Amphibious Corps

Admiral Turner s Joint Expeditionary Force was composed of the Northern Landing Force (V Amphibious Corps) scheduled for Saipan and Tinian, the Southern Landing Force (III Amphibious Corps) earmarked for Guam, and a Reserve Force, consisting of the ayth Infantry Division afloat and the 77th Division in Hawaii. 

The V Amphibious Corps invaded Iwo Jima in February 1945. It was a costly campaign waged against an enemy entrenched in a superlative defensive system. But as one Marine Corps historian has stated ... 

After-action reports for the Iwo Jima operation attested to the value of the flame weapons. Of the two types, the mechanized flame thrower seemed to have come out on top. One battalion commander called it the "best single weapon of the operation. The V Amphibious Corps report referred to the mechanized weapon as the "only effective means ... 

Okinawa was the last battle of the war and one of the hardest. Conducted by Tenth Army on the very doorstep of Japan, it was to involve more CWS equipment than any other Pacific campaign. Each of the four Army divisions of XXIV Corps had 141 portable flame throwers each of the three Marine divisions of III Amphibious Corps had 243, the same number as had been taken to Iwo Jima. The 713 th Tank Battalion, converted to a provisional flame thrower unit for the operation, received a complement of 34 POA main armament flame throwers. ... 

Tank crews developed a fear of the periscope type after the fuel container of one burst and ignited upon being struck by an enemy shell, burning the tank crew to death. This type of auxiliary flame thrower, therefore, was never fully tested in battle. Nor was the bow gun type, with which the III Amphibious Corps was equipped, put to much use, for main armament flame tanks of the 713th Tank Battalion were preferred by Marine as well as Army units. ... 

The Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Units (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)s) have an enhanced internal capability, in terms of NBC threats, to support operations from ships in the littorals. The enhanced capability consists of 19 personnel who are trained in the requisite occupational fields and receive an additional level of expertise that is supervised by CBIRF during workups at the home base. This capability should be exploited for cross-training with the Navy during deployment aboard amphibious ships at sea. 

November 14-16, 2001, in Norfolk, Virginia (plenary session). Site visit to Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, Virginia, U.S. Navy Atlantic Fleet Command, Headquarters, Marine Forces Atlantic, and U.S. Joint Forces Command to discuss operational readiness issues—fleet, bases, ports, Marine Corps warfighting—and joint doctrine training, tactics, and procedure development. 

The Fifth Army plan for its drive on Rome consisted of two parts a 3-corps attack against the Gustav Line followed a few days later by an amphibious maneuver south of Rome and in back of the Gustav Line defenses—the Shingle operation at Anzio. Army planners hop6d that the pressure on the main German position, combined with the threat to his rear, would force the enemy into a general withdrawal. 

Lt Col Whitman S. Bartley, Im Jima Amphibious Epic, Marine Corps Monograph (Washington, 1954), pp. 49, 83-84. 

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