Plant safety programs permits

Suzy remains open to new ideas for safety programs and plans to initiate more as time permits. Each of the above programs is reviewed annually in a different month by other plant managers and members of the safety committee. Suzy always tries to bring in at least one outside person to get fresh insight into what she is doing. 

Other parts of this section discuss the management of change, emergency response plans, permit programs for hazardous operations, incident investigation, the use of safety manuals and incentive programs, and plant safety inspections. 

Regular, systematic inspections coupled with an adequate maintenance program enhance the safety of all operations. However, only trained personnel who are aware of the hazards associated with malfunctions of the equipment should be permitted to work on low-temperature and related systems. Numerous accidents have occurred as a result of repairs made by personnel who are not familiar with hazards associated with the cryogenic fluids and the interactions of these fluids with their surroundings. A safe plant or test facility can be completely destroyed by the replacement of one component incorrectly. 

Safety-related controllers in conjunction with safety or fail safe I/O modules are used for critical and hazardous applications where an incident can result in danger to persons, and/or damage to plant and environment. These safety-related controllers can work with the safety-related distributed I/O system (may be with internal verification for input or output via safety switches as described in Clause 5.0.1—safe PLC approach), or directly with fail-safe transmitters cormected via the fieldbus. These controllers are supposed to detect faults both in the process and their own internal (self-diagnosis) to the system. It is the duty of the same to automatically set the plant to a safe state in the event of a fault. These controllers need to work in multitasking environment — may be in a mix of standard BPCS or safety-related applications, if integrated operation is permitted by the end-user. The programs of BPCS and SIS must be functionally separate, so that faults in BPCS applications have no effect on safety-related applications and vice versa. Special tasks with very short response times can also be implemented [14]. For safety applications controllers and I/O modules need to individually certified by third party and to comply SIL 2/SIL 3 (as the case may be — SIL 4 only for nuclear application) as per lEC 61508. For safety-related applications a few restrictions are followed such as ... 

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