Human error, accidents associated with

No discussion of aew error is complete without considering the hazard Loss of Situational Awareness , which studies have shown to be a leading causal factor in a review of 175 military aviation nfishaps (Hartel et al., 1991) and a major causal factor in 88% of accidents associated with human error in a review of major aircraft accidents between 1989 and 1992 (Endsley, 2001). 

This gateman has associated zero with practice, and in doing so has positioned zero firmly within his own site reality in which people are the cause of unsafety, and the reason zero cannot be achieved. But this is not blame as prescribed in the simplistic causal thinking of human error and accidents, rather more systemic causes are naturally identified, long hours and fatigue, creating a close relationship between zero-people-work. For this worker, zero in its tangible form is simply unachievable the current reality will dominate and injuries can never be eliminated. 

A formal hazard analysis of the anticipated operations was conducted using Preliminary Hazard Assessment (PHA) and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) techniques to evaluate potential hazards associated with processing operations, waste handling and storage, quality control activities, and maintenance. This process included the identification of various features to control or mitigate the identified hazards. Based on the hazard analysis, a more limited set of accident scenarios was selected for quantitative evaiuation, which bound the risks to the public. These scenarios included radioactive material spills and fires and considered the effects of equipment failure, human error, and the potential effects of natural phenomena and other external events. The hazard analysis process led to the selection of eight design basis accidents (DBA s), which are summarized in Table E.4-1. 

According to the major incident/accident reports of nuclear power plants in Korea, the contribution of human errors takes up about 22% of the total events (KINS). The previous study presents that most of the human-related unplanned reactor trip events during the normal power operation are associated with the test and maintenance activities (63%), which are comprised of the plant maintenance activities such as a periodic preventive maintenance , a plannedmaintenance and a corrective maintenance (Kim Park 2008). This means that the test and maintenance activities should be a major subject that needs to be focused on. The hiunan errors intervened during a periodic preventive maintenance and a corrective maintenance mostly lead directly to a trip event, while the hmnan errors during a planned maintenance , which are performed during the period of a plant overhaul, are mostly dormant imtil a triggering event occurs. 

On the basis of Nagel s (1988) information processing stages, 71 per cent of the 284 accidents studied were considered to involve human error, whereby 22 per cent were eoded as information errors, 35 per cent as decision errors, and 43 per cent as action errors (O Hare et al., 1994). However, a different picture emerged when the mishaps were divided according to accident severity. Of the 34 accidents in which there was a fatality or serious injury, 62.5 per cent were attributable to decision errors, while only 25 per eent involved the action stage (O Hare et al., 1994). Of the 169 cases involving minor/non-injury occurrences, only 30.5 per cent were the result of decision errors, while 45.6 per eent were attributed to action errors. These results closely mirror those reported by Jensen and Benel (1977) in their examination of NTSB reeords between 1970 and 1974 in whieh the majority of non-fatal incidents appeared to involve perceptual-motor factors, whereas most fatal accidents were associated with decision-related factors (Jensen and Benel, 1977). 

The following symbols are associated with the model i = fth state of the transit system, where x = 0 (transit system operating normally), x = 1 (transit system failed safely due to hardware failures), X = 2 (transit system failed safely due to human errors), x = 3 (transit system failed with accident due to hardware failures), x = 4 (transit system failed with accident due to human errors), x = 5 (transit system in repair workshop)... 

It is widely known that 70 % of accidents have a human cause related to operator errors. Equally, if one adds to this the contribution of designers and managers to what are called technical errors (breakdowns) or organisational errors (management decisions, social climate), 100 % of accidents actually have direct or indirect causes associated with human factors. 

The ecological safety model a cognitive investment that is adequate for the aims being pursued. An understanding of the human brain shows that it works in an extremely reliable and sophisticated way, quite the opposite of the message of inadequacy and unreliability which is generally associated with human behaviour. This is due to a misunderstanding and is the result of studies that are too focused on numerous errors (which are poorly understood) and rare accidents (which are subjected to an excessive amount of study). 

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