Process safety management future

Incident investigations are a part of process safety management. In investigations, lessons are learned as to how inherently safer technology could have prevented or mitigated the results. How can these learnings be disseminated such that future incidents in similar processes are avoided ... 

The audit team, through its systematic analysis, should document areas that require corrective action as well as where the process safety management system is effective. This provides a record of the audit procedures and findings and serves as a baseline of operation data for future audits. It will assist in determining changes or trends in future audits. 

PSSR (conducted before the modifications are commissioned) is also a part of the MOC procedure. Any new items identified during the PSSR may require further rounds of review and approvals by the reviewers. Completed MOC is an important part of process safety management it needs to be filed in the facility s process safety and project files, and stored for the lifetime of plant operations. These forms are required for future MOC audit and also are useful during future PHA studies. CCPS (1995) and CCPS (2007) presented MOC process and useful check lists. Note that a proper MOC procedure could have avoided the Flixborough incident outlined in Section 3.2 (CCPS, 2007). 

In addition to the evaluation of chemical process hazards, and the proper applications of the evaluation to process design and operation, the management systems are important to assure operation of the facilities as intended. Brief introductions into hazard identification and quantification, and into management controls from the perspective of process safety are presented in Chapter 4. Future trends are also briefly reviewed here. 

One approach is to mesh all investigation and root cause analysis activities under one management system for investigation. Such a system must address all four business drivers (1) process and personnel safety, (2) environmental responsibility, (3) quality, and (4) profitability. This approach works well since techniques used for data collection, causal factor analysis, and root cause analysis can be the same regardless of the type of incident. Many companies realize that root causes of a quality or reliability incident may become the root cause of a safety or process safety incident in the future and vice versa. 

Different metrics may be used to describe past performance, predict future performance, and encourage behavioral change. They are a means to evaluate the overall system performance and to develop a path toward superior process safety performance. This is accomplished by identifying where the current performance falls within a spectrum of excellent-to-poor performance. Such information will allow executives and site management to develop plans to address the specific improvement opportunities that could lead to measurable improvement in process safety. Good process safety metrics reinforce a process safety culture that promotes the belief that process safety incidents are preventable, that improvement is continuous, and that policies and procedures are necessary and will be followed. Continuous improvement is necessary and any improvement program will be based on measurable elements. Therefore, to continuously improve performance, organizations must develop and implement effective process safety metrics. 

Validity relates to whether you are measuring what you want to measure. When we measure the width of a room, the question of validity usually does not arise. When we are measuring a complex process, such as aptitude to perform well in college or the ability of the safety-management system in a plant to prevent future loss, validity becomes a serious question. Scientists (Chronbach and Meeh 1955) generally define three categories of validity content-related, criterion-related, and construct-related validity. 

These indicators typically represent performance of individual components of the barrier system and are comprised of operating discipline and management system performance. Indicators at this level provide an opportunity to identify and correct isolated system weaknesses. Tier 4 indicators are indicative of process safety system weaknesses that may contribute to future Tier 1 or Tier 2 PSEs. Tier 4 indicators can provide opportunities for both learning and systems improvement. Tier 4 indicators are intended for internal organizational use and also for local reporting. 

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