P-Reactor Disassembly Basins

The BIO examines the hazards assodated with K-Reactor in the Cold Standby condition described in the K-Reactor Cold Standby Plan (reference 2). Tlie BIO also examines the D-Reactor and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins to ensure that die storage and handling of irradiated components in those basins and hazardous mat als in their Disassembly Areas are bounded by the analyses performed for the K-Reactor Disassembly Basin. 

The operations of the K-Reactor Purification Area and the K-, L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins have been examined in this BIO to ensure the adequacy of tiie safety envelope, and to develop and promulgate any new requirements ensuing from the Preliminary Hazards Analyses and the Hazards Assessment Documents. The existing K-, L-, and P-Reactor Technical Spedfications were also reviewed. The review revealed the need for new admimstrative controls to preserve the safi ty anatytis assumptions. 

K-Reactor in Cold Standby will continue to store and handle uninradiated fitd and irradiated components and store and process contaminated moderator in the same maimer as previoudy used except for the larger quantity of unirradiated fiiel and contanunated moderator and in some cases contaminated moderator stored in new locations. The L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins... 

At the Savannah River Site (SRS), K-Reactor b in Cold Standby lit which a startup capability is maintained, but no planned provision for restart Cold Standby operations be the continued stor and handling of unirradbted foel and hia ed components and the storage and processlng of contaminated modnator. Also, the L> and P-Reactor Disassembly. Basins will continue to store and handle irradiated conqioiMots. 

The puipose of this Basis for Interim Operadon (BIO) is to establish an interim safety basis for K-Reactor in Cold Standby and to bound the operations of the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins. This BIO demonstrates safety to ty workers throu adherence to saf management programs. In addition to adho ce to sa management program ti BIO demonstrates safety to co-located workers and the public by identitication of the safety envelope and presentation of the results of qualitative and senii-quantitmive safety analyses (Ref 1 1). The BIO serves as the basis fbr the continued use ofK-Reactor in Cold Standby ti>r tiie puipose of tiie... 

The mission of the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins will continue to be the storage and handling of irradiated components prior to shipment to the Separations fiidlities or to the burial grounds. 

Because the location and operations perfonned at K-Reactor in Cold Standby and L- and P> Reactor Disassembly Basins vdll lemain the same as previously petfonned during routine reactor operations, the cuirent site and reactor order compliance statfis is applicable to the continued use of K-Reactor to store and handle unirradiated fUd and irradiated compcments and to store and process contaminated moderator and the continued use of L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins to store and handle inadiated components. 

The op compliance sdiedule approvals (CSAs) and DOB Order noncompliances fi)r K-Reactor and L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins involve 29 Orders. Of these, 17 were found to be relevant to K-Reactor in Cold Stamlby most were programmatic in nature. There were 13 open CSAs and 4 exemption requests found to be relevant to the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins. 

The P-Reactor Disassembly Basin stores 456 inadiated fiid assemblies (53 Mark 16B, 396 K rk 22, and 2 Mark 42 fuel assonblies) and 542 inadiated targets, neutron sources, and other reactor components (Ref 2-8). 

Though K-Reactor is m Cold Standby and the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins are in Cold Shutdown/Standby, chenucals will continue to be used in these Bv comparison of the emsting inventories of chemicals and the allowable quantities of chemicals agamst hazardous chemical screening criteria, the only hazardous chemicals of concern which were Identified are nitric acid for the K-, L-, and P-Reactor Disassembty Areas and sodium hydroxide in solid form for the P-Reactor Disass nbly Area. 

The Reactor Division Disassembfy Ba Managemem Plan (Ref. 2-13) addresses the vulnerabilities associated vnth fiiel and target material in the K-, L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins. This plan provides fisr resolution of issues that were raised by Secretary O Leary s vulnerability assessment of DOE reactor irradiated material sto e fidlhies (Ref 2-1%. Immediate, int mediate, and long-term plans and assumptions are inchided (Ref 2-13). 

The systems for the storage and disassembly of fiid and target assembfies and procesdng of other irradiated components in the L>, and P-Reactor Disassendily Badns will be the same as currently used. The chemistry of the water in the K-, L> and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins will be improved in accordance tiie Disassembly Batin Management Plan ef 3-4). 

Revisions to the and P-ILeact( Technical Specifications will continue to be made to keep the Technical Specifications current so that they reflect L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins as they e st and as tfa are anafyzed in this BIO. The L- and P-Reactor Techmcal Specifications will be revised to incoiporate tiie requirements of Section 7.2 that are related to the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins once this BIO is approved by DOE. Modifications to the L- and P-Reactor Disassembfy Basins, des changes, and changes to the L- and P-Reactor Technical SpedficatuHia shall be sutgected the USQ process pursuant to RDP 12.03 of WSRC Manual RD-1 (Ref 4-19). 

The plan covers activities during and after the interim phases required to achieve an orderly transition of P-Reactor to Standby. The plan summarizes activities required to align and maintain the structures, systems, and components of the P-Reactor Disassembly Basin until frssile and hazardous materials have been removed. Also, the plan describes the minimum staffing requirements for operaUng and support personnel. 

Irradiated fUd and target assemblies and other irradiated components in the K-, L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins... 

Long-Term Action - The preparation of additional CSAs and exemption requests for later conditions 0.e., for conations in which fed and targets, moderator, and contamination are removed or moved within K-Reactor or irradiated components are removed or moved within the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins) based upon the knowledge gained from the prior steps following the standby/shutdown plans... 

To determine the current DOE Order noncompliances which are relevant to K>Reactor in Cold Standby and L> and P>Reactor Disassembly Basins, noncompliances for the SRS production reactors were examined. The relevant noncompliances concerned primarily either programmatic or generic issues. Altogether the open CSAs ai DOE Order noncompliances for the production reactors numbered 29. Of these, 17 were found to be rdevant to K-Reactor in Cold Standby. 

As noted in Section 5.1, noncompliances with DOE Orders associated with K>Reactor in Cold Standby and L and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins are either of a generic or programmatic nature. Tables 5,1 1 and 5.1>2 contain the compensatory measures and schedules for each of these... 

The fissile mateiiab stored in the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin are included in Marie 16B and Mark 31A fiiel and target assemblies, calibration sources, and thorium slugs. The fissile materials stored in the P-Reactor Disassembly Basin are included in Marie 42, Mark 16B, and Mark 22 fuel assembUes a Pu-Be source and Ai 243 slugs. 

In order to prevent a credible criticality event involving the handling of fuel assen lies in the K-, L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins during normal operations, the Technical Specifications (Ref. 6-3, 6, 6-5), Limiting Conditions for Operations 3.9.3, impose restrictions for handling and storing fiiel.as5 nblies in the Disassembly Basins. 

SRS complies with the appKcable requirements for control of personnel exposure to hazardous materials. There are no hazardous chemicals/materials us stored, or allowed in K-Reactor in Cold Standby and L- and P Reactor Disassembly Basins which could adversely affect the health and safety of the public or pose a reasonable risk to worker except those permitted by the chemical control program. 

The existing work management system and work control procedim DMP 3.01 in WSRC Procedure Manual RD 3.1 (Ref. 6-30) is used to control corrective and preventive maintenance activities in K-Reactor in Cold Standby and in the L- and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins. 

Because K Reactor in Cold Standby and the L and P Reactor Disassembly Basins are continuing... 

FUEL IffiTENTION TIME ANALYSIS, CHEMISTRY CONTROL, AND WATER QUALmrPLANS FOR K-, L-, AND P-REACTOR DISASSEMBLY BASINS... 

The conductivity of the K-, L-, and P-Reactor Disassembly Basins has been near 200 pmho/cm in the last few years and is currentty about 135 pmho/cm. Chloride contents range from 6 to 20 ppm. Sludge and d iis in the bottom of the Disassembly Basins is primarily iron and aluminum oxides and acts to concentrate the corrosion causing impurities to increase by a foctor of about 10 times (Ref. 6-70,6-71). 

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