Rail network

The first UK highway FRP bridge deck to span over a railway being lowered on to the abutments at Standen Hey, near Clitheroe, Lancashire. Image courtesy of Network Rail. Acknowledgements to TPG and Partners (the designers) and to Birse Rail Ltd (the contractors). 

Figure 17.1 illustrates a typical Network Rail-owned cast iron beam/ brick jack arch carrying a public road over the railway in Irlam, Greater Manchester the supports to hold the FRP composites in position whilst the adhesive cures are clearly shown these were removed after about one week... 

Illustrates the upgrading of Network Rail Cl brick arch bridge (New Moss Road Bridge, on the CLC Liverpool to Manchester railway. Greater Manchester). Image courtesy of Network Rail. 

Expert judgement from in-house expertise within RSSB and Network Rail. 

Starting salaries are typically 24k- 25k for new graduates entering train operating companies or Network Rail. The range is wider in design and manufacturing companies, typically 22k- 27k. 

Some work experience in the sector can be useful, but is by no means essential. Some train operating companies and manufactirrets offer work placements and surmner internships, the latter ustrally open to those in their penultimate year at university. For companies that don t offer formal work experience, a speculative approach can be worthwhile. Railway Technology website hosts a comprehensive online directory of companies in the industry, and a list of train operating companies and freight operating companies is available on the Network Rail website. 

Finally, the third principle of safety risk assessment is the necessity of extensive use of Domain Specific Expertise. The systematic risk based approach to any undertaking has been developed within Railtrack PLC (now Network Rail) and has become a nationwide Engineering Safety Management guidance adopted by LUL and the whole of UK railways. The following are the key risk assessment principles (RSSB, 2007) ... 

The widespread introduction on the UK Railways, of axle counters for train detection, where track circuits would otherwise have been used, is a strategic decision made by the Network Rail (UK Railways custodian). 

The Axle Counter Concept Safety Case (ATKINS, 2002) was developed to demonstrate that axle counter systems can be implemented safely on Network Rail controlled infrastructure where track circuits would otherwise have been used. 

Thus, individual Project and Application Safety Cases demonstrate that they have met the safety targets, the integrity requirements and the generic safety requirements provided within the Concept Safety Case, and that they have mitigated the specific project and apphcation hazards. The Project Safety Case thus demonstrates that axle counters can be used safely as the sole train detection system where track circuits would otherwise have been used on Network Rail controlled infrastructure for that specific apphcation but with the bounds dictated by the Concept Safety Case (ATKINS, 2002). 

A secord set of tests concentrated on Parametric Functions. The aim of these tests was to ensure the mathematical correctness of the Parametric Functions, and to eliminate logic errors in their definition. The data for these tests was supphed by Network Rail. This data was a coarse estimate of possible parameter and expected values for some model elements (Base Event, Barriers, Critical Events and Consequences). 

The Stage A work was a Technology Demonstrator for the application of the novel Italian signalling system, never before used on the Network Rail infrastmcture. This stage was commissioned in April 2003 ... 

In the case of standard hazards or hazards originating from either the conventional systems already in use or standard proeedures already applied on the railways, the elosure of these hazards is jnstrfied throngh the application of well-established good practice, inclnding Railway Gronp Standards and Network Rail Company Standards. These hazards were not further assessed. 

A recommendation to Network Rail to collect performance metrics was made. 

The author would like to thank South West Trains and Network Rail for their support of this work and for supplying infrastructure data and expertise to enable the models to be developed, and also the UK Department for Transport and their funding of project T972 Piloting a geo-referenced safety risk model for the rail network in Great Britain , which forms the basis for the work presented in this paper. 

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