Failure reporting, analysis, and corrective

Failure Reporting Analysis and Corrective Action System... 

European Train Control System Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System Failure Review Board In Service Reliability Demonstration Test Line Replaceable Unit Maintainability Demonstration Test (MBDT is used instead of MDT, which is reserved for Mean Down Time ) Mean operating Time Between Failures Lower one-sided confidence limit on true MTBF... 

MIL-STD-2155, Failure Reporting, Analysis, and Corrective Action (FRACAS), Department of Defense, Washington, DC. 

FAILURE REPORTING, ANALYSIS, AND CORRECTIVE ACTION SYSTEM (FRACAS)... 

Defect/failure reporting analysis and corrective action system (DRACAS/FRACAS)... 

The main objective of the In-Plant Reliability Data System (IPRDS) was to develop a comprehensive and component-specific data base for PRA and other component reliability-related statistical analysis. Data base personnel visited selected plants and copied all the plant maintenance wor)c requests. They also gathered plant equipment lists and plant drawings and in some cases interviewed plant personnel for Information on component populations and duty cycles. Subsequently, the maintenance records were screened to separate out the cases of corrective maintenance applying to particular components these were reviewed to determine such things as failure modes, severity, and, if possible, failure cause. The data from these reports were encoded into a computerized data base. 

Summarize the quality data of batches delivered during the last 3 years and prepare trend analysis. Report deviations with regard to normal failure levels, out-of-specification situations, and corrective actions. The quality control and quality assurance managers shall review the trend. 

Estimates of batch release concentrations are performed without decay correction since the exact time of the release is not known at the time of the measurement, the release Is in the near future (usually less than six hours from analysis) and failure to incorporate a decay correction maximizes the reported activity for any isotope. Samples are analyzed for a length of time (usually 5,000 seconds) which will ensure the LLD requirements are achieved for each individual sample. This concept must be Incorporated since the YNPS RETS require notification of the NRC, on a yearly basis, of all samples for which the LLD has not been achieved. This concept is tantamount to establishing the last spectral evaluation of the sanple in question as the latest a-priori LLD estimate for the sample under investigation (i.e. the analysis incorporates all of the interferences specific to that sample at that time) (2). 

Detailed information on previous/similar designs from various sources, including failure reporting and analysis corrective action system data. 

Such errors include mis-reading certificate or report data supplied by the producers, using secondary information from catalogs and/or literature listings, and reporting incorrect data. For the correct use of a RM/CRM, it is essential to read the information that accompanies the product once an appropriate RM/CRM has been obtained. The only reliable source of information is the Certificate of Analysis or Report of Assigned Values issued with the RM/CRM, and it must be the most up to date version available. Failure to follow a producer s recommendation will invariably result in error. 

Just prior to the incident the pipe-laying operation had been stopped. Operators reported a system failure and that the hydraulic power had been lost. Such an occurrence was not particularly unusual and, in line with company procedures, this was investigated immediately. A team of technicians led by the chief electrician tried without success to resolve the problems. After these attempts, a more in-depth analysis was made. It was decided, on the basis of input from the system diagnostics, to perform a memory reset. Following this the system appeared to be running correctly. This was the first time that a full memory reset was requested by the internal diagnostics of the control system during a project operational phase. 

Although studies have been published on safety analysis approaches, controlled experiments are rarely reported. St lhane and colleagues published a set of controlled experiments with students comparing different approaches in the area of security and safety with respect to the subjects performance, i.e., the number of identified hazards. They compared misuse cases (MUC) with FMEA [10], MUC with textual use cases (TUC) [11], and system sequence diagrams (SSD) with TUC [12]. Like FT, FMEA can be used for failure propagation analyses, but it is used here for hazard identification. Learning from those experiments, the assessment of participants perception is an appropriate complement to objective metrics such as number of correct solutions. 

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