Decision making, protecting from

Limited possibilities of using automation or guarding to block certain actions in certain circumstances, or to take actions over. Examples are interlocks on machines which prevent access when the machine is under power or in motion, or automatic train protection systems which apply the brakes if a frain passes a red signal. The latter example is one which leaves the human in the loop to take the decision, but intervenes in clear emergency situations to cope with human failures. We can contrast this with automatic shutdown systems, which take the decision-making away from fhe person and fake fhem out of the loop. The person then has to intervene if fhe automatic system fails, an almost impossible task if fhis occurs very infrequently (e.g. once every few years) . 

From a regulatory point of view, the provisions of Article 68 (2) are a very useful instrument for the implementation of restriction measures because they enable relatively fast decision making for the health protection of consumers. They also emphasize that substances which are known or presumed human reproductive toxicants should be kept away from the general population as effectively as possible. 

To protect the public from the harmful effects of toxic chemicals and to find ways to treat people who have been harmed, scientists use many tests. One way to see if a chemical will hurt people is to learn how the chemical is absorbed, used, and released by the body for some chemicals, animal testing may be necessary. Animal testing may also be used to identify health effects such as cancer or birth defects. Without laboratory animals, scientists would lose a basic method to get information needed to make wise decisions to protect public health. Scientists have the responsibility to treat research animals with care and compassion. Laws today protect the welfare of research animals, and scientists must comply with strict animal care guidelines. 

The research further concludes that chemical uses should be subject to a permitting mechanism at Member State rather than EU level when a political response to control occupational exposure in industrial settings is necessary at a national level. This follows the evidence from the interviews that indicate that serious political pressure at national levels may arise if certain chemicals are not included in an authorisation process (Section 5.3 - Box 5.1). Making these uses subject to Member State permitting-based schemes therefore enables national authorities to set the appropriate level of occupational health protection. While implementing measures relating to Article 138 of the EC Treaty is outside the immediate scope of REACH, it will ultimately affect decision-making. 

The Standards draw upon information derived from extensive research and development work by scientific and engineering organisations, at national and international levels, on the health effects of radiation and techniques for the safe design and operation of radiation sources and upon experience in many countries in the use of radiation and nuclear techniques. The United Nations Scientific Committee of the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), a body set up by the United Nations in 1955, compiles, assesses and disseminates information on the health effects of radiation and on levels of radiation exposure due to different sources this information was taken into account in developing the Standards. Purely scientific considerations, however, are only part of the basis for decisions on protection and safety, and the Standards implicitly encourage decision-makers to make value judgements about the relative importance of risks of different kinds and about the balancing of risks and benefits. 

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