Basic risk

This book in not intended to provide in-depth guidance on basic risk assessment principles nor on fire and explosion protection engineering foundations or design practices. Several other excellent books are available on these subjects and some references to these are provided at the end of each chapter. 

The most suitable method for the quantitative evaluation of the positive inotropic effect of a cardioactive steroid is at present the assessment of its influence on the isometric contraction curve, measiured in isolated papillary muscles. However, to obtain reliable data for the comparison of the inotropic potency of the various cardioactive steroids, it is important to perform the experiments under identical conditions [16]. Because of the variety of test conditions used, it is not easy or it is even impossible to compare the data reported in the literature [17,18]. A comprehensive survey of the structure-activity relationships found in guinea-pig left atria under identical conditions has recently been presented by R. Thomas and coworkers [19]. Therefore, this aspect will be mentioned here only with regard to the two basic risks for misinterpretation of pharmacological data from animal model systems. 

The basic risk equation was provided in Chapter 1. It is repeated below as Eq. (15.1). 

An acceptable risk level for structures must be related to the basic risk accepted by all people in a society. Tliis basic risk is that which is beyond th individuals direct control. In modern times it has been the duty of govermeni through various safety controls, to regulate this hazard at an acceptable level fo society as a whole. The choice of an acceptable risk level will be affected by th special importance of structures in society as previously discussed, but must b clearly distinguished from the risk levels that an individual is prepared to tolerat when he is in control of what he is doing (for example mountaineering). 

The risk quantification models discussed in this chapter will take a broader view of supply chain risk and model it as a function of occurrence, impact, detectability, and recovery. Methods to quantify each risk component will be developed. We will begin with the development of a basic risk quantification model as a function of impact and occurrence. Separate mathematical models will then be developed for risk detectability and risk recovery time. All the models will be integrated and illustrated with a case study on risk adjusted multi-criteria supplier selection model at the end of the chapter. 

This immediately shows how high the share will be of those of the population observed, whose annual mean risk due to technology is smaller or greater than the absolute basic risk R g. In the same manner the load due to a single risk source, as for example a concrete technical installation, can be ascertained from comparison of the two annual mean risk-distribution functions—once with, once without the installation concerned—and thereby an admissibility criterion can be obtained. 

At its most basic, risk in fact involves the question of when, where and to what extent unopportunities possibilities (see textbox 1.1) will become reality. If there is uncertainty in these respects, then a further question is whether the threats will become reality at all. During an incident, the point is to combat the actual violation of physical safety. In cases of risk and uncertainty, the point is to weigh up the opportunities and threats. The aim of risk and uncertainty management is to prevent or limit incidents and damage or to anticipate them. When an incident or damage cannot be prevented, the aim is to remedy physical unsafety. 

Basically, risk analysis means analysis of consequences, likelihood, and human factors. Control measure is also a part of risk analysis, but will be dealt separately in Clause 4-4. Also in this clause three different kinds of risk analyses shown in Fig. II/4-2.3-1 will be covered. 

One of the provisions in this section recommends that suppliers of equipment, technologies, processes and materials provide documentation establishing that a risk assessment has been conducted and that an acceptable risk level, as outlined by the procuring organization, has been achieved. Addendum D is an example of a basic Risk Assessment Report that can be used as a guide for that purpose. 

The Dow-Mond Index is a more structured approach than the previous two techniques and takes into account quantities and hazards to arrive at a basic risk classification. This method provides a level of quantification of risk and considers the off-setting factors which exist to control intrinsic hazards. 

The Safety Cue Card is a good place to start. It s a simple and convenient tool you can use to provide basic risk assessment in your day-to-day activities. 

Muhlbauer, W. K. 2004. Pipeline Risk Management Manual, 3rd ed., Oxford, U.K. Gulf Professional Publishing. The new, expanded third edition of this title now includes offshore pipelines and distribntion systems and CTOss-country liquid and gas transmission lines. Divided into three sections, covering risk evaluation at a glance, customizing the basic risk assessment model, and risk management Over 50 examples are included to help illustrate the concepts and models. 

Basic risk measures applicable in evaluating the risk impact of CT changes are (RG 1.174, USNRC, 2011) 1) Conditional risk given the limiting condition of operation, 2) Incremental conditional risk and 3) Yearly CT risk, which can be formulated, adopting the CDF as a baseline risk measure that can be derived by using a Level 1 PRA, respectively as follows ... 

The PRA is used to calculate the CDFj and CDFq basic risk measures, adopting 10" as the truncation limit. By using Equation 2 it is possible to quantify the conditional risk metric, ACDFj. ... 

The basic risk assessment model can be expanded to incorporate additional features that may be of concern in specific situations, as illustrated in Fig. 4.13. Since these features do not necessarily apply to all pipelines, this permits the use of distinct modules that can be activated by an operator to modify the risk analysis. 

The level of trust afforded by each class of operating system is prescribed in a separate NCSC document, the "Yellow Book" [DOD 85b], which is an example of a basic risk assessment method (the security engineer s equivalent of the safety engineer s hazard analysis). Just to take two extreme examples we would find ... 

Risk management concepts have been around and used for many years in high hazard industries. However, many safety programs are still designed around regulatory compHance using post loss criteria and only limited use basic risk management principles. 

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