The Mechanized Flame Thrower

The Mechanized Flame Thrower The Requirement for an Auxiliary Model 

The role played by the U.S. mechanized flame thrower in the war against Germany was of even less consequence than was that of its portable counterpart. American-made flame throwers were not used at all in the Mediterranean theater. After the Sicily Campaign General 

Patton expressed doubt about the tactical value of a mechanized flame thrower. A September 1944 demonstration of two models of the newly developed auxiliary flame thrower for the medium tank elicited no requirement for the weapon. A series of conferences on the mechanized flame thrower led Allied Force Headquarters in December 1944 also to report that no requirement existed for the auxiliary model. One of the major factors in this conclusion was the fact that the Italian terrain was most unfavorable for the use of tanks.  

In the zone of interior the Armored Force Board had never been enthusiastic about any flame-throwing tank that was a special-purpose weapon, that Is, if it had the flame thrower as its main armament, or if it had a distinguishing silhouette. The British Crocodile met the first requirement, but its fuel-carrying trailer certainly made it readily identifiable. In any event, the board urged the Chemical Warfare Service to concentrate its efforts on the auxiliary model, one that main- tained the normal armament of the vehicle, which was then under development. The result was an auxiliary flame thrower which was interchangeable with the bow machine gun of either the light or medium tank. 

On 9 March 1944 General Eisenhower requested that one of these 

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Flame Throwers and Projectors. One advance ia flame throwers siace World War II was a mechanized flame thrower kit for a variety of armored vehicles other than the main battle tank. The multishot, lightweight, shoulder-fired, four-tube flame system capable of firing one to four flame rounds semiautomaticaHy is replacing the portable flame thrower. Indeed the mechanized flame thrower is expected to become obsolete because of the family of large-cahber flame rounds. 

A few logistical difficulties arose during these flame operations in the Marianas. Planners for the invasion had estimated that the daily expenditure of each flame tank would be one load of fuel actually, two loads were required. A shortage of napalm meant that most of the flame fuel was either diesel oil mixed with Bunker C fuel obtained from the vessels, or, at times, straight Bunker C. A postcampaign recommendation called for adequate amounts of thickened fuel for future operations to insure a longer, more effective range for the mechanized flame thrower. ... 

The preinvasion preparations of the three Marine divisions earmarked for Iwo included work with both the portable and the mechanized flame throwers. For the smaller weapon this preparation consisted mostly of integrating the flame throwers with the assault teams. It was 3d Marine Division policy to have in each of its battalions an assault platoon made up of 6 men from each rifle company and 2 men from the battalion headquarters company. These 20 men, specially trained in the use of flame throwers, rocket launchers, and demolitions, were placed under the immediate control of the battalion commander. The commander in turn could attach the whole platoon, or a part of it, to his assault companies as the situation required. Other Marine divisions devised similar platoons. Regiments of the 4th Marine Division organized 3 9-man platoons which were attached to each battalion landing team. Squads from these platoons were then assigned to companies for specific missions. ... 

After-action reports for the Iwo Jima operation attested to the value of the flame weapons. Of the two types, the mechanized flame thrower seemed to have come out on top. One battalion commander called it the "best single weapon of the operation. The V Amphibious Corps report referred to the mechanized weapon as the "only effective means ... 

In the trial of battle the Army and Marine Corps in the Pacific discovered that the value of the flame thrower lay in its ability to reach the enemy in his prepared positions, which were for the most part impervious to conventional weapons. The excessive infantry casualties ordinarily incurred in rooting the Japanese from their defenses were thereby reduced. It appears certain that had the war not come to a sudden close the mechanized flame thrower would have demonstrated its ability to cut these losses to an even greater degree—not to mention the casualties which would be inflicted upon the enemy. 

The CWS in World War II had mixed success with flame throwers, the portable as well as the mechanized. With regard to the mechanized model there was some indecision on the part of the using arm as to the characteristics, indeed as to the very necessity, for such a specialized vehicle. Moreover, in no other field of CWS endeavor was there so little liaison between the users in the field and the developers in the zone of interior. Because of this lack of liaison and because of available facilities and vigorous CWS people in Hawaii, the mechanized flame thrower support in at least one Pacific area came principally from local sources, not from the United States. And this support resulted in the most effective combat employment of the mechanized flame thrower in the war. 

Mechanized or Tank-type Flame Throwers, During WWII a 3td type of flame dirower was developed, the so-called tank-mounted or "mechanized flame thrower, which at first was intermediate in size between the stationary and portable types but later surpassed the W WI stationary types in size. Although tank-mounted throwers were effective at... 

In the Portable Flame Thrower, the original electrical ignition has been replaced by a mechanically actuated safety-type match. The fiie-produdng mixture (Formula 19) is in a tiny metal cup and is actuated by a blunt steel pin coated with phosphorus mixture, which is pushed by a lever action into the cup. 

Other weapons and ammunition furnished by the CWS ETO to the combat forces included the flame thrower, smoke pots, and smoke grenades. The CWS ETO had acquired a sufficient supply of the portable flame throwers, and chemical units had mixed a substantial quantity of thickened fuel. No American tank-mounted flame thrower was available, but fuel had been mixed for use in British models on loan in limited numbers to the United States forces. Soon after the invasion, St. John reported critical shortages of both portable and mechanized flame throwers and of fuels as well as of mortars and mortar parts, but subsequent experience did not warrant the critical designation since flame throwers were not popular in Europe. ... 

For a discussion of the research and development of mechanized flame throwers, see Brophy, Miles, Cochrane, From Ltbortiory to Field. 

The poor results of flame thrower improvisation in the Pacific theaters was no cause for criticism of the responsible chemical officers and tank commanders the portable flame thrower was basically unsuited for tank adaption. If nothing else, these efforts clearly indicated that improvisation was not the answer and underlined the real need for a mechanized flame thrower in the Pacific fighting. 

After the experience at Tarawa, General Richardson, Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in Central Pacific Area, asked the War Department if mechanized flame throwers were available in the zone of interior. Upon receiving a favorable reply, Richardson requisitioned... 

In an auxiliary mechanized flame thrower the flame weapon supplemented the normal armament of the vehicle in a main armament mechanized flame thrower, as the name implies, the flame thrower was the principal armament. 

Mechanized flame throwers experienced the usual difficulties of tank-infantry communications. Close contact between the two was particularly important because of the limited visibility in the mountains where infanrymen often had to guide the tank to its objective. A power telephone on the rear deck of the tank was rigged to the turret, allowing the turret operator to conunvinicate with the infantry but only at the cost of cutting off turret traversing power whenever he spoke. ... 

The 4th and yth Marine Divisions each received four Hawaiian-made main armament mechanized flame throwers. The development and procurement of these flame throwers was undertaken by the... 

All seven of the divisions to see action on Okinawa were combat tested and experienced in portable flame thrower operations. Employment of the portable weapon closely paralleled that of earlier actions. Especially significant was the fighting in the southern portion of the island where enemy positions most closely resembled those which had been found on Iwo Jima. Despite these successes the portable flame thrower was overshadowed on Okinawa by its mechanized counterpart. 

Each of the four Army tank battalions had eighteen periscope flame throwers each Marine tank battalion carried sixteen E4R2-jRi s. Tenth Army Action Rpt, Ryukyus, 26 Mar-30 June 4J, p. 4< 713th Tank Bn Armored Flame Thrower (Provisional) AAR ch. IX, in McKinney, Mechanized Flame Thrower Opns, app. 6, p. 374. 

The American forces did not have mechanized flame throwers when they were first committed to action in France, nor did they have them in any numbers for almost five months after the Normandy landings. This initial lack of experience and training with flame-throwing tanks probably did as much as anything to set the pattern for the insignificant role the weapon was to have in Europe, a role in decided contrast to... 

The only American-made, mechanized flame thrower used by U.S. troops in the European theater was the E4—5, later standardized as the M3-4-3, the auxiliary model which initially had arrived without the transmission fuel tanks. Four of these flame thrower units arrived in the sununer of 1944 action with First Army in September. 

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