Organizational structure, system safety

A safety management system for implementing the prevention policy has been put into effect. The policy should include the organizational structure, responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes, and resources for determining and implementing the policy. 

Additional system safety requirements and constraints, including those on operations and maintenance or upgrades will be used in the design of the safety control structure at the organizational and social system levels above the physical system. There is no one correct safety control structure what is practical and effective will depend greatly on cultural and other factors. Some general principles that apply to all safety control structures are described in chapter 13. These principles need to be combined with specific system safety requirements and constraints for the particular system involved to design the control structure. 

In analyzing an existing organizational or social safety control structure, one of the first steps is to determine where the responsibility for implementing each requirement rests and to perform a gap analysis to identify holes in the current design, that is, requirements that are not being implemented (enforced) anywhere. Then the safety control structure needs to be evaluated to determine whether it is potentially effective in enforcing the system safety requirements and constraints. 

Once the mapping is complete, a gap analysis can be performed to ensure that each system safety requirement and constraint is embedded in the organizational design and to find holes or weaknesses in the design. In this analysis, concerns surfaced, particularly about requirements not reflected in the defined ITA organizational structure. 

This chapter describes the implications of STAMP on operations. Some topics that are relevant here are left to the next chapter on management organizational design, safety culture and leadership, assignment of appropriate responsibilities throughout the safety control structure, the safety information system, and corporate safety policies. These topics span both development and operations and many of the same principles apply to each, so they have been put into a separate chapter. A final section of this chapter considers the application of STAMP and systems thinking principles to occupational safety. 

The organizational structure associated with safety instrumented systems within a Company/Site/Plant/Project should be defined and the roles and responsibilities of each element clearly understood and communicated. Within the structure, individual roles, including their description and purpose should be identified. For each role, unambiguous accountabilities should be identified and specific responsibilities should be recognised. In addition, whom the individual reports to and who makes the appointment should be identified. The intent is to ensure that everyone in an organization understands their role and responsibilities for safety instrumented systems. 

The safety organizational structures and protocol vary widely with the NASA community. At headquarters level, the System Safety Branch is part of the Safety Division. The Safety Division manager reports to the Associate Administrator for Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance. 

An examination, observation, measurement, or test undertaken to assess structures, systems, and components and materials, as well as operational activities, technical processes, organizational processes, procedures, and personnel competence. See also Safety Inspection. 

Ensure that system safety managers are appropriately placed within the organizational structure to ensure that they will have the authority and organization flexibility needed to perform elfectively. 

Organizational interfaces may pose other problems. When management does not take responsibility for decision making in the process, functional and system safety groups may be at odds with each other. Management perception is another difficulty. System-safety concepts are more abstract than those in many other disciplines. Therefore, it is important for the safety professional to structure the program so its impact is clear. 

Often we see organizational structures that have various safety committees that approve plans and procedures for fissile material operations prior to startup. This approval system in our estimation does not preclude the operator or supervisor ultimately being responsible for his safety. In other words, where is the buck going to stop in case of an accident it stops with line supervision and his employees. In all probability, those safety committees will be treated as consulting Or advisory groups in such situations. 

The Scope section (1.1) states that the standard defines the minimum requirements [emphasis added] for occupational health and safety management systems (OHSMS). The emphasis in the advisory data is on a generic and systems approach for continual improvement in safety and health management, and the avoidance of specifications. Further, the writers of the standard recognized the uniqueness of the culture and organizational structures of individual organizations and the need for each entity to define its own specific measures of performance. ... 

As a conclusion, the maintenance-related risk assessment and management has to be holistic, so that factors relating to technology, human and organizational viewpoints are considered. The risk assessment and management procedures must also take into account the system s condition, surrounding activities and structures, as well as fault manifestation in practice. Depending on the scope, the analyses may also need to pay attention to post-maintenance system safety. 

In this chapter we will consider the internal systems BR put in place in compliance with the legislation and will assess how these regulatory systems operated. The research tried to discern how much employees knew about the company s own systems, rules, and procedures for health and safety. Attention was paid to staff knowledge and perceptions of BR s written policies and to the company s systems for promoting the health and safety of the workforce. In particular it focused on the checks that existed for ensuring that the policies were implemented and on the organizational structures in place for the promotion, enforcement, and review of the health and safety of the workforce. 

Clear safety policy including measurements and systems Clear organizational structure with clear safety responsibilities Appropriate techniques and measures in place for conformance to the standard Identification of non conformance issues and corrective actions are under taken. 

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