Formal Safety Assessments risk associated

IMO (International Maritime Organisation) (2004) Formal Safety Assessment Risk Evaluation. Report submitted by the International Association of Classification Societies (lACS), Maritime Safety Committee, 78th session. Agenda item 19, MSC 78/19/. 

Formal Safety Assessments (FSAs) are built around the concept of acceptable risk. For example, the decision as to whether a firewall should be installed between two sections of the platform will depend on the associated risk, i.e., the nature of the hazard (spreading fire, the consequence of the fire, and the... 

Formal safety assessments (as discussed in the next chapter) wiU analyze MAEs to assess the level of risk associated with them and to take corrective actions as necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 

More test case studies also need to be carried out to evaluate and modify formal ship safety assessment and associated techniques and to provide more detailed guidelines for the employment of them. This would enable validation of them and can also direct the further development of flexible risk modelling and decision making techniques and facilitate the technology transfer to industries. 

The Occupational Health and Safety Advisory Services (OHSAS, 2007) standard BS/OHSAS 18001 provides assessment specification for occupational health and safety management systems. The standard can be adopted by any organization wishing to implement a formal procedure to reduce the risks associated with health and safety in the working environment for employees, customers, and the general public. BS/OHSAS 18001 addresses the following areas ... 

Software safety analysis is another area where further study is required. In recent years, advances in computer technology have been increasingly used to fulfil control tasks to reduce human error and to provide operators with a better working environment in ships. This has resulted in the development of more and more software intensive systems. However, the utilisation of software in control system has introduced new failure modes and created problems in the development of safety-critical systems. The DCR-1996 has dealt with this issue in the UK offshore industry. In formal ship safety assessment, every safety-eritical system also needs to be investigated to make sure that it is impossible or extremely unlikely that its behaviour will lead to a catastrophic failure of the system and also to provide evidence for both the developers and the assessment authorities that the risk associated with the software is acceptable within the overall system risks (Wang (1997)). 

Safety committees or teams can be a valnable asset and serve as an edncational resonrce. All stndents should have access to information (MSDSs, books, etc.), know about the hazards of the substances they handle, and be prepared to respond in emergencies. For students conducting research, thorough risk assessments must be carried out to evaluate potential hazards associated with planned experiments. In the event of an accident, formal review of the incident and appropriate follow-up actions must occur. A safe environment must be provided in all classrooms and laboratories. 

In addition to the hazardous conditions that develop during daily operations and are incorporated in the closed-loop hazard tracking system, the customer may require the contractor to perform a formal periodic risk assessment (usually annually, but it can be more frequent if the customer so desires or if operational activities dictate) of all facilities in which operations will occur. The risk assessment will also take into consideration the hazards associated with the permanent equipment and hardware assigned for use in the facility. The accident risk assessment then becomes a detailed safety analysis of a facility, including its systems and functions. 

One of the key findings of the initial review after the accident was that there was no formal, methodical safety risk assessment process. So the company set out to develop one. They decided that it needed to be a uniform and consistent methodology that could be used worldwide, across all product lines. Though product lines vary greatly, how their safety risks should be assessed needed to be very methodical and repeatable. Also, it was important that safety hazards and their associated risks must be communicated to the corporate level in a uniform and consistent manner so that risks could be compared across all operations. 

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