 Indeed, the Allies believed, in a report issued after the war, that the Germans had about 70,000 tons of poison gas stockpiled at various... 

During the course of the war, the role of experimental science moved from the periphery to the centre of the conflict. Although traditionally sceptical towards technical innovation and the involvement of civihans in war, the military establishment felt compelled to exploit civihan scientists for the war effort. Whereas the Royal Society had made Htde progress in persuading the War Office to use civilian expertise, Haldane and Baker s commission set a precedent in establishir the role of British scientists in chemical warfare research. Their war-related work ushered in a period of scientific innovation and reform which saw the employment of chemists and physiologists to conduct research into offensive and defensive aspects of chemical warfare. British scientists, many of them Fellows of the Royal Society (FRS), felt duty-bound and honoured to place their expertise at the service of the realm, and had little, if any, moral objections in developing new weapons of mass destruction. 

Although responsibility for chemical warfare research rested with different departments, British scientists did not follow this division of labour in practice instead, they established informal networks and channels of communication which allowed them to coordinate, as best they could, their work throughout the war, and advance their professional careers thereafter. Appreciating the potential limitations of being integrated into the military and ministerial hierarchy, scientists used some of the newly created departments and expert committees on chemical warfare for the exchange of information and avoidance of duplication, for example at the War Office, the Ministry of Munitions, the Royal Society, and the Medical Research Committee, the predecessor of the Medical Research Council (MRC), founded under Royal Charter in 1920. ... 

The report discusses the importance of chemistry in medicine, the need for cooperative research in this area, the lack of adequate facilities in the United States, the superior situation in other countries, and so on. No specific solution is proposed, however, just a plea for cooperative research (73). The efforts of the Chemical Warfare Service, with which several members of the Committee had been associated, were pointed to as an example of productive cooperative research between physical and biological scientists (as discussed by Daniel Jones in his paper in this volume). What happened to the proposed research institute At... 

Project-research, a method of organizing research by stipulation of projects and allocation of these to individuals or teams of scientists in separate laboratories, was developed in the United States during World War I in research on chemical warfare. This research was initially conducted largely by academic chemists as volunteers and later by them in the Research Division of the Chemical Warfare Service of the U. S. Army. Many of the leading American chemists in the 1920s shared the common experience of research on chemical warfare. The model of project-research was tried by the leaders of the division of chemistry and chemical technology of the National Research Council in order to allocate specific research problems and foster cooperative research after the war. 

Project-research was essential to the plans of the NRC not only to ensure scientific freedom but also for a financial reason. Having no substantial funds to support research itself, the NRC was dependent upon scientists volunteering their efforts. In both respects the model of organization used by the research program on chemical warfare during the war was found to be a very useful one by the leaders of the NRC as they attempted to organize American science in the 1920s. 

For the development of new chemical weapons (CWs), a number of criteria are necessary a research base including scientists and equipment, access to information, chemical and arms industries, and of course financial support. It is noteworthy that the development of CWs is possible not only for states but also for terrorists. It is necessary to stress that the intention of this chapter is not to describe new CWs or chemical warfare agents (CWAs) but to comment on a number of trends in toxicology with the aim that these chemicals may be proposed for inclusion in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) verification mechanisms. However, the text of the CWC is comprehensive and covers practically all chemicals that may be misused as CWs. 

In the summer of 1942, the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) changed completely the nature of our research. In July 1942, a group of imiversity scientists who were working on chemical warfare problems met in Evanston, Illinois this group later became Divisions 9 and 10 of the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC). By that time many potential chemical war gases had been identified, synthesized by chemists, tested on animals for toxicity, and tested with respect to how well gas masks stopped them. The group discussed what else should be done. 

Paul Weiss is a noted scientist, experienced in research and research administration at both the University of Chicago and the Rockefeller Institute. He has often been called to serve in an advisory capacity to government agencies, professional societies, and the Department of State. He is at present a member of the Chemical Warfare and Biological Warfare Panel of the President s Advisory Committee on Science. 

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