Allied Force Headquarters

Chakt 6—Organization of Chemical Warfare Section, Allied Force Headquarters, and Headquarters, North African Theater of Operations, U.S. Army, November 1943... 

Patton expressed doubt about the tactical value of a mechanized flame thrower. A September 1944 demonstration of two models of the newly developed auxiliary flame thrower for the medium tank elicited no requirement for the weapon. A series of conferences on the mechanized flame thrower led Allied Force Headquarters in December 1944 also to report that no requirement existed for the auxiliary model. One of the major factors in this conclusion was the fact that the Italian terrain was most unfavorable for the use of tanks. ... 

The OflSce, Chief of Military History, provided several other groups of studies and histories. The Army Service Forces monographs on logistical problems were of great assistance as was the History of Allied Force Headquarters. The histories and after action reports of a number of organizations and units from army groups to chemical mortar battalions and even service units were extensively xised. In the... 

Supply was a very difficult matter to handle. Since there had been no preplanning for a theater headquarters based in Australia, all supplies obtained in the early period were destined for arriving organizations. There was no theater reserve. American forces supplies and services of all kinds were obtained from the Australians when possible through a necessarily complicated series of procedures which prevented a fatal drain on the Australian economy and which precluded competition among American and Allied forces for available goods and services. Captain Williams had little to work with Copthorne wrote to CX CWS that he could determine neither theater strength nor the availability of supplies in the hands of troops. ... 

Responsibility for CWS operational supply projects rested with Marriott. Since he had very little assistance and since, after the move to Alamo Force at Milne Bay, even his own section was divided, most of the supply policy load fell directly upon his own shoulders. But even this was not difficulty enough in the difficult Pacific area. He lacked the logistic information and means of transportation, and his ability to improvise locally was practically nil, since there was no available civilian source of transportation and no substitute line of communication to Allied forces such as many field chemical officers had. New Guinea had no motor roads, no industry, and only a little unskilled manpower. Air transportation carried very high priority and water transportation was at a premium. Until 15 November 1943, he could deal with the Chemical Officer, Advance Section, USASOS, at Port Moresby. From 15 November until 31 March 1944 he dealt with chemical officers of Advance Section at Lae and Intermediate Section at Port Moresby. But miles of water or air lay between the USASOS sections and his office in Alamo Force headquarters, which was at Milne Bay until October, at Goodenough Island until December, and near Finschhafen until May 1944. ... 

SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces... 

OCCWS which many officers had expected. It became necessary to deal with the Allies, to act within the framework of international policy. Although acting within this framework, most overseas chemical officers, with the notable exception of Shadle, found themselves set apart from the Allied agencies, operating even below the joint Army-Navy-Army Air Forces level, at the level of the Army supply services. Even in Shadle s case, his presence in an Allied headquarters isolated him to some extent from the field agencies and to a greater extent from the War Department. Furthermore, there was the necessary but nevertheless restrictive requirement for OCCWS to deal formally with its overseas branches through ASF and OPD. 

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